EXHIBIT 24

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(Proceedings commenced at 10:06 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. This is Judge Silverstein. We're here in the Boy Scouts of America bankruptcy case, case number 20-50527. Ginger, please remind everyone of the protocol for the hearing. Ginger, I'm not hearing you.

THE CLERK: It's extremely important that you put your phones on mute when you are not speaking. Once speaking, please do not have your phones on speaker, as it creates feedback and background noise, and it makes it very difficult to hear you clearly.

Also, it's very important that you state your name each and every time you speak for an accurate record. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Abbott.

MR. ABBOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. Derek Abbott of Morris, Nickels, Arsht & Tunnell here on behalf of the Debtors. Thank you, Your Honor, for making time. I know your schedule is quite tight these days. It's been a little while since we've been before the Court, so we thought it might make sense for me to ask Ms. Boelter to give you just a very sort of quick update on things about the case going on, and then get to the agenda if we may, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Boelter.

MS. BOELTER: Thank you, Your Honor. Jessica

Boelter. Again, we understand that there is a very full agenda for this morning, so I will be brief. We only have two items that wanted to update the Court on.

The first of those is that the core members of the Debtors legal team have switched law firms. You may have noticed that from our pleadings. Myself, Mr. Andolina, and Mr. Lindor have moved from Sidley, Austin to White & Case.

BSA has signed an engagement letter with White & Case. They've also directed Sidley, Austin to transfer files from Sidley to White & Case. And we, Your Honor, are very mindful of the 30-day nunc program tunc rules in Delaware. We will be filing our retention application in very short order but wanted to give the Court a heads up with respect to that transition.

The second item, Your Honor, is just a follow up on the advertising motion that the Debtors filed previously and was the subject of two Court hearings. In the past several weeks, the Debtors have been inundated with complaints related to unsolicited robo calling and unsolicited what I'll call robo texting, if that is, in fact, a term. Some of these robo calls and robo texts run afoul of the Court's advertising order, in other words, they contain phrases that the Court ruled should not be permissible in advertising.

They also -- it's the Debtors concern that they

also may run afoul of the legal ethics rules in the various jurisdictions where the text messages and calls are being made. The Debtors are investigating the source of the text messages and calls We've already take it upon ourselves to contact various parties and alert them of the Court's prior order in this regard. But just to give the Court a preview, we may be before you in very short order to the extent was have difficulty enforcing the Court's order.

With that, Your Honor, that's the totality of my update for today. I'm going to hand it back over to Mr.

Abbott unless the Court has any questions for me.

THE COURT: I do not.

MS. BOELTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, this is Tancred Schiavoni for Century, if I may be heard briefly on this retention issue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHIAVONI: So, Your Honor, if you recall when in the course of the retention hearing for Sidley, Austin, the Debtor was asked to put in submissions that were relied upon by the Court in exercising what the Court characterized as discretion to allow Sidley, Austin to continue, and the element of the Court's decision was the submissions by Sidley and it's consultants that Sidley's retention was critical in the declarations they submitted and in their briefs, they

said that the change involving Sidley would be "catastrophic" to the Debtor. This change that has now occurred has happened at critical point in the case when a whole series of decisions are being made between now and November 16th including these motions that are before the Court. We don't think. I know what the rule says about 30 days, but we don't think the case can wait 30 days for the 2016 disclosures on conflicts. It should come in pronto. They've known about this change has apparently been in the works for some time because an extension was sought of the appeal of the retention application. We've known about it.

The impact of it on the case is, it's the prior representations of Sidley Austin are correct, are significant. So, we just ask that the 2016 disclosures be made within a week. There's no reason to wait, you know, for the full 30 days for those disclosures to be put in.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I'll deal with issues related to retention when the retention is in front of me, and White & Case, I was thinking of the firm, White & Case takes the risk, as do all Counsel who come in, that their retention may not be approved, and they may not get paid for the work that gets done in this interim period. But I'll deal with the retention issues when they're in front of me.

MS. BOELTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Abbott.

MR. ABBOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. Derek Abbott.

We get back to the agenda, Your Honor, I would like if the

Court would entertain it to go a little bit out of order just

out of professional courtesy. We've got a large number of

folks on the phone or on Zoom that are here for Docket Item

No. 9 and probably only Docket Item No. 9. That's the

motion of the TCC for authority under rule 2004 to issue

subpoenas to the Debtors and local counsels and if the Court

would entertain it, I'd to start with that and turn it over

to, I don't know if it's Mr. Morris would likely to handle or

one of his colleagues.

THE COURT: That's fine. You can start with that.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, this is John Morris from

Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl, & Jones. Can you hear me?

THE COURT: I can. Let me remind people other

than Mr. Morris, please mute your phones. I'm getting a

little feedback.

MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor, John Morris for the Tort Claimant's Committee. I'm pleased to report, Your Honor, that the 2004 motion has been conditionally resolved. I'd like to provide just a brief background as to what led to the filing of the motion, as well as the description of the terms of the stipulation that the Parties entered into.

Immediately after the TCC was formed, we began the

process of seeking informal discovery from the Debtors. We sought documents not just from the Debtors, but on behalf of the local Counsels. The document sought included everything that's the subject of the 2004 motion itself, and the request for -- were first made at the end of March. Over time, I'm happy to report that the Debtors, I believe, acted in good faith and continue to act in good faith. And it made available a large swap of documents for our review.

And the TCC has been working very hard over the last months to prepare itself for the mediation, and to otherwise educate itself as the financial condition, the assists that are available, and other matters related to this bankruptcy.

In the Spring, in the late spring, early summer, we reached out to the ad hoc committee to get documents from the individual committee members, we were told that we had to seek those documents on a member by member basis, and we did so. Again, informally, so as not to burden the Court. I'm happy to report that all of the ad hoc committee members did, in fact, produce documents, albeit not at the same pace and not at the same level. But nobody refused to participate in the document production.

And so, again, over the summer, we've collecting documents from the ad hoc committee members and preparing ourselves for this case. In September, we reached out to a

certain group of the local Counsels - - those that we thought had a combination of the most of the claims against them, and the largest asset case, and we made informal requests of those local Counsels. We didn't receive a response. But with the bar date coming, with the mediation pressures increasing to move this case along, we filed what we believed was an extremely narrow and prudent 2004 motion that was limited to three very discreet topics, insurance policies, restricted asset information, and rosters.

We had discussions, you know, with the Boy Scouts and the ad hoc committee for some time about all of these issues. We made it clear to everybody both in our papers and in our communications that we weren't asking anybody to reproduce anything that had been previously placed in the data room. We were looking to make sure that we had all of our insurance policies, not just the insurance policies of the Boy Scouts but the insurance policies of the local councils.

We wanted to make sure that if assertions were made that assets were restricted and unavailable for distribution. That there was a factual basis to support those assertions, and so we've asked for that information and we'd asked for the rosters, because that -- the rosters, we believe, contain critical information relating to liability, the validity of claims, potential claims the estate may have

against third partis.

And so, during the course of our discussions with that the Debtor and with the ad hoc committee, we were able to reach a quick agreement, particularly as to insurance policies and the restricted asset information, and you know, early on in the process they agreed that they would fill whatever gaps remained with respect to those topics.

So, that's the first component of the stipulation.

The Boy Scouts and the local council ad hoc committees

members have agreed to produce all of the insurance policies

and all of the restricted asset information described

specifically in the stipulation.

With respect to the balance of the local councils as Your Honor may recall, there is an injunction in place preventing the prosecution of any claims outside of the bankruptcy court against any of the local councils. The Boy Scouts have until October 22nd to seek an extension of that injunction. And we have agreed as part of the stipulation that at least two of the conditions to an extension of that injunction will be that all local councils complete the production of insurance policies and restricted assets information as described in the stipulation by mid-November. Really by the bar date, that's the goal.

If for whatever reason we can't come to an agreement on an extension of the injunction, the parties have

agreed that these matters, other than the Boy Scouts and the ad hoc committee members commitment to providing insurance policies and restricted assets information, all of that would be back before the Court.

The one issue that we hadn't been able to agree on my Sunday evening was the issue of the rosters.

So, the Boy Scouts and the ad hoc committee filed their opposition papers on Sunday evening solely with respect to the issue of the rosters. Discussions continued. On Tuesday, yesterday afternoon, we presented a proposal that would, you know, that we intended -- that the TCC intended to address certain of the issues raised as regards to access and use of the rosters.

And with that, Your Honor, we've reached an agreement to simply fold that into the discussion concerning the extension of the injunction. And what we would ask -- the only thing we would ask the Court today, is to see if we can get on the calendar for October 23rd or soon thereafter as Counsel can be heard to keep a date available in the event that we can't reach an agreement. And I'm hopeful that we can, but given the calendar, given the upcoming bar date, given the need to participate in the mediation, if we're not able to reach these agreements, Your Honor, the parties have agreed that we would come back to Your Honor on October 23rd or soon thereafter as Counsel can be heard. So, that's the

only thing that we request here today.

and I have looked at the Rule 2004 Exam Motion. You keep saying the parties have agreed. And this motion isn't directed at the DXA, and it's not directed at the local council committee, it's directed at specific local councils, who themselves had objected, some of them, to production. I don't see how the BSA and the local council committee can resolve a matter that doesn't involve them. So, do you have agreement with all of the local council, or certainly those that have objected as to a course of conduct with respect to them?

MR. ABBOTT: I would say two things, Your
Honor. First, I think that question is more properly directed
at the ad hoc committee with whom I negotiated on behalf of
the local councils, but more importantly, Your Honor, we're
nothing seeking any relief today. What we've done is we've
simply kicked the can so to speak. And --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ABBOTT: -- if they want to sign on, they -- if they want to sign on to the injunction, they dan do that. They -- they're not obligated -- this doesn't obligate them to do anything. If want to hear them, the merits of the motion, I'm happy to do that today, too.

THE COURT: Well, people seem -- I'm seeming to

aet --1 2 MR. ABBOTT: Appropriate --THE COURT: -- in this case and others, some 3 4 misapprehension of when you get to kick the can, and who you 5 have to speak to, okay? If a matter's been joined, you don't 6 get to unilaterally kick the can on your motion. You have to 7 speak with the people who have objected and see if it's 8 acceptable or come to the Court. But you don't get to on 9 your own kick the can. Nor do you get to, on your own, decide that the replies are going to be filed at 4:00 o'clock 10 the day before the hearing, or extend deadlines --11 12 MR. ABBOTT: We do have the motion --13 THE COURT: -- beyond the --MR. ABBOTT: -- Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: -- local rules. MR. ABBOTT: We do have a motion for the late 16 17 filing. 18 THE COURT: Yeah, it's very presumptuous. I saw 19 in the stipulation that the previous stipulation that you all 20 had agreed to that. It's very presumptuous. Let me hear from -- I'm not inclined to enter 21 22 any order. I'm not sure why I need to enter any order that 23 addresses what the BSA and local council committee are going to do in connection with the motion that's not directed to 24 25 them? But let me hear - -

MR. ABBOTT: But that's what it is, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: -- from the local council committee, and I'll hear from the BSA, and then I'll hear from the 3 4 objectors. 5 MR. ABBOTT: Okay. MR. CELENTINO: Your Honor, this is Joe Celentino 6 7 from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on behalf of the ad hoc 8 committee of local councils. Can you hear me? 9 THE COURT: I can. 10 MR. CELENTINO: Can you hear me, Your Honor? THE COURT: I can hear you, I just can't see you, 11 12 so I have to look, but go ahead. Ahh, got you. Go ahead. 13 MR. CELENTINO: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, Craig Martin of BLA Piper is Delaware Council for 14 15 the ad hoc committee. He's on the line and I've admitted pro hoc vice, but with your permission, Your Honor, I'd like to 16 17 speak on behalf of the ad hoc committee. 18 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 19 MR. CELENTINO: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 So, Your Honor, we've been -- as Mr. Morris said, 21 we've been working with the TCC on discovery for months here. 22 My committee has reached out even more broadly than 23 Mr. Morris Rule 2004 Motion goes to local councils and have 24 been engaged in a massive effort since the beginning of this 25 case, Your Honor, to collect information about local council

assets which we believe is important to a global resolution of this case.

On the question that Your Honor just asked, you know, I think it's important to realize that my committee indeed does not represent all local councils. I rep -- the committee is made up of eight local councils and I'm appearing today on behalf of the committee and not on behalf of any individual council.

What we would say with this -- respect to this,
Your Honor, is that Your Honor doesn't need to enter any
order today, any stipulation between the TCC adjourning this
motion and my committee does not bind, if you look at the
terms of the stipulation, any of the objectors, they do not
have to take any action here at this time. We are simply
moving the hearing date down the line in the hope that we
will be able to resolve it consensually, through voluntary
productions like the local contemplates. And so, Your Honor,
we think there isn't any need for an order here, and we don't
proport to speak either today to you or in the stipulation on
behalf of the objecting local councils.

THE COURT: Thank you. I didn't think that you did, but I appreciate that clarification.

MR. CELENTINO: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ANDOLINA: Your Honor, it's Michael Andolina, White & Case, proposed co-counsel for the Debtor. May I be

heard on this?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANDOLINA: Your Honor, as Mr. Celentino indicated, his group has been working extremely hard over the last several months trying to serve as a coordination point for communications with all of the local councils. It's a thankless job, and I think of all of us Mr. Celentino might have the worst gig here. But what I will say in terms the proposed stipulation is that the goal of the BSA, of the ad hoc committee, and I think of the TCC, is to set up a mechanism whereby we can have a proposed agreement on the extension of a preliminary injunction.

As Mr. Morris indicated, October 22nd is the expiration date for the current agreement that we have. On that date, either we will have a proposed termination extension notice that is agreed to by the parties, or the BSA will have to file a motion to extend the preliminary injunction which we assume the TCC would object to. The negotiations that have been ongoing are an effort to create a mechanism so that local councils will have an opportunity to provide information, and the TCC will have an opportunity to review that information and decide whether it sufficient so that the extension of the preliminary injunction can be continued.

So, as Mr. Morris indicated, the goal here really

is to allow the parties eight days to work through whatever issues we may have to have an agreement that is either adopted by all of the local councils or is rejected by some. So, I don't think the current issue of the 2004 discovery is before the Court, but what we're seeking is to have a hearing on that delayed.

And I did want to address that the Court's concern about extending the notice, that's well taken Your Honor. I apologize on behalf of the Debtors. We were working hard to try to get a resolution, but I recognize the Court probably was preparing and in the future we will be sure to abide by the local rules in terms of timing and I do apologize on behalf of the Debtors for that.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Let me hear from any objector who wants to speak.

MR. DUEDALL: Hello, Your Honor, this is Mark
Duedall for the Greater St. Louis Area Council. May I be
heard?

THE COURT: Mr. Duedall.

MR. DUEDALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

We have no objection subject of course to the Court's calendar to the continuance. We were not consulted on this because this is excessively odd. There's ad hoc committee that's doing wonderful work but doesn't bind all the local councils and there is good information flow from

time to time, but it is odd that though this seems to be skirting the local rules in many respects.

There was no meet and confer before the motion which happens, but it shouldn't happen. There was no agreement to continue the hearing upon any party's objection except by the Debtor and the ad hoc committee. There was not agreement to extend the reply deadline, although they had asked me if I had even heard from the TCC, which I still haven't. I, of course, would have consented to extend any reply deadline. So, have no objection to the procedure they're laying out because there's no relief being granted today. My Council takes the view that much of this information is important and relevant and we have been producing it, and we produced more last night, and we will continue to produce information.

In short, Your Honor, since there's no relief being sought today as to my client, GSLAC, I have no objection to what they've laid out and things being moved eight or ten or 12 days, what have you. But in the future, it would just be good if there were -- there's not many objectors, it would be good if there was dialogue among the objectors as well as opposed to us just kind of hearing what's being agreed to kind of on our behalf and kind of not. That's what I would ask in the future.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, this is Todd Brooks from 1 2 Whiteford Taylor, may I be heard? THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Brooks. 3 4 MR. BROOKS: Thank you. I represent the Baltimore 5 Area Council which is an objector. It's on the -- our 6 objection is on the docket at 1423. I'll be brief. 7 I share Mr. Duedall's support in the idea of -- I 8 don't know if the right word is continuing this, but not 9 going forward with the relief the TCC seeks today. My Council 10 likewise never received a telephone call for meet and confer. On that basis lone, the Court could deny the motion as to 11 our Council. 12 13 I think that's I have to say for the time being. Thank you. 14 15 THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else? MR. CORCORAN: Your Honor, this is Matt Corcoran 16 17 with Jones Day, may I be heard? 18 THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Corcoran. 19 MR. CORCORAN: I represent Council 10, and I just 20 echo the comments of the other council for the respective 21 councils. We did not receive any request to meet and confer 22 before the motion. We weren't consulted on the stipulations. 23 In fact, when an extension was granted to the BSA and the ad hoc committee to file their objection two days later, we 24 25 reached and requested an extension and were denied the same

courtesy.

With that said, Your Honor, we are okay with continuing the motion to a later date as long as we can reserve all our rights to prosecute our objection and deal with it at the time the Court hears it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BOWDEN: Your Honor, it's Bill Bowden at Ashby & Geddes, may I chime in very briefly?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Bowden.

MR. BOWDEN: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Your Honor, we filed on behalf of the Capital Area Council, ad joiner to Circle 10's objection.

Your Honor, I -- I'm confident that ever party to this hearing heard Your Honor's admonishment at the outset of this matter. Capital Area Council does not object to the brief adjournment of this issue to see if a resolution acceptable to the parties can be achieved. And when I say the parties, I mean the effected local councils and that's all I have to add, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Any other objectors?

Okay. Given that the objectors are not objecting to a continuance, I will continue the hearing. And I am available on the 23rd, but this will be the only matter that I hear then. I'm generally opening that gate to anything anybody wants to file.

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So, we'll continue it to 10 o'clock. And I expect that the Tort Claimants Committee will reach out to the actual objecting parties to see if there can be a resolution. There should have meet and confer under the local rule which requires as I recall, either in person or telephonic hearing, or a telephonic communication. Even emails, I do not think meet our local rule, and there's a reason for that which is to open the communication pathway to see if there can be a resolution Let me add that I recognize the job that the local council committee has been doing. I did not mean by my comments to diminish their role. But it's been clear from the beginning that they're a group of a council who have been in dialogue but don't bind the local councils themselves and this motion was directed at the local councils specific individual local councils. And so the parties, in my mind, are the Tort Claimants Committee and the individual effected local councils.

Now, that doesn't mean that the Boy Scouts and the local council committee can't make whatever agreements they think are appropriate between them, but it doesn't resolve the issues unless the Tort Claimants Committee wants to withdraw its motion as to the individual local councils. So, I think I've said enough with respect to that, but it needs to be clearer that people are negotiating and speaking with the correct parties.

MR. BOWDEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, James Ruggeri for Hartford, may I be heard for a point of clarification?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RUGGERI: The clarification that we want is this is the first we've heard of a stipulation that was entered and we just want to be sure that the information, whatever information is produced in response or pursuant to a stipulation in response to the request is disclosed and produced to all parties and interests in the data room or otherwise, including the insurers, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I have not -- and I'm not going to, quite frankly, in connection with this Rule 2000 for a motion intern order approving the stipulation. The parties can stipulate to whatever they want to stipulate to.

I'm not going to enter an order. This doesn't seem to me to be directed to the Rule 2000 for a motion. It seems to be directed to the adversary proceeding and the preliminary injunction.

And if the parties want to do something with respect to that, and I mean the parties to that proceeding, which again is sort of at an odd posture because the parties to that proceeding are not just the Tort Claimants Committee and the Boy Scouts, but, in fact, however many Plaintiffs that have -- that exist in the underlying litigation, and

that were named in that lawsuit. So, it's been kind of confusing from the beginning in terms of stipulations entered among "parties" to certain litigation.

But I don't see a need to sign this, and I'm not going to, and not in this context, because I think it has nothing to do with the Rule 2004 motion. If the parties want to put another stipulation in front of me, the parties, meaning the BSA, the TCC, and the local council committee want to put a stipulation in front of me in connection with the adversarial aisle, entertain it.

But I don't see a reason to enter this here and let me add that if the parties come to arrangements, I don't need to sign off on everything. And I'm not sure why there would be a need to. The parties have agreed, I assume they will keep their word, and they will agree to do what they said they're going to do. And I don't know that I need to sign off on every agreement between the parties.

Mr. Derek -- Mr. Abbott, what's our next matter?

So, anyone who wants to be excused from the hearing, feel free to drop off. You know, of course at any time anyone can do that, but since we took this matter first, anyone who wants to drop off, please feel free.

MR. ABBOTT: Thank you, Your Honor, Derek Abbott again.

Moving back up the agenda to the first matter

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Your Honor.

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going forward, that is the motion of the coalition with
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    respect to sealing their exhibit to the 2019 and approving
    their 2019. So, I'll turn the podium to Ms. Beville, I
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    suspect.
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               THE COURT: Ms. Mersky, I think you're speaking
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   but you're still muted.
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               MS. MERSKY: Can you hear me, Your Honor?
               THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. ABBOTT: Both, I misspoke. I didn't mean
   Ms. Beville, you're right. Ms. Mersky. Thank you, Your
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    Honor. Sorry about that.
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               MS. MERSKY: Good morning, Your Honor, on behalf
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    of the coalition, Rachel Mersky on behalf of the Coalition
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    for Abused Scouts for Justice. Mr. Molton will be first
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    addressing the Court regarding our motion.
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               MR. MOLTON: Judge, can you -- can you hear me,
    Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Molton.
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               MR. MOLTON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor, I
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    appreciate it. I'm glad to be here.
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               I'm here, Judge, along with Ms. Mersky, I'm with
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    Sunni Beville who has spoken earlier in these proceedings,
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   Ms. Beville will be handing the 2119 issues and Eric Goodman
    of our office will be handling the Proof of Claim issues,
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But I do want to take the opportunity at the onset to announce two important events in connection with the motions outstanding, and I'll be handling, Judge, when we get to the Mediation Motion.

Number one is the resolution of the Trustee's objection in connection with the Rule 21019 in connection with the Coalition, Ms. Beville will be addressing that in an instant. That leaves Your Honor only as we see it, two outstanding objections that are still live, and that would be the objections of the insurers and that objections of the TCC, Tort Claimants Committee.

Off of yesterday, Your Honor, the mediators filed a statement which we think is an important event in connection with our role in this case, and I'm going to get to that more at length and when I have the honor and pleasure of addressing Your Honor in the Mediation Motion. But I think it's important in the context of going into all of these issues. That's their sentence, and particularly part of their last sentence, being that and that is -- and that statement was filed through the Debtors on behalf of the mediators and at their direction and request. And it's to quote, Your Honor, and this Docket No. 1500. "The absence of the Coalition is a mediation party has and will continue to hinder the mediation efforts to guide the parties to a place of consensus, the time for which grows increasingly short."

1 And I want to underscore that last clause.

I know that Ms. Boelter and Ms. Andolina on behalf of the Debtors have repeatedly this Court and all of the parties that the Debtor is a melting ice cube.

They need a plan by early 2021 to be teed up. And if this plan is going to result in Boy Scouts emerging and continuing on its mission, which was I think broadcast to the Court and the aspiration of the Debtor on its first day hearing, if that's going to happen, Your Honor, then we have to get moving.

The Coalition stands poised, ready, willing and able to work with all of the parties, including those that have stood up on, you know, and submitted objection against our participation in this case, to see if that goal can be reached. And that mean, Your Honor, in the next few months, working with all the parties to seek -- see if we can find a consensual resolution that will allow Boy Scouts to emerge.

I do want to note, Your Honor, that perhaps the emergence of Boy Scouts in the manner that Ms. Boelter, I think, described in the first day, may not be in the economic interests of the insurers who might have reasons to see Boy Scouts go into a free fall and turn into a liquidation.

I want to say, Your Honor, that that's just not my though, and my pontification, but actually if you take a look at what's happened in this case, this six- month old case, as

we stand poised over a crucial next four months, I don't think that that's a conclusion that is necessarily wrong.

You weren't here, but I know that there was a lot of time spent a disqualification of the Debtor's Counsel, Sidley Austin. And we heard that again today. It -- you do -- this morning that, you know, issue ways in connection with the Whiteon cases emerging from this case. We saw time wasted and useful resources utilized in challenges to a mediators appointment.

Well, now it's our turn.

Your Honor has seen a rainfall of pleadings filed in connection with what we think our useful participation in this case, what the mediators have concluded is a necessary participation in this case. What the Debtors have said is a useful and valuable participation in this case, and what other actors and parties and interest in this case including the Unsecured Creditors Committee, the FCR, as well as the ad hoc group of local councils have not objected. You know, and I think that those non-objections also send a message.

Again, Your Honor, we'd like to -- we're looking forward to presenting these motions today, getting through them. We're looking forward to Your Honor deciding them and accordingly after that introduction, I respectfully would like to turn the rostrum or the Hollywood Square as you would say it in our age, over to Ms. Beville who will describe the

resolution of our 2019 issues with the US Trustee as well as deal with certain of the various objections extant in connection with that issue. If Your Honor minds, I'll do that right now.

THE COURT: That's fine. Ms. Beville.

MS. BEVILLE: Hi, I'm here, Your Honor?

Your Honor, we took your comments to heart at the last hearing, and as noted by Mr. Molton, works to resolve as many objections as possible and complete disclosure of the 2019 documents in accordance with the order that Your Honor entered regarding the motion to file the documents under seal. Your Honor, as we move forward just procedurally, it is from our view that your order address our motion to file under seal and it leaves open for today the sufficiency of the disclosures under 2019 and then in regards to the Coalition's Mediation Motion.

I'm very please, Your Honor, as Mr. Molton reported that the Coalition has reached an agreement with the United States Trustee's office that resoled this objection to the Rule 2019 statement that was filed by the Coalition, and as Mr. Molton noted we do have the full support of the Debtors and the mediator. The only remaining objecting parties, Your Honor, are the insurers and the TCC, and I will address objections later on in my presentation.

But first, Your Honor, I would like to note that

the agreement that we've reached with the US Trustee was -in the supplement that we filed last night at Docket No.

1510. It was filed at the request of the US Trustee's Office
to document and reflect the terms of the agreement and I will
allow the US Trustees Office to speak for itself as to the
resolution.

But, Your Honor, for the benefit of everyone here, I wanted to just highlight the agreement we — is that the Coalition's itself will consist of members that are the survivors that have signed affirmative consent. You may recall on our papers, Your Honor, that one of the things we did after the hearing was send written request for acknowledgement by the clients of the law firms that are representative on the committee, and I am pleased to report that as of this morning's hearing, we have over 7,300 affirmative consents that we've received directly from clients of the law firm that presented it.

So, Your Honor, going forward the Coalition will not note that it represents all of the clients of the law firm at this point, which totals over 28,000. We will restrict the membership of the Coalition to only those members that sign the affirmative consent.

Your Honor, we also have acknowledged in our papers that the individual survivors be Coalition members themselves are not responsible for payment of the Coalition

fees and expenses that the professionals, those fees are being paid by state court councils directly. State Court Counsel will provide notice to their clients of the same change in payment status in accordance with their ethical obligations in any applicable jurisdiction, whether it's through affirmative consent or otherwise.

And Your Honor, just to be clear, the 2019 statement does not in any way prejudice any party's rights to -- ethical or either issues that might arise or have arisen in connection to the Coalition's formation or other actions by the Coalition.

Your Honor, it our view that the Rule 2019 statement is a disclosure issue to the extent parties raise other issues with respect to ethics compliance or otherwise. Frankly, Your Honor, it's not relevant to the hearing now, and if there are issues to raised, they can be done so in reason and in as an affirmative motion but be the best to whatever the issue may comport with, whether it's voting or -- plans -- in other cases, but, Your Honor, those aren't the facts before the Court today.

Before I move forward, Your Honor, it would be helpful for us to just to back and give you sense of what's happened since the last hearing like from a factual development perspective. Following the hearing, Your Honor, and at your direction, the Coalition provided to all

requesting parties and those identified in the order -- into the motion to file under seal, unredacted copies of the Exhibit A document that were filed with our original 2019 statement, but the only redaction being with respect to the pricing information included in the state court council engagement letter.

Your Honor, on September 29th, Kosnoff and Andrew Van Arsdale resigned from the Coalition. In the weeks following the hearing, several new law firms were added to the Coalition and their clients became Coalition members.

The new firms, Your Honor, are Motley Rice, Napoli Shkolnik, Mark J. Garn and Partners (phonetic), Crowd Continsman Law Firm (phonetic), Juneau and Associates (phonetic), and Whisevinda (phonetic). But Your Honor, that brings us to a total of 11 law firms acting as representatives in the Coalition representing over 28,000 sexual abuse victims.

On October 7th, the Coalition filed its second amended verified 2019 statement. That, Your Honor, included the pillars of 2019. We'll walk through those later in my presentation. Included an updated disclosure from Exhibit A, filed those under seal in accordance with Your Honor's order and also produced those unredacted copies to the correcting parties.

And to the entities identified in your order as

well. Thereafter, Your Honor, the Coalition continued its discussions with the US Trustees and ultimately reached a resolution of the US Trustee objection. And as I noted earlier, Your Honor, that resolution resulted in the Coalition restricting its membership to only those members who returned the affirmative consent, and as I noted to date we've received about 7,300 returned affirmative consents.

Your Honor, the Coalition engaged in discussion with the other objectors, namely the TCC and certain of the insurers. But we were unable to resolve those objections.

And so, Your Honor, now to focus on Rule 2019.
Rule 2019, Your Honor, is a disclosure requirement.

The issues relating to Rule 2019 generally relate to what must disclosed and subject to what confidentiality restrictions. And Your Honor, I would -- that Your Honor's order on the motion to file under seal addressed the confidentiality component and the decision before the Court today is what must be disclosed. And, Your Honor, we believe that we have disclosed all documents that are required Rule 2019.

And, Your Honor, as we go through the cases that are cited by the objecting parties, that are cited by the Coalition, all of those cases go to disclosure. They may arise in different context, in context of plan voting or in a context of a law firm trying to file proof of claim. In each

of those instances, Your Honor, the Court that was considering Rule 2019, what was the remedy. It was disclosure. And underlying issues relating plan voting or proof of claims was out -- separately as a separate matter. But the resolution of the Rule 2019 issue was disclosure.

So, Your Honor, the Coalition is an ad hoc committee and pursuant to Rule 2019 and we have asserted otherwise. We are subject to and have made our disclosures pursuant to Rule 2019. The Coalition represents — the Coalition as a whole, in consequently is a collective interest of the individual members, we do not represent the individual members individually.

I'll turn your attention, Your Honor, to the WaMu Washington Mutual Case which outlined exactly how ad hoc committees function and the value of how ad hoc committees function in bankruptcy cases. Your Honor, in Washington Mutual, which is cited at 419BR271, it was a 2009 case Your Honor, in the District -- bankruptcy court in Delaware before Judge Walrath and their -- Your Honor, identified that ad hoc committees are typically a loose affiliation of creditors.

There's an at will major of committee membership is one of the defining characteristics of ad hoc committees.

Because membership at will, the ad hoc committee cannot bind members absent their consent.

And generally, all members must agree on any

1 position the committee takes.

Your Honor, in Washington Mutual, the judge noted that the ad hoc committee filed pleadings collectively, not individually, and took its instructions from the group as a whole. And in this case, Your Honor, Judge Walrath noted that the council does not represent each member in an individual capacity but rather the group as a whole. And I bring your attention to that case, Your Honor, simply to refute the statements and the objections that, you know, ad hoc committees represent the individuals, this is unusual. How can this ad hoc committee function?

An ad hoc committee as contemplated by Rule 2019, is a group of creditors acting collectively to advance a common interest. And that is exactly what that Coalition is here, Your Honor, it is a group of sexual abuse victims represented by their law firm who formed the Coalition and retained bankruptcy counsel to represent the collective interests of the sexual abuse victims in these cases.

Your Honor, there have been various issues raised regarding the Coalition's authority to act. And to refresh your recollection, Your Honor, I addressed this at the last hearing, but to make sure there's not confusion, the -- each member of the state court council engagement letter explicitly authorizes Counsel to associate with co-counsel.

Your Honor, this express consent provided in the

engagement letter that authorizes the association of Brown Rudnick as Counsel representing the collective interests; in our view, nothing further was required. Those State Court Counsel, Your Honor, then signed engagement letters with Brown Rudnick and the Murphy Firm verifying their authority to sign and bind their members to a term.

At the time of our original 2019 filing, State
Court Counsel sent a letter to all of their clients informing
them of the formation of the Coalition and the retention of
bankruptcy counsel. To address concerns -- hearing, Your
Honor, the State Court Counsel sent a request for written
acknowledgement to all clients. At the time of our filing of
the amended 2019, we'd receive more than 4,500 affirmative
consents and in that short time that has passed since then
that number had now risen to over 7,300 affirmative consents
received. And, Your Honor, part of the resolution that US
Trustee's office is that the United State Trustee may, at its
request audit the affirmative consent to review and make any
necessary assessments as to the validity of those affirmative
consents.

So, Your Honor, especially given now that the membership of the Coalition is restricted to the members that sign affirmative consents, and those affirmative consents, Your Honor, acknowledge the formation of the committee, being a coalition, acknowledge that the individual is a member of

the Coalition, acknowledged that the fees and expenses will be borne by the State Court Counsel, acknowledged that the State Court Counsel is authorized to direct Brown Rudnick as counsel to the Coalition, and acknowledge that the Coalition represents the collective interest of the Coalition and not the individual member's interest. And, Your Honor, with that affirmative consent in hand, we don't see there being any concern further in that Brown Rudnick has the authority to act on behalf of the Coalition.

So, Your Honor, as I mentioned in the Washington Mutual case, we cannot bind individual members and we cannot bind the law firms individually, but we can make representation and we can make recommendations that the law firm client takes certain action, support a plan, development of a plan a certain way, this is not unusual, Your Honor. We have seen instances like this in mass tort bankruptcy cases where ad hoc committees have played a vital roles in mediation and development of a plan, and in those cases, Your Honor, and I'm referencing cases like Purdue, and PG&E, and when Mr. Bolton has a chance to take over, he can describe the role of the ad hoc committees in more detail. But this isn't anything that we have created out of --

Ad hoc committees can play a meaningful role and I would deposit here Your Honor, that we have played a constructive role in this case to date. Our participation

that's been that's been -- as advertising motions, the motion that we recently filed regarding a attainting of signatures, I pushed the claim, Your Honor, even not being a -- we have provided detailed claims data to the better than the mediators that have been incredibly helpful for them to start to really review what that claim - where are the located, what would their claims resolutions have to start to look like and as recently as yesterday, Your Honor, we spoke with Counsel to the ad hoc committee of local councils, and have given permission for the Debtor to share that claims data with the local councils so they can start to identify what types of claims may be raised as -- certain of the local councils on an individual basis as opposed to a collective aggregate number of 28,000 sexual abuse victims in the case more generally.

Your Honor, moving into the specifics of Rule 2019, and I will ask if you'd like me to walk through each of the, you know, requirements and there are C1, C2, C3, and C4. And in summary fashion, Your Honor, we provided the names and addresses, the incident data, the types of claims, how my new Coalition members, we have provided, I think more than is required on your C4. The case, Your Honor, that deal with additional disclosures under C4 almost all -- and that's requiring the law firm or the ad hoc committee to disclose their intention agreements, which we have already done here,

Your Honor.

In addition to that, we provided copies of the affirmative consent that is being requested in the initial notice that was sent out. And, Your Honor, at least in my review of the cases, I haven't seen a law firm that ad hoc committees that extra step to provide evidence of their authority to act as an ad hoc committee.

Your Honor, it is our view that these disclosures comply with the governing Third Circuit precedent, the use of exemplar if it was permitted in expressly in the Third Circuit in a Pittsburg -- case. All of these cases, Your Honor, are included in our papers and I trust that you are familiar with those and won't take up the Court's time reviewing each of those cases. But, Your Honor, I do want to highlight that the cases that are cited by the insurers are the distinguishable here and don't stand for the proposition that the insurance company -- please review that somehow we have failed to disclose or must be compelled for additional disclosure.

In the Arch Dioses of Minneapolis case, Your
Honor, that was a case where a law firm was responsible for
over 70 percent of the claims that were being voted on in the
plan by one law firm, and what developed in that case, Your
Honor, was the Court ordered the production of that law
firm's retention agreement. And that is exactly what we have

already done here, Your Honor. And there is, Your Honor, a case that's been cited very heavily by the insurers. That was a pre-packaged bankruptcy, Your Honor, where the terms of the plan had been negotiated pre-petition for solicitation and voting on the plan had occurred pre-petition. And there was a small group of locked arms that presented a vast majority of the -- creditors in that case. And there were objections and then crushed into a -- by the insurance companies as to how -- whether or not that was a good, safe process. And relied on Rule 2019 to obtain disclosure from the lock arms that were involved in that process, and the outcome there, Your Honor, was disclosure.

The lock arms were required to produce copies of their intention agreements which, again, Your Honor, we have done both here.

I would like to make note, Your Honor, that the same parties here that are going for additional disclosure or are prohibiting the Coalition from shift -- in the cases, themselves have not followed the rules of the cases. The TCC has not filed a 2019, the insurers' attorneys representing more than one client, have not filed 2019 statements. There are other ad hoc committees involved in these cases, Your Honor, that have not filed 2019 statements. It is a selective application of the rule here, Your Honor, designed to prevent sexual abuse victims from having access to the

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bankruptcy and having their voices heard, and it is time,

Your Honor, to make that stop and allow these victims to be

heard, have them participate in the mediation process and

allow these cases to move forward.

Your Honor, we made note in our motion that there is a question regarding whether the insurers even had standing to object to the 2019 disclosures. There is a group of cases, Your Honor, that we have cited that including the Third Circuit in Ray Combustion Engineering (phonetic) at 391 at third 190, that indicates that insurers must demonstrate that they are a grieved person by order that "diminishes their property, increases their burden, or impaired their rights" and, Your Honor, the case law followed from that decision really, including it he 2019 context, Your Honor, and I refer to Pittsburg Corning and Kaiser -- where the Courts ruled that the insurers lacked standing to challenge the Rule 2019 order, and Pittsburg Corning, Your Honor, very familiar to the facts here, the insurers were alleging conflicts of interest on the part of the Plaintiff's lawyers and alleged the need to investigate fraudulent asbestos claims. And there, Your Honor, the Court did not deny access to information, it ensured that the insurance companies had access to the Rule 2019 disclosure, but they lack standing to appeal the Rule 2019 order itself.

Similarly in Kaiser, Your Honor, the court ruled

that the insurance companies lacked standing to challenge
Rule 2019 order. That required the insurance companies to
file a motion to obtain access to the information. And
there, Your Honor, the Court noted that insurance-neutral
plans are possible, and until such time as a plan is before
the court that does not have insurance neutrality provisions,
the insurance companies lack standing.

There are other cases, Your Honor, where the insurers did have standing to object, and in those cases, Your Honor, including Baron and Budd, which was a case where it was arguable that the plan was not insurance-neutral, in which case the insurance companies had standing.

But Your Honor, even if the insurance companies have standing and you are here to hear their objection, I must note that their accusations on Coalition is a marketing label are baseless. The Coalition itself has not undertaken any advertising.

Your Honor -- and I mentioned it in the hearing last time -- what the insurance companies and the TCC are responding to is the number of victims here.

There have been allegations by the insurance companies that these are fraudulent claims, that we're drumming up claims. But Your Honor, going back to 2002 when the Boy Scouts did its own investigation and released a portion of the files, the portion of the files that were

released, Your Honor, identified at least 5,000 individuals that were released from the Boy Scouts for perpetrating or potentially allegedly perpetrating abuse against Boy Scouts.

So Your Honor, that number is 5,000. In many of those cases, the perpetrators allegedly abused more than one victim. Your Honor, that brings you to the thousands of victims that existed -- that the Boy Scouts potentially knew of in 2002. And that does not include the victims that did not come forward, that did not speak, and that does not include the perpetrators that were included in files that had been lost.

So when we hear the insurance companies argue that we're manufacturing claims, Your Honor, there is no evidence to support that. There will be a claims resolution process as a part of a plan or any trust distribution procedures, and that, Your Honor, is the appropriate time to review and reconcile claims and ensure the validity of the claims.

Again, Your Honor, 2019 is a disclosure issue, and I posit, Your Honor, there is no additional disclosure that the Coalition needs to make here. But to the extent, Your Honor, you've identified something that the Coalition needs to produce, we simply request the opportunity to hear about the deficiency. That is all for now. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. No, I don't have any questions. I wanted to hear your presentation. I will say

that the Rule 2019 statement is a little confusing. Maybe of necessity by use of terms. But as to who exactly the Coalition is, is it the law firms, is it the clients.

I think you've cleared that up. But more importantly from my perspective is the written acknowledgements that have now been received from the 7,300 or so clients because it did -- I was concerned about that and who the committee is and even who the clients are.

The -- but one thing about this case, and I don't know if it's the same in other mass tort cases or not where there are ad hoc committees, is the group seems to change.

And what's the anticipation if the group changes in terms of updating the Rule 2019 statements?

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, I would anticipate that we would file periodic updated statements as either additional law firms joins as representatives and their clients join, as we continue to receive signed affirmative consents. I don't know the timing of when the numbers will be changing materially. Obviously, it happened rather quickly over the past week. But we would endeavor to provide throughout reports, Your Honor, if you have specific time frame, we're happy to do it every other week, once a month, but in any event, when the numbers change materially, we have updated either new law firms or a material number of new affirmative consents, we will file an updated 2019 statement

reflecting those changes.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- let me hear from the -- let me hear from Mr. Schiavoni.

MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, it's hard for me to say I don't want to speak, but if I may pass to Mr. Ruggeri, who has a witness.

THE COURT: Yes, you can pass to Mr. Ruggeri.

MR. RUGGERI: Good morning, Your Honor. That indeed is a first that Mr. Schiavoni has yielded the floor when called upon.

Judge, let me start by addressing Mr. Molton's comments in suggesting that we're making objections for improper reasons. We're not, Your Honor. There's a process that needs to be followed. We're following the process.

Do we have an economic interest? We do, as everyone participating in this case has an economic interest.

So we're all trying to do what we need to do and do our jobs to deal with our respective economic interests.

But there's nothing nefarious or improper about anything that the insurers are doing.

With regard to standing, it's a little easier here because we are a creditor. So we don't even fall into the argument, although the insurers clearly have a stake in the 2019 disclosure here.

We heard about a rainfall of pleadings. There is

a rainfall going on, and the Court's talked about it before. We just saw two days ago some websites now published 50,000 claimants -- more than 50,000 claimants are expected to be filed in this case.

Why is that important? It's important because the predicate for the ad hoc committee, the Coalition's participation in this case was the representation that it represented the vast majority controlled the vast majority of the claims, the sex abuse claims that we're talking about in this case.

The Court has seen the Kosnoff email about chilling out and going sailing and representing 80 percent or more of the claims. What we heard this morning is very different. What we heard this morning is that the Coalition actually today represents as few as 14.6 percent of those claims, if we're looking at the 50,000-plus number. Or no more than 26 percent of the claims, if we're using the 28,000 number, which counsel has said the law firms represent 28,000 claims, of which they've only received the affirmative consents for 7,300.

And I will say -- and maybe it was inadvertent, but Ms. Beville's presentation caused further confusion because, on the one hand, she said the Coalition's only represented the affirmative consents, and then later on when she was introduced to the new counsel, she referenced that

the Coalition represents 28,000 members.

so we still don't know sort of the scope of the engagement here. I will tell you that I thought we were looking at the Coalition coming in and asking the Court not to kick the can down the road but to acknowledge that today's proceeding on this issue was premature because late last night, they filed a document that said the affirmative consents are coming in, and that they will file in seven days -- seven days they're going to file an amended 20 -- a further amended 2019 disclosure, which is going to tell us who they represent, at least as of that time.

That's one of the issues that we've been looking for from the beginning, Your Honor. Had they provided some information to us? They have. We don't doubt that. And it's been helpful. But have they made a complete showing on who they represent? No. So we don't know on whose behalf they're empowered to negotiate.

And presumably, it looks like we won't know that for at least another seven days when they intend to file a further supplemental filing.

Had they produced the foundational documents that will allow us to see not only who purports to act on behalf of these Coalition members but on what basis do they purport to act on their behalf, we don't. We saw recently filings referring to by-laws. I think they were by-laws from

September. We haven't been produced the by-laws.

If we were produced those by-laws, it may help us get our arms around to make sure we know who's at the table and how they're at the table. Where are the empowering documents? We don't have those. There are by-laws. We know there are by-laws. They have not been produced.

We heard today that it's not unusual to have an ad hoc committee. I agree with counsel. It's not unusual to have ad hoc committees, but what's unusual is to have an ad hoc committee in my experience that really overlaps the job of the official committee.

The official committee has the fiduciary obligation to represent these same claims. This is apparently just a subgroup of those same claimants whose interests are already being represented and not -- not a big bag of representation or interests to be representative. It's the same claimants.

But they want to be separately represented, and they want to be separately recognized in negotiating, even though their numbers may total as few as 14.6 percent of the interest --

THE COURT: Is that relevant --

MR. RUGGERI: -- that are already represented by the committee.

THE COURT: Explain to me the relevance of that.

Explain to me the relevance of -- to 2019, the relevance of a, as you call it, subgroup of those who are represented in a representative capacity by the tort claimants committee.

MR. RUGGERI: Admittedly, Your Honor, it gets into the merits of the participation and the mediation motion. It really begs the question of why. It's not a question of disclosure in that regard once they identify who their members are. But there is a direct overlap of Mr. Stang and his committee, who is charged with a fiduciary obligation to represent those same claimants. So it's a question of need.

And the representations on the stated need is that these folks were needed because of their majority representation, which appears to be incorrect in terms of the affirmative consents that are coming back.

So I don't know -- I don't see the need for this separate collection of an ad hoc committee, nor do I think that it aids the process. But more importantly from a disclosure standpoint, we don't know who they are still.

We're not going to know for seven days who they are. We don't have the empowering documents. We do have concerns about the ability of the state court counsel to purport to engage the Coalition counsel, the Brown Rudnick firm and the Monzack Mersky firms to represent the Coalition.

And in turn, we have questions about the affirmative -- the informed consent that the state court

counsel purports to have received. And that's in connection with our submission to the Court of declarations by Professor Moore, we've offered the Court two declarations that go to those issues and really go to the issue of informed consent on every level.

What we can't happen here is to empower a Coalition, it seems to me, that is tainted by virtue of either Coalition counsel wasn't represented by law firms who had the authority to represent them, or the claimants, the claimants, the individual claimants -- I still don't know who's the real client here of the Coalition -- but the individual claimants did not give informed consent to their lawyers to engage the Coalition counsel to represent this ad hoc collection of interests, Your Honor.

We have offered the declarations to the Court. They've been filed on the docket, ECF 1499-2 and 1499-3. Professor Moore has joined us here this morning. She is available to testify, if needed. We're certainly pleased to offer her declarations into evidence in lieu of her direct testimony and to make her available for cross-examination and allow her to support her testimony and her opinions on the inadequacy of the disclosures and the conflicts that are raised by the disclosures if the Court deems that appropriate.

THE COURT: Are they inadequacies of disclosures

relevant to 2019 or are they inadequacies of disclosure relative to an attorney/client relationship?

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, both. I think that the Coalition's filing last night tells us there's an inadequacy disclosure of the interests they represent because they just recently sent out those affirmative acknowledgements to their clients. They haven't come back and there's going to be more filed within -- they say seven days.

THE COURT: And as I said, this sort of rolling nature of --

MR. RUGGERI: Understood.

THE COURT: -- the Coalition or committee is something that I'm not sure exactly what to do with.

Nonetheless, what is it that your client doesn't understand about who Ms. Beville represents?

MR. RUGGERI: I don't understand the individual claimants because it's incomplete. I don't understand the rolling admission of state court counsel in and out. I don't understand the Kosnoff and Van Arsdale situation, who still have clients who apparently are represented by -- in the case by the Rothweiler firm. They were the triumvirate, if you will, that flashed and engaged people on the abuse and scouting letterhead, all three of them.

So we're told that Kosnoff and Van Arsdale have resigned. Have they? Have they really? I don't know, but

who is really directing traffic? If I saw the bylaws, for example, I might be able to get an understanding of who's directing traffic here. Who's empowered to direct the Coalition counsel to act on behalf of the Coalition. We don't know that today, and that is a disclosure issue, Your Honor. That is a disclosure issue with regard to that issue, Your Honor. It's an adequate disclosure.

THE COURT: Well, I will state that the resignations -- I don't want to say they're a red flag, but I will say they're interesting. And I'm not sure why they happened or needed to happen or what the impact of that is.

I will agree because their clients are still -- at least some of them, those who have returned the written acknowledgement -- are still part of the Coalition.

MR. RUGGERI: They are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Assuming the Coalition are the actual clients. So --

MR. RUGGERI: And Your Honor, we don't have a resignation from the Eisenberg Rothweiler firm either, and that was -- the three firms were associated counsel on behalf of their clients. So we only have Kosnoff and Van Arsdale who "resigned", but I don't know what that means, if it really means anything given the nature of the situation. But there hasn't been full disclosure of that.

And it may be the Kosnoff resigned because of the

attention that his email is receiving in this case, and -THE COURT: Could have been.

MR. RUGGERI: -- likely will continue to receive.

THE COURT: It could have been. Or the notice of his deposition. There could be a number of reasons for it, and whether he's behind the scenes calling the shots is an interesting question. I guess for purposes of 2019 -- and I want to understand -- I think there's no question that -- well, I shouldn't say that.

When you say you don't know who Ms. Beville's representing, because you don't know every detail and nuance of the relationships, or because you suspect, or because there may be -- I don't want to put words in your mouth that go beyond what you're saying -- that there may be some impropriety in the solicitation of clients, the -- or there may be some ethical obligations that underlying counsel are not comporting with.

How does that impact Rule 2019 as opposed to whatever concerns are raised by the conduct of not Ms. Beville's firm but the six, nine, however many law firms there are now --

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, in addition to your list, and this is a disclosure issue, seems to me, there's the equivocation internally in the documents that have been produced, including the engagement letter, both the state

court counsel engagement letters and the Brown Rudnick engagement letter. That makes it unclear who are the clients.

There's internal equivocation on that. So what we've heard is Ms. Beville today seek to clarify that issue, but that doesn't change what the documents themselves say. So there are issues with regard to that.

There is a disclosure issue with regard to the individual claimants as we talked about, and the Coalition concedes in the filing it made last night and the representation is going to make a further filing within seven days of further supplemental disclosure to -- so we'll have a better understanding of who they represent.

It's also undisputed that we don't have the bylaws. The by-laws, I think, are important disclosure so that we understand, again, the empowering documents, who was the authority to act on behalf of the Coalition and to instruct someone to act on behalf of the Coalition. Those are all classic, in my view, disclosure issues, Your Honor, and that are to be resolved at this stage.

The other issues with regard to the ethical propriety or impropriety or those issues there get closer to the line of whether they're disclosure issue or whether those should be taken up separately.

But we do have (inaudible) at the same time that

there's a request for the Court to approve the sufficiently
admitted disclosure, we have a request to allow this

Coalition to participate in the mediation. And I dare say
that I don't know that the mediators have received the same
information that the Court received today, even in terms of
the scope of the representation of the Coalition and the
numbers that they represent.

So I think we get closer, but I do have a concern that if we are going to be at a mediation and that mediation with one of the parties is infected by conflict, and I think the mediators have been clear that they only believe the Coalition should be there if it's a legitimate Coalition that's not tainted with any of those concerns that the last thing we want to have is to go through a mediation and then have another ad hoc committee come forward and say, that's great you had that negotiation, but that Coalition didn't represent my interests because I didn't give informed consent for it to do that.

That's our concern, Your Honor. One of our concerns at the mediation to make sure that we have the right parties there who have the authority to negotiate on the people they say they have the right to negotiate on behalf of.

THE COURT: Well, they're going to have the -- let's assume they have the authority for the moment to

negotiate. They've already said as the Coalition of local counsel has said that they don't bind their individual members. They're negotiating, but they don't bind their individual members, just like Mr. Ruggeri, you don't bind your client until your client says you bind your client. And you --

MR. RUGGERI: You're right.

THE COURT: You negotiate, and you don't bind them until your client agrees.

So I'm trying to understand whether the membership is 7,000 clients, 10,000 clients, or 14,000 clients, or 28,000 clients.

In terms of the underlying policy of Rule 2019 and understanding the motivation and the economic position so that there's awareness of where a group is coming from, how is that your client doesn't know that?

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, we do now know the 7,300 -- although they haven't been provided to us, the affirmative consent. That's something we know. What we don't know is that this Coalition represents the majority of interests that it purported to represent when it first entered this case. So that dynamic has changed.

At the end of the day, although the Coalition counsel can't bind the client, the parties -- and with my client as well -- you're correct in terms of I can't bind.

But I do come to the table with the authority, proper authority, unconflicted authority to negotiate on my client's behalf, on behalf of the client that I purport to represent.

And that's what makes this a little bit different because we don't know, in fact, that the Coalition counsel has the proper, unconflicted authority to participate at the negotiating table the way the other parties do as to whom there are no such issues.

THE COURT: And what do you mean by unconflicted authority?

MR. RUGGERI: If the state court counsel did not have authority to engage Coalition counsel on behalf of their client, we have a problem. We have a problem. And if you look at Professor Moore's declaration in this case that she identifies that problem.

And simple example, for example, the word associate. What does associate mean? If you look at the engagement of the state court engagements, associate really means to represent the individual interests. And that's not what we're told they're doing now with regard to associating in the Brown Rudnick firm and the Monzack Mersky firm. It means something else.

So as a client who's told they're associating in this new counsel, okay, I don't think it's clear to the client that it means that counsel is not being engaged to

represent your individual interests. I think the (inaudible) 1 2 is used. So that's a real problem. So that's an example 3 of --THE COURT: I think I raised that last time as a 4 5 possible question that I didn't know the answer to. 6 But I think I raised that as to what does 7 associate counsel mean. But --8 MR. RUGGERI: And it still is --9 THE COURT: Now we have these written requests for written acknowledgement. Why doesn't that solve the problem, 10 to the extent there was one? 11 12 MR. RUGGERI: I think the question is, Your Honor, for example, there is no explanation of the divergent 13 interests that this counsel represents, for example. There 14 15 also is -- my recollection is there's a statement that the Coalition counsel has been -- or the individual members have 16 been availed of the opportunity to be provided information as 17 18 opposed to information being provided to them. 19 So there's a difference in terms of providing 20 acknowledgement whether you're providing acknowledgement 21 based on informed consent or an uninformed consent. 22 And the question these acknowledgements to me, 23 Your Honor, is whether the consent provided by these

claimants is informed consent after, for example, a full

disclosure of the conflicting interests that Coalition

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counsel is representing through this Coalition, where if I'm the individual claimant, again, if someone is associating for me, then I believe they're associating in to represent my interests. That's a problem that still exists with regard to these engagements, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And how is that problem addressed in other mass tort cases?

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, I don't want to speak out of school in terms of the other mass tort cases. You are familiar with the Baron and Budd case. That case does involve one of the new state court counsel who's entering -- who entered an appearance here a couple of days ago. So there was a requirement of full disclosure in terms of the retention agreements that some would argue went above and beyond.

So I think it does -- it varies based on the case, Your Honor. It varies based on the facts and circumstances that are presented.

THE COURT: I did read the Baron and Budd case.

It kind of plops you in the middle of the case itself if you're not familiar with all the underlying facts, which I'm not, and that's not a criticism of the judge because I do that, too, sometimes and assume familiarity with the case because I'm writing for the parties.

So it kind of plops you in the middle, and it deal

with ethical issues. But ultimately -- it seemed to do so because -- well, first of all, it also dealt with the previous iteration of the rule. So that's one issue that could be a distinguishing factor.

But what does Judge Ferguson say? She says -- she seemed to suggest that the treatment under the plan that was -- and the fairness of the plan's classification system was involved. So there was some very specific provisions of this prepackaged plan, which I'm not -- don't know what they were -- that seemed to call into question the good faith filing issues. But she seems to have had some very specific concerns about a negotiation that went on pre-petition that affected the rights of other creditors.

MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, this is Tanc

Schiavoni. I argued before Judge Ferguson the 2019 motion,

and I -- perhaps after Mr. Ruggeri or now, I could just

address that specifically.

THE COURT: I'll let you address it afterwards.

But I did read that -- you know, I did read that case, and

I'm not surprised to hear you argued it. The -- but from the

case itself, it seems kind of -- yeah. Somehow those clients

got preferential security interest. I don't know what

happened there.

But we're certainly not at any of that kind of stage. But ultimately -- ultimately what she said was you

need to disclose stuff.

MR. RUGGERI: Right. I think we're not at that stage, Your Honor. Congoleum has a long and sordid history, certainly, and there were good faith filing issues. But with regard to the issue that we're touching on today, from my perspective, the importance of that ruling was the requirement that there be full disclosure of potential conflicting interests. That's what the effect of the requirement for the disclosure in that case was, and that was my lesson that I take in terms of the 2019 issues at bottom.

And I'm happy to let Mr. Schiavoni expound from there if he has a different take from the perspective of the one who argued it. But that's the lesson from that case with regard to the issues that we're raising on behalf of my clients is the adequacy of the disclosure of the potential of conflicting interests, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And specifically, then, because where I'm struggling is if there's disclosure, then how deep do I get into the professional obligations of the underlying counsel and whether they have fulfilled whatever their state law, professional obligations are?

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, I certainly think it comes into play in terms of approving the adequacy of the disclosure if we can't rule out the issues over the conflicts and we can't satisfy ourselves that the disclosures were

adequate and that the Claimants were adequately disclosed or informed of the potential conflicts, then I do think it goes in the adequacy of the 2019 disclosures because there's an absence of that information.

And that leads in, again, I still don't know why we don't have the bylaws. If folks wanted to address some of our concerns in terms of empowering documents, that to me seems to be one of the easiest documents that should have been made available so that we know what is the document or what is the instrument that empowers people to do what they're doing in good faith. And that may go some of the way towards satisfying our concern about not knowing who has authority to act and on what basis do they have the authority to act.

We have counsel coming in and out now. How is that happening? We now have 11 counsel, right? I thought -- I didn't know if the 11 counsel represented all 28,000. They apparently may but only a subset of the 28,000 is actually represented through the Coalition.

So there's lots of inconsistency here, not just the numbers, but in terms of the conflicts, in terms of the empowering instrument and documents, and we think that is part of the disclosure obligation here, and I think that they're wrestling so much over this conflict issue.

And then you lay on top the withdrawal of Kosnoff

and Van Arsdale, there are lots of questions here.

And we don't have the information to really answer those questions.

And again, the metaphor used by counsel at the last hearing about the stool, if a stool has a rotten leg, the stool collapses. And that's what we're concerned about here.

THE COURT: What are the bylaws going to tell you?

MR. RUGGERI: Who directs Coalition counsel, Your

Honor, for example. How --

THE COURT: So that they have to have a majority vote of the -- I mean, what are they going to tell you?

MR. RUGGERI: I don't know what they'll tell me about, for example, who comes in -- you asked the question who comes in and comes out. That could be addressed in the bylaws. I don't know. I don't know who purports to have the authority to represent Coalition counsel. I don't know if it says anything about the basis on which they purport to have the authority. I would like to see it. I think it's --

THE COURT: Well, what you'd like to see -- I don't think what someone would like to see is the standard. I think the standard is what has to be disclosed under Rule 2019. Whether somebody likes the disclosures or doesn't like the disclosures, I don't think is the issue. I think the issue is what has to be disclosed. And the reason --

MR. RUGGERI: Correct, Your Honor. Financial -THE COURT: -- the reason for the disclosure is so
that the other side knows where a party's coming from.
Right? I mean, that was the whole impetus behind the rule
change. I forget where I have that.

I actually went back to Judge Gerber's letter on the -- and I think it was 2008 or 2009 when they were looking at whether to abolish Rule 2019 or not. The Rules Committee. Or to extend it.

And the idea was parties and the Court need to understand where people are coming from. And I don't -- we know where this group is coming from. You may not like where this group is coming from. But we know where they're coming from, don't we?

MR. RUGGERI: I think we know they're coming from state court counsel who purports to have the authority to empower Coalition counsel. But I really don't know where they're coming from in terms of who is calling the shots. I didn't -- I used an improper word when I said I would like to have the bylaws. I think the bylaws are necessary to a full disclosure here because the bylaws may tell us who is empowered to direct the Coalition counsel.

The Court mentioned majority. I don't know if it's the majority or not. I don't know if there's been a single person -- single law firm appointed. I don't know how

1 | the firms come in and how they go out. Those are sort of the 2 | issues.

So I think we don't know who really is at the table and on what basis that person is at the table. I think that, again, that the concern grows up from the individual Claimants to their state court counsel, state court counsel to Coalition counsel. So I think the bylaws are necessary to a full and appropriate disclosure in a 2019 context when these issues pervade, Your Honor.

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, may I respond to the issues that were raised here?

THE COURT: Not yet. Not yet.

MR. SCHIAVONI: Judge, should I be heard when they're done or after (inaudible)?

THE COURT: I'm going to hear you after Mr. Ruggeri's done.

MR. STANG: And Your Honor, this is Mr. Stang, I would like to make a couple of very points -- targeted comments.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'll hear from you too. Just looking for what I did with -- yeah, I don't have, unfortunately, my -- where I annotated then-Judge Gerber's January 9, 2009 letter. But he talks about understanding the other person's agenda. What's their agenda. And he talks -- this is in the context of distress debt, investors in

distress debt, and understanding that perhaps sometimes they own multiple -- they own -- at different positions in the debt structure. And sometimes they may even want the company to fail, that that might be in their best interest rather than have the company succeed.

So he talks about understanding, having information and disclosure to understand the agenda of the parties in front of you. He actually even suggested that disclosures be made by every party in a case. That did not get adopted.

But his concern was, in particular, discretionary decisions that judges have to make and understanding the party who's in front of you making the argument about what's in the best interest of the estate, when they have a particular agenda that the judge and other parties do not know about because there's been no disclosure.

Now again, this is his letter to the advisory committee rules committee. And it's his view, which then Judge Drain actually adopted and came up with a copy of other reasons why Rule 2019 should not be abolished.

But when you read the letters and you read the legislate, you read the committee history, and you take a look at the cases, the idea really is do you know the agenda of the party, of the committee, and where they're coming from. Does everybody understand their economic -- or

other -- this was dealing with economic -- but their economic or other interests that they are advocating for so that if it's -- something's undisclosed, you don't know.

Here, I guess the question is what don't we know about the agenda of these -- of the Coalition. What don't we know about their agenda?

MR. RUGGERI: Well, Your Honor, I think one of the questions is -- I think we learned a lot about the agenda through Mr. Kosnoff's email that was sent on June 28th and provided to the Court.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RUGGERI: And now what we know is that
Mr. Kosnoff has "resigned". So I don't know if the agenda
that he set forth in that pretty long email, which was pretty
transparent on the agenda, continues to be the agenda or not.

THE COURT: Let's assume it is the agenda. Let's assume it is and that we know the agenda. And, yeah, we can take a look at that letter, and we certainly know his agenda.

MR. RUGGERI: And the question would be whether that's a legitimate agenda. It would come into --

THE COURT: No, is that what Rule 2019 goes to?

I don't think Rule 2019 goes to whether it's a

legitimate agenda or I like the agenda because parties

certainly can advocate for their own positions, and they do

every single day.

MR. RUGGERI: Sure, but --

THE COURT: What is their best interest? And there's nothing nefarious about advocating for what you believe is in your best interest.

MR. RUGGERI: There's not, Your Honor, but we see in the papers filed since then, where the Coalition has moved itself away from that agenda, if you will. And again, it begs the question in terms of what is Mr. Kosnoff's real role here now in light of this purported resignation, where he still continues to represent — purports to represent many of the Claimants, and he's still part of Abuse in Scouting, which as I said two days ago, published north of 50,000 claims it expects to be filed here.

So I don't know what the agenda is or not. I certainly haven't heard the Coalition say that their agenda remains consistent with the agenda that Mr. Kosnoff charted back in June, Your Honor. So I think there is an open issue there in terms of what is the Coalition's agenda.

THE COURT: Well, I suspect you'd be happy if their agenda deviated from what was in that -- what was in that letter to be something more productive.

MR. RUGGERI: I think that may be so. But the question marks about the agenda is another reason why there's an open request for discovery of Mr. Kosnoff, which think the Court will address later today.

1 | THE COURT: I will address it.

MR. RUGGERI: So that is an open issues in terms of the agenda.

THE COURT: I will address that. But what I'm dealing here with -- and I agree, the issues for today are somewhat intertwined, okay? But I think for purposes of 2019, I'm focused on disclosure.

MR. RUGGERI: Understood.

THE COURT: And understanding where the ad hoc committee is coming from and who they represent, and I think it's abundantly clear who they represent. There may be other issues. I do have some concern, quite frankly, about ensuring that each underlying Plaintiff is adequately represented by their underlying counsel.

But I'm not sure how I'd get involved in that.

And I have those concerns because of the numbers. IF you get calls from, you know, 500 people between now and

November 16th, can you effectively represent all of them? I don't know.

But -- so I have some concerns. But I don't think I have Rule 2019 concerns. Let me -- if there's -- and I appreciate the declarations of Professor Moore, which may have very valid concerns. I'm not sure how that impacts 2019.

MR. RUGGERI: I think the most obvious point, Your

Honor, is the bylaws, and that is something that Professor

Moore does address in her declarations. The absence of the
empowering documents. So that is one of the opinions that
she expresses. She knows who purports to have authority to
speak on behalf of the Coalition, but she doesn't see
evidence of the empowering documents, and that's added to her
also concerns about whether there are valid attorney/client
relationships that have been established on behalf of
Coalition counsel and the state court counsel or Coalition
counsel in the underlying Claimants. Her opinion is that
there are no valid attorney/client relationships that have
been established between the Coalition counsel in either of
those groups.

And also, her concern is I still don't understand where the empowering documents are, which is standard, even for ad hoc committees. And it actually is raised by the supplemental filings the Coalition made in adding the new state core counsel with the express reference to those bylaws, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you. And --okay, the bylaws. Mr. Schiavoni, I'll hear from you next, then I'll certainly hear from Mr. Stang, I think, spoke up for the QCC.

MR. SCHIAVONI: So you know, this is Tanc
Schiavoni for Century. I'd like to address really Baron and

Budd because I think it's extremely relevant here. But if I can just take one step back from it, and that is that just how -- what is 2019, and how did it come to pass, and what is it intended to address?

The SEC was a major proponent behind the adoption of Rule 2019, and it followed from a series of abuses that had taken place in connection with a voting lockup agreements being entered into that were undisclosed among creditors and then how that distorted the plan process later that went on.

THE COURT: Right, so wasn't that insiders -wasn't that the concern that there were insiders and -- I
forgot what they called the committees that really ended up
controlling -- that really ended up controlling how a plan
was presented to the court, and nobody knew about the
insiders' influence?

MR. SCHIAVONI: Exactly. That's exactly what was happening. And Justice Belglitz (phonetic) at the time -- he wasn't a justice that he was working at the SEC -- he wrote about this as part of the advocacy to have 2019 adopted. And what he focused on was how these committees were being formed and maintaining secrecy because they were trying to get, as he put it, "the emollients of control". There were financial benefits -- if you could hold yourself out to the debtor as "controlling" the plan process, you could derive from it financial benefits that -- for your group that otherwise

would not be achievable. And that's what led to these terrible abuses that had happened.

Granted, sort of in different contexts. But those issues have direct application and in a much important way to amass to our case. You've seen, Your Honor, the - you've seen Mr. Kosnoff's email. There's almost no question here that he's holding this group out as holding a voting lockup arrangement of some sort, the nature of which is not disclosed, but he's made it very clear to the mediators and to the debtor that he holds that threat.

And the debtors are kind, you know, they're like deer in a headlights with this. It's like if they think that they hold the veto over them emerging, they will do, in essence, almost anything he says. That's a problem.

And where -- let me just tie the connection to that that what was going on at Baron and Budd. You've seen also, by the way, with Mr. -- with the retention agreements that were disclosed here that in some ways, this sets up incentives that were even worse than what Justice Douglas was dealing with at the time because there it wasn't just the creditor interest, but here, you've seen those retention agreements -- 40 percent of the claim is held by these state court firms.

In addition to that, the Coalition legal fees, they -- if they obtain the emollients of control and they can

derive a plan as they want it, one of the things this submission said last night is they reserve the right to have the Coalition's legal fees -- Brown Rudnick's fees, and all the costs of the Coalition borne by the Claimants out of the plan itself, either through the plan or through the -- (Overlapping voices)

THE COURT: Ms. Beville, you'll have a chance to respond, but please don't interrupt.

MR. SCHIAVONI: But through a substantial contribution award. What happened in the Baron and Budd case was there was a pre-pet. It failed, just like the pre-pet here failed. The case went into a regular bankruptcy. That group that was formed pre- petition, they continued to operate as a group. And Judge Ferguson was -- you know, addressed that situation. She had some emails that were a little like what Mr. Kosnoff had. And she -- it was discovery there. We were permitted to take Mr. Rice's deposition of Motley Rice. And by the way, that's the same Mr. Rice and the same Motley Rice that is now behind the Coalition.

This firm has no history of any involvement in abuse -- sexual abuse cases with respect to the Boy Scouts as far as we've been able to ascertain.

They've interjected themselves at this point in the case.

When Mr. Rice was deposed, and one of the things that came out was that there were agreements by and between the law firms that were undisclosed to the clients about how this voting -- how the emollients of control, the benefits that they would derive from having a voting block would be racked up among the different participating law firms.

Judge Ferguson saw that, and she entered an order that basically sort of tracked 2019. And this disclosure requirement here that I don't think Mr. Ruggeri, or the Court is really focused on, but it's 2019(c)(2)(b). It's the one about disclosing the -- all disclosable economic interests. I mean, the Court probably could have just like kind of skipped over that, thinking that's just about the fact that they -- an abuse Claimant has a claim against the estate. But it's more than that, and Judge Ferguson realized that.

She was like I want on the table all of the arrangements that are out there. And what that led to was disclosure that among those law firms, they had agreed to kickback some of their fees to Mr. Rice, that there was a fee-sharing arrangement among them that was tied up into their -- into the voting lockup agreement that was in place.

And what was critical about that was that that then played itself out that the talk here about how these secured interests worked in that case, it played itself out over the course of the case because some Claimant groups --

there was a dispute. You've got some minor case in Imerys, and ultimately, you'll get a sense of here between how money is sort of to be allocated among the different types of claims and the different types of claims based on the proof they have.

Think about what you're presented here as far as this fact pattern. You have one set of lawyers and law firms, who by the way are not part of the Coalition, who historically have brought claims against the Boy Scouts, and there were a relatively small number of these claims going into the filing.

These lawyers think that because they vetted their clients and the rejected ones that they didn't think were meritorious, they think that their clients have very meritorious claims, and they've collected a lot of proof on them.

Then there's this other group, including the Motley Rice firm, has no history in these cases, which is somehow engage these call centers to generate huge numbers of claims by running cable TV ads very quickly. And it's like there's almost no proof on them at all, and we're going to find that they have a very different nature. And they're going to have a totally different interest than how a plan is designed, how the TDPs are designed, and what claimants get paid what. That was the exact dispute that played itself out

in Congoleum. And it totally distorted the plan so that there was an effort by the group, the controlling group, to put in place a TDP that you just simply had to sign -- just check a box that you were exposed to the product, and you got paid pretty much the same as most of the other people in the case.

That kind of dispute, I don't think you'll hear from Mr. Stang -- it's like what's going on behind the scenes is something that I don't think we'll hear from him. But it's like that kind of thing plays itself out here. And we brought a cross-motion -- we actually brought the motion in the first place, asking for an order that just ordered compliance with these different provisions, including a specific ordering clause of 2019(c)(2)(b) asking that each disclosable economic interest be put out.

To the extent the small group affirms have borrowed or may have borrowed a huge amount of money from third-party vendors, if they've ceded any control to those vendors in making settlement decisions, if they've reached any agreements between each other about fee sharing between them, that ought to be on the table. That ought to be disclosed so that the mediators and the debtor and us and the Court all understand their economic interests here.

Because with Congoleum, it turned that it led to the plan being held to be not in good faith because with

those economic interests on the table, it was clear to the court that TDPs were being distorted by these fee-sharing, split-up, you know, kickback agreements between the lawyers.

It's vital information. If we had had Mr. Kosnoff's deposition, we might have sort of been able to get a peek at what was going on. But without that discovery, you don't have any assurance at all of that compliance with 2019(c)(2)(b). That's why we'd ask for either -- you know, we could have the affirmative discovery on this or we could just have an affirmative order that we submit it with our motion a copy of the order that was entered by Judge Ferguson, that was upheld by the District Court, that laid out exactly what should be -- you know, how -- it's an order that tracks 2019 and requires these disclosures.

Otherwise, all we have are sort of these amorphous statements by counsel that are hearsay and untested that there's been compliance. But we really don't know. And that's why this is vital. It's vital to the tort committee. It's vital to us that we know that we have a fair process in front of us.

And that's, by the way, one of the reasons why the courts found that we had standing to be heard on this. It goes fundamentally to the process.

Your Honor, that's all I really have to say directly on Baron and Budd. I did pass to Mr. Ruggeri so --

we had a witness to put on. Just to comply with formalities here, we would tender Ms. Moore into evidence and ask that her declaration be accepted into evidence, and we offer her for cross.

THE COURT: Does anyone have an objection to Ms. Moore's two declarations being admitted into evidence?

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, the Coalition objects to the admission of the declarations as evidence. The declarations were filed less than 24 hours before the hearing and were being touted as expert reports. And Your Honor, it clearly defies compliance with any and all rules on discovery, on notice, on ability to ask any questions on an expert prior to the hearing.

There was no opportunity for the Coalition to review and respond and perhaps even retain its own expert to refute the conclusions that were made in the declaration.

Your Honor, the -- you may not have noticed, but the first declaration signed by the -- by Professor Moore was actually dated October 7th but was not filed with the Court until October 13th and was not provided any notice to any of the parties, at least to the Coalition counsel, that it was going to be filed.

And Your Honor, this is just consistent with what we've seen in the case. As Mr. Molton pointed out earlier with respect to delay, the late filing discovery, Your Honor

noticed at the last hearing that any discovery, evidentiary issues, should be dealt with right away. And I would argue for reason of it being submitted less than 24 hours before the hearing alone is reason to exclude those declarations as evidence.

And beyond that, Your Honor, if you were to consider the declarations, we would argue that the evidentiary value should be limited. We believe the declarations contain essentially legal conclusions, Your Honor, legal opinions that are not based on -- there's no methodology. There's simply a recitation of the rules, and then Professor Moore's conclusion as to how those apply to the facts of the case as interpreted by the insurers.

You know, the declarations violate Rule 702 as far as expert testimony and the Daubert standard.

It's simply a statement by a professor that does nothing more than recite general legal principles.

That is the model rule. And applies them to the facts of the case.

Your Honor, that is squarely within the province of the Court, of your determination as to how to apply the law to the facts of the case. And having an expert report, if you will, or a declaration of an outside counsel, we don't see there being any probative value to that.

Moreover, Your Honor, I would note that it's the

declaration is based on what's entirely the faulty premise of the use of ad hoc committees is improper and that ad hoc committee was never properly formed as an entity or an organization.

And in making that statement, she notes that the engagement letter was not signed on behalf of the ad hoc committee, cites to Rule 1.3 of the model rules, which she notes typically applies to corporations and partnerships.

The ad hoc committee, as I noted earlier, Your
Honor, is not a partnership or a corporation. It's a loosely
affiliated group of creditors that have retained bankruptcy
counsel in this bankruptcy case. And so some of the
statements, Your Honor, are predicated on false assumptions.
I'm not sure how I would characterize the statements the
engagement letters were not signed on behalf of the ad hoc
committee when it was a law firm representative that signed
on behalf of their clients, who are the Coalition members.

Your Honor, she states in her declaration in my opinion an informal group of 12,000 members is not capable on being represented as an organization separate from its individual members. It goes straight to the heart of the propriety of the role of an ad hoc committee in bankruptcy. It's a legal conclusion, Your Honor. It's not an expert opinion based on ordinary practice in these bankruptcy cases.

She notes that there is almost no authority for

treating other informal groups as entitled to (inaudible) status and notes that they're commonly applied to corporations or partnerships. She focuses as Mr. Ruggeri described, on the lack of a decision- making structure.

And here, Your Honor, was where the focus on the bylaws come into play. But you know, it was noted in the Washington Mutual court, the ad hoc committees are at-will. The bylaws as far as how new firms are added, who comes in, how are votes done, that is not what is required to be disclosed under Rule 2019, and the premise of the declaration assumes that bylaws are required to be disclosed, and I don't think that's a determination that's been made. I certainly haven't seen the case law supporting that the bylaws at ad hoc committees, which frankly are optional, may or may not exist in many ad hoc cases.

I haven't seen any cases -- certainly none that were cited by the insurance companies that require production of bylaws that Your Honor could change from time to time. I just don't see the relevance to those here.

And Your Honor, it disregards the fact that even the cases cited by the insurers involve ad hoc groups of a multitude of mass tort victims. In each of those cases, their own declaration would suggest that every single one of those cases violates some other rule.

And Your Honor, she offers no support as to why

the victims here, any conflict that may exist among the victims. She makes a simple statement that it rises to a level that materially impaired counsel from acting. And Your Honor asked the right question earlier today -- how is that different from any other mass tort case?

And you have a declaration, Your Honor, that states that as a fact. And what is the evidence cited to for that fact, Your Honor? She cited to her own book. That is the quote that she pulled out. It's not other cases. It's not decisions by judges. It's her own assessment of how ad hoc committees don't work in the bankruptcy context.

And Your Honor, there have been several cases where Professor Moore has submitted declarations, and in those cases, Your Honor, the courts, and I would request the Court do here, either excluded the declaration in its entirety based on the fact that they are (inaudible) legal conclusions and legal arguments, or at the very least, acknowledge that to the extent it is legal argument discarded the value and the evidentiary nature of those declarations.

Your Honor, I think this goes to -- and I appreciate that you're asking about the declaration, but I do want to touch on the ethics point because really the declaration focuses on the model rules and compliance with ethics.

And Your Honor, I can see you struggling with and

how to articulate it, Rule 2019 requires disclosure, and that's what the Coalition has done to date and what impact, if any, the concerns raised about the engagement letters have on the 2019 disclosure.

And Your Honor, from my perspective, it would not be in an ordinary case the insurance companies that would raise the issue as to whether or not there is a potential ethical violation in an agreement between two consenting parties. And in those cases, Your Honor, that would be an ethical violation, that it is typically the client, themselves, that raise the ethical violation.

Here, Your Honor, again, to go back to standing, I don't understand and have not articulated how the insurance companies have standing to raise issue with respect to the validity of the engagement letters between State Court counsel and their clients, especially, Your Honor, where here, we have a direct line of ability between (inaudible) as Coalition counsel with clients signing written acknowledgements affirmative consent here.

So Your Honor, to the extent that there are potential ethical issues, it's not a 2019 issue. What are the remedies here, Your Honor? Under 2019, the remedy is disclosure. I have not seen a case in the (inaudible) for context or otherwise where under 2019, a court has in mass, invalidated consensual attorney- client engagement letters

based on the attack by an insurance company. I haven't seen it before.

And so, for these reasons, Your Honor, we believe the declaration should not be admitted as evidence and to the extent that it is, that the legal conclusions and the legal arguments made should be disregarded by the Court.

I also have a number of responses to the other issues raised, but I will wait for Your Honor to let me know when you're ready to hear that.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. I'll hear any response to Ms. Beville's objection to the entry into evidence of the declaration, and then, I'll hear argument from the committee.

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, James Ruggeri, again, for Hartford. Thank you. With regard to the timing, I think the timing of the filings, Court admonished the parties earlier today, those have been coming in fast and furiously, and Professor Moore was responding to the filings as they were made, that we engage an expert to opine on these issues comes as no surprise to anyone. We previewed that at the September 9th hearing when we asked for time to consult with folks on the conflicts that we saw were presented.

With regard to the argument that it's impermissible legal opinion, we disagree. In fact, the premise of the Coalition's filing last night and their other

papers was the sufficiency of the written consent of the underlying claimants for the state court counsel to engage the Coalition counsel on their behalf.

Professor Moore's declarations go to the sufficiency of the Claimants' consent from the perspective of a legal ethics expert. It's not impermissible legal opinion testimony. Counsel references that Professor Moore's declarations have been not accepted in other cases.

I don't know the other cases to which she's referring. But it's clear from the resume that we submitted on behalf of Professor Moore, there's a reference that she has been accepted in various other cases as an appropriate expert opinion and her expert opinion is appropriate in this case. Again, it goes directly to the issue that was raised by the Coalition at filings, including, again, last night, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SCHIAVONI: (Inaudible), Your Honor, we cite specific cases, Oklahoma PAC, 122 BR 392, and in re Matter FNC International, 194 -- or 1994 Bankruptcy Lexis 274 at page 8, which is (inaudible). Both of those cases deal specifically with how 2019 is -- although it's a disclosure requirement, it's one like bankruptcy rule 2014 and 2016 in that, to quote Oklahoma PAC, "The Court should also play a role in ensuring that the lawyers adhere to certain ethical

standards. Rule 2019 was designed for such a purpose," cited in our papers.

The FNC case similarly says that the 2019 is -fits into these issues because it's to try to determine
whether there's actual real authority for the parties to act.
So we cite those cases for the support for Ms. Moore. Thank
you.

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, if I could please respond on the two cases. The Oklahoma PAC case, Your Honor, dealt with a law firm that represented two secure creditors with competing liens on the same property that was being sold and valued as part of bankruptcy case.

In that case, Your Honor, the Court said that (inaudible) confirms here because the value of this property becomes an issue, there will be an immediate conflict between the law firm's two clients. And in that case, Your Honor, the lawyer freely admitted that there was an insurmountable conflict between his two clients was forced to withdraw.

I don't -- that case is not applicable in any fashion here, and the FNC case, Your Honor, that was just cited by Mr. Schiavoni. That was a law firm was filing a mass proof of claim on behalf of a number of different claimants and have not filed a Rule 2019 disclosure statement. And again, Your Honor, the relief -- the remedy in that case was disclosure under Rule 2019. Thank you, Your

1 | Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any conflict between -- for counsel for having clients on the -- as part of the Coalition and clients that aren't?

MS. BEVILLE: No, Your Honor. The Coalition represents the collective interest of the sexual abuse victims, and I read in, for example, in Oklahoma, there was a competing priority as to secured assets here. I don't believe there is a conflict at all, certainly not one that would prohibit a law firm from acting on behalf of the collective interest of the sexual abuse victims. And in fact, in essence, the other non-members of the Coalition would essentially get the benefit of, you know, the representation of the Coalition of the collective interest of the members, but there's not a conflict that exists between the clients themselves, Your Honor.

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, James Ruggeri for
Hartford, our response is potentially and very likely there
is a conflict, and that's presumably why the Court may have
raised the question because the agendas of the Coalition
members may be very different from the agenda of the nonCoalition members.

We haven't yet vetted the claims, so I don't know for sure, but the strength and weakness of the claims, the entitlement to recover assets may you put those camps in

conflict, if you will, so there is definitely the potential for a conflict and there very likely is a conflict, Your Honor.

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, and that conflict is the same that you would see in any other mass tort bankruptcy where there's different levels of injuries. And here, there is not a plan in place, Your Honor. There has not yet been discussions about the various — how that would even be treated, and it is the agenda of the Coalition if you go for equitable treatment of all sexual abuse victims.

And I think, Your Honor, the touting of potential conflicts between the sexual abuse victims, it's a red herring, Your Honor. You know, these sexual abuse victims have a right to be heard. They have a right to have counsel at the bargaining table.

They have a right to form a group to be heard, and whether it's a group of 5 victims or 1000 victims or 20,000 victims, Your Honor, there is the ability under Rule 2019 to act as an ad hoc committee. And the only requirement, Your Honor, under 2019 is disclosure. And here, I submit, again, that the Coalition has made all the relevant disclosures, and again, Your Honor, I would like to go back to some of the points that were made earlier.

The Coalition members are those that have signed affirmative consent. There was question about, you know,

there being another amended 2019 and, you know, the smoke and mirrors. We don't know who they represent. Your Honor, there is no confusion. The additional filing that would be made within seven days is just to identify the subset of 28,000, the 7,300 that have filed affirmative consent. It would be the same names and addresses that were already produced.

It will just be a smaller group.

The amended 2019 statement itself will not be substantially changed, simply narrowing down the names and addresses, and the only reason it wasn't filed earlier, Your Honor, is just the technical issues of producing that information. There --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from Mr. Stang.

MR. STANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor,

I'm going to address one very specific issue that's come out
in the course of the now, let's see, two-and- a-half hours of
discussion. I'm not going to repeat what is in all papers.

But on the specific -- and then, I want to address something that Ms. Beville has said, and Mr. Molton has said because as someone pointed out, there's a real conflation here of (inaudible) and 2019 and the motion for allowing the Coalition to be (inaudible) party. But on the very specific issue, when it goes to the bylaws, it's unclear who has accepted these bylaws. They may exist but have the 7,300

people who have given the affirmative consents adopted those bylaws, which might delegate authority.

I suspect the answer to that is no because when you look at docket number 1429 at page -- I think this is 102 of the PDF, which is the invite to people to join the Coalition, which is a vast improvement over what they did before, which is opt-out. There is no reference at all to bylaws.

And then, when you look at the new -- what do they call them -- the amendment (inaudible) to the engagement letters, the new law firms are referred to as new voting representatives. Well, I did a word search in this document to see when that phrase first arose or even voting representative. And it does not appear until these amended or additional law firm agreements.

So someone was a voting representative before because when you call someone a new voting representative, there must have been someone else. So A, who adopted these bylaws, and B, maybe the bylaws explain who were the voting representatives before since we now have new voting representatives.

So as to the specific issues that have been brought up today, I think they raise some really important concerns. I'm not going to go over them again because I think after two-and-a-half hours, you probably have heard

1 | enough about the details of this.

But I do want to make a comment about Mr.

Molton's introduction, and some things Ms. Beville has said.

And again, we are conflating a lot of matters that are on the agenda. And maybe we'll end up with you ruling across the board at one time or another.

The Coalition, in their papers and in comments today, have made some very, very inflammatory comments about the Tort Claimants here. They have said that victims need to be heard, that the parties raising these very important 2019 issues are trying to stop them.

Well, we're one of the ones who raised some important issues, and the suggestion -- not the suggestion, the expressed statement that we are trying to stop victims from being heard is insulting. It is without any support and is an attack on nine men who have spent months trying to get this case in a go-forward direction.

And it's especially insulting when Ms. Beville and Mr. Molton know that on August 21st, the TCC agreed in an email to them, which they acknowledged and accepted, that every one of their clients of the underlying state court counsel and Brown Rudnick that at the time I think it was the predecessor local counsel firm, could be mediation parties.

They accepted that offer and looked forward working together. So how dare they say to you and to the

world that this committee of fiduciaries is trying to stop victims from being heard? They can't accept yes for an answer.

And so it raises the issue, really, of why the Coalition. Maybe it's so that they can try to figure out how to make a substantial contribution claim because otherwise, we have invited them into the tent. We did it two months ago, and Mr. Molton wants to talk about wasting time.

Given what we agreed to, they are the ones that are wasting time for purposes that, frankly, I cannot discern. The TCC is focused on trying to get the information necessary to negotiate in the mediation, make monetary demands where appropriate, and negotiate TDPs where appropriate.

The Rule 2004 exam letter that you heard, first matter on the agenda, reflects that we have spent months, in fact, with the BSA, the entire case, trying to get documents. And the Coalition has joined our limited 2004 exam, but the idea that we are to rush to a mediation without full disclosure tells me that there's a race to the bottom here.

No one can negotiate a case without asking for insurance policies. No one can negotiate this case without finding out the local council assets, restricted, unrestricted. No one can negotiate this case without knowing the rosters, which, amongst other things, won't disclose the

identity of parties are likely -- they want to be part of a (inaudible) response reorganizations, local churches and clubs that brought these troops into existence.

So I suspect this we-need-to-get-this-done-quickly reflects some of the mass tort aspects of this case.

The final issue that I wanted to mention, Your Honor, is that -- is this -- the mediator statement.

We were shocked that mediators who are neutrals chimed in on a contested matter before you. And while there was a qualification that the Coalition -- this is the qualification, using the same term -- if qualified, should be part of the process.

That qualification made go to the 2019 issue that, in fact, they're advocating on an issue that is before the Court. And we had hoped -- we hope they do that again because we don't think it is appropriate.

So Your Honor, the specific issue was bylaws, who are the voting representatives, and I wanted you to really hear our position as you go into any additional argument on mediation party that the notion that our committee is not doing its job is -- I don't even have -- is so unfortunate, that in an effort for the Coalition maybe to establish a right to legal fees is attacking the fiduciaries in this case. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, it's David Molton. Can

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I -- we conflated the mediation issues here. Can I just
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    preface a number of things and then, turn it over to
   Ms. Beville?
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               THE COURT: No, I haven't gotten to the mediation
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   motion.
               MR. MOLTON: Okay, that's fine.
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               THE COURT: I'm on the Rule 2019 motion. And I'd
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    like to finish that up, and then, we'll move to the next
   motion. I don't think I'm going to rule independently
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   because I think these are intertwined. And so I understand
    the difficulty, perhaps, in untwining them for purposes of
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    argument, but I want to make sure the 2019 issues are -- have
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   been fully vetted.
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               MR. MOLTON: That's fine, Judge. That's why I
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   asked. Thank you.
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               MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, may I respond on the
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    2019 points? I --
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MS. BEVILLE: -- would appreciate (inaudible), as
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   well, I will also keep it brief.
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               Your Honor, we heard a lot from the insurance
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    companies regarding, you know, who are -- who are the parties
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    represented. I think it's clear, Your Honor, that we
    represent the individuals that returned the affirmative
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    consents, and as of today, that number is 7,300. Your Honor,
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as we noted earlier in the hearing, we will provide supplemental updates as that number changes materially as any other ad hoc committee would as their membership changes.

Your Honor, there's been a lot of focus on, you know, the term voting representatives and the bylaws must be, you know, super important because we don't know, you know, the voting representatives, we don't have the empowering documents.

Your Honor, the empowering documents are the retention agreements. Bylaws are not empowering documents. They don't grant authority. They may govern whether it's inter-issues among representatives or what the quorum at a meeting and that your vote issues, Your Honor, are not necessary. And as you noted, some people may like to see them, but it doesn't mean it's required under Rule 2019.

And again, Your Honor, I haven't seen any cases where production of bylaws is required under Rule 2019 or otherwise. And Your Honor, just to be clear, it is stated very clearly in our engagement letter that the law firms will direct (inaudible) on behalf of their clients. That is -- I don't think there can be any confusion as to that statement.

Your Honor, the insurers, you know, said there's not a need here for the ad hoc committee, and I'm not understanding how that is at all relevant, the insurers' view of whether or not we're necessary, how that's relevant to

2019, especially where we have the debtors and the mediators supporting the ad hoc committee's participation (inaudible), Your Honor, that's not a 2019 issue.

There seemed to be reference about the affirmative consents and are they valid or not, and I just want to remind the Court and the parties on the call here that the affirmative consents do and will be monitored by the United States Trustee. That was a request from the United States Trustee that we agreed to. So the United States Trustee has the ability to audit those affirmative consents.

The agreement with the U.S. Trustee also includes the provision, though I don't think it needs to be stated, but it is expressly stated, that the 2019 disclosure is without prejudice to any parties' views, remedies, future motions on any ethical issues.

Your Honor, Tim Kosnoff's name has had come up a few times, and Your Honor, again, I'm not sure, I think the mood of confusion is not a disclosure issue, it's that people don't like the answer.

Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Van Arsdale resigned from the Coalition. They have no role on the Coalition, Your Honor. They're not -- they resigned as voting representatives.

They're not -- they don't participate on calls. They don't receive correspondence. The Eisenberg Rothweiler firm has continued on as a member of the Coalition. That has been

disclosed. And their clients, Your Honor, have received the affirmative consents. They are among the groups that are responding and returning those affirmative consents.

THE COURT: Should it concern me that those two lawyers may be calling shots behind the scenes that are not disclosed?

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, there -- the engagement letter identifies the co-counsel's relationships among Eisenberg Rothweiler firm, and Van Arsdale and Tim Kosnoff firm, so it has been disclosed, it's in the retention agreement. And the unredacted version identifies and discloses the (inaudible) among those law firms.

So I don't think that there is any more to be disclosed. I am sure, Your Honor, that those attorney conversations, that they have co-counsel relationships with their clients. But as among the Coalition and Coalition counsel, we have only had interactions with the attorneys at Eisenberg Rothweiler.

THE COURT: Isn't that kind of artificial?

MS. BEVILLE: I don't think so, Your Honor. I

think there's, you know, there -- I don't have the -- I don't

see it being artificial in that we have one (inaudible) on

the Coalition. You have co-counsel that are not. They do

not participate in the discussions. They do not have a vote.

If there is correspondence among lawyers, you

know, behind the scenes, I'm sure that people all talk to each other on different levels. But I don't think there's anything artificial about it at all, Your Honor, and it's been fully disclosed under 2019.

THE COURT: It's been disclosed. It's -- and I don't know if the circumstances around the occurrence of the resignations matter. It's certainly been disclosed. It raises questions in my mind. Okay.

MS. BEVILLE: Your Honor, there's been questions about (inaudible) engagement. I will note that the affirmative consents acknowledge the (inaudible) engagement and (inaudible) ratified that. The questions about divergent conflicts and, Your Honor, the only conflicts that have been identified that I'm aware of is potential conflicts among the clients as identified by insurers that we relayed to you, the victims have varied degrees of injury or harm that they suffered.

And I would argue that that certainly doesn't rise to the level of precluding participation of law firms, especially in the mass tort context, Your Honor. There's been no evidence that that conflict actually exists.

And there's been questions raised as to whether the individuals are aware that the Coalition does not represent them individually. And Your Honor, that was made very clear in the affirmative consents that have been signed

by these individuals. Your Honor, I just want to note again, attention's been made regarding the Kosnoff email. I just want to highlight that that email predated the formation of the Coalition. It was sent in June.

The Coalition was not formed until July 18th.

And whatever agenda was set forth in that email or

(inaudible) agenda is not, I think, at all reflective of the

Coalition's actions that have been taken to date. And I

don't see that what one attorney may have emailed, whether it

was a venting or something he truly believed, is not relevant

to the Coalition today, especially as that individual is no

longer a member, a law firm voting representative on the

Coalition.

Your Honor, there was also some question regarding the economics of the state court counsel and I'd just like to remind the Court that those contingency agreements, similar to those that were requested in the Baron and Budd case, were made available and I just want to make note the reason for my interruption was that Mr. Schiavoni was making reference to information that was filed under seal and making it now publicly available, in violation of the order to file under seal.

And just to touch on the Baron and Budd case, Your Honor, the facts of that case were very different. There was a lock-up agreement that was negotiated pre-petition, and

there did seem to be economic incentives within the plan itself. I was not a party to that as Mr. Schiavoni was, but that is not the case that we have here.

And to the extent that the mediators have had any questions, Your Honor, we have been able to answer those, and I have not -- there have been no discussion of economic interest in the plan when especially you are here, the agreements have all been disclosed, including the percentage sharing between different co- counsel arrangements.

And I do want to just address briefly Mr. Stang's comments that somehow the Coalition is dividing itself to overtake TCC and its fiduciary duty. And Your Honor, we've made crystal clear in our papers and any inferences by Mr. Molton or I that the TCC is not a fiduciary or has not been acting on behalf of the sexual abuse victims is false. In fact, we recognize their fiduciary duty. We recognize that they are the statutory-appointed committee representing sexual abuse victims.

But, Your Honor, sexual abuse victims and (inaudible) generally have a right to their own counsel. And I don't think that that in any way is overtaking, overriding, or trying to in any way undermine the TCC. In many other cases, Your Honor, there are official committees and there are ad hoc committees. And that is a fact of life in these bankruptcy cases.

And I just want to note as to the agreement that had been reached with counsel for the TCC on the 2019 issues and participation in the cases, we have reached an agreement. We disclosed that in our motions before the Court, but the agreement was premised on acceptance of those terms by other parties in the case, and those terms were not accepted by other parties in the case.

And so we would find ourselves in the same position today, Your Honor, had we tried to move forward where the insurers were objecting to participation on behalf of the Coalition and on behalf of the law firm, on behalf of lots of clients, however you framed it.

And so it's that reason, Your Honor, that we move forward filing a 2019 statement and seeking the ability to appear in these cases on behalf of the Coalition, which is how this group originally came together.

So Your Honor, and any inference, also, Your Honor, about the cases moving quickly, we have been relaying information received by the debtors and by the mediators. There has been no need for speed, if you will, recognized by the Coalition other than its time to get started on the substantive (inaudible) discussions. We would like to have a seat at that table, but before we can get there, we need to have a ruling that we have complied with Rule 2019 disclosure. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. STANG: Your Honor, this is Mr. Stang. I know you'd like to conduct these hearings in an orderly way, but something Ms. Beville just said is simply not true, and I think you should know that.

When we -- when she acknowledged our agreement to allow the law firms, including Brown Rudnick, to appear for mediation on behalf of their clients and all future clients, she wrote email in response. She said we accept your offer on behalf of the law firms noted in your email below. We, then, reserve the right for the Coalition and its members to participate in the mediation.

But when she says that their acceptance was conditional, the next sentence in her email says, we look forward to receiving the TCC's mediation brief and working hard to construct (inaudible) mediation parties. They're only entitled to the mediation brief if they're a mediation party. So their acceptance of the offer was not conditional.

They reserved rights to expand who the mediation party was, but it was not a conditional acceptance of our agreement that all of their clients be mediation parties and appear through their law firms. Thank you, Your Honor, and I'm sorry to do that because I know you don't like the back and forth, but that was just not a true statement.

THE COURT: Okay. The 2019 argument is concluded. We're going to take a break. Trying to see what's next on

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the agenda.
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               MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor, Derek Abbott, it's the
   mediation motion, docket item number 7.
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               THE COURT: Okay. We are going to an hour. I'm
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    going to try to take a quick look at what was filed last
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    night, which I haven't seen that everyone's talking about.
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               So we will reconvene at quarter to 2. We're in
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    recess.
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          (Recess taken at 12:46 p.m.)
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          (Proceedings resumed at 1:48 p.m.)
               THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Abbott, you said we were
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    on --
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               MR. ABBOTT: I think we're up to Item Number 7 on
    the agenda, Your Honor, which is a motion for participation
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    and mediation, again, by the Coalition.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, that's me, David Molton
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    for Brown Rudnick on behalf of the Coalition.
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               And again, Your Honor, it's a pleasure and an
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   honor to address this Court. A lot of the issues that were
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    discussed this morning really come down to the question of
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    the Coalition's motion for participation and mediation. And
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    I'll -- I'm going to try to address those. I want to be
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    concise, Your Honor, I want to give you the facts, and I want
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    to give you answers to some of the questions as well as deal
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with some of the attacks that were levelled against the Coalition.

One of the first actions the Coalition took, Your Honor, as to the formation -- is formation, was to request participation in the mediation. Indeed, Your Honor, the entire -- the Coalition's entire purpose is to advocate for its members' interest in this case in order to get to a fair, equitable and just resolution.

And the Court has made clear that all of this should be negotiated through the mediation process. That's an admirable goal, it's one that saves resources of the Debtor and other case (inaudible), and it's one that has achieved success in other mass tort cases, and I'll deal with that shortly.

Most significantly, with the active participation of ad hoc committees who may or may not be represented by the creditors' committee as well who includes constituents. In sum, Your Honor, when boiled down the entire morning and all the arguments we heard on September 9th, really the argument comes down to this one last question; whether or not we, the Coalition, should be permitted to participate if a significant stakeholder party in this case, any significant interested party, representing significant stakeholder in the mediation, that motion, Your Honor, is at 1161 of the docket as we understand.

Your Honor, I heard a lot this morning of misdirection and attack, and it's a shame that with so much at stake for these young men, old men, perhaps some women, that this evolved into attacks, attacks on law firms, attacks on individuals, on 20-year-old cases. In any event, Your Honor, the bona fides of our Coalition, the bona fides of our disclosure, the work that we've done to try to get this thing done properly and (indiscernible) up, Your Honor, cannot be denied, as well as the work we've already done in this mediation.

So I'm not going to utilize misdirection and attack. I'm going to try and deal squarely and solely with the facts. One of the things, Judge, is that, you know, there's -- as Ms. Beville noted, we have 7,300 Coalition members who have signed affirmative consents. That number may grow. Your Honor may know that we've heard a lot from my friend who represents the insurers that, oh, my God it's only 7,300. They had said earlier it was more. Well, the 7,300 isn't that much off from the 12,000 that existed when we first made our motion and notwithstanding we anticipate that we're going to have a lot more Coalition members with affirmative consent, and with updates and filing and supplements to 2019, you know, done in accordance (indiscernible).

It seems to be, Your Honor, they're unable to

really address the narrative mediation. The 2019 has become a club by which those objectors who stand against our participation are relegated or forced to you in order to do that. And that's a shame, Your Honor, because as I think as Your Honor noted earlier today, and certainly I'm not going to put words in Your Honor's mouth, but 2019 is a disclosure item. And a lot of your questions to my friends who are in the objecting side had to go with, well, how did you deal with the disclosure issue? In any event, I think it's a fact to realize that one of the things that is being done is utilizing the 2019, you know, issue as a weapon on what is the mediation motion.

I do want to deal, before I get into, you know, the more substance of my discussion to deal with something that Mr. Stang said regarding, you know, our agreement as to how we would participate when we get objections to the Coalition (inaudible) so. And I also want to address also his, what I think is an unfortunate attack on what is a very qualified and esteemed group of mediators --

THE COURT: Before you do, Mr. Molton -- before you do, let me remind everyone, please check your phones and make sure you have them muted if you are not Mr. Molton.

MR. MOLTON: Thank you, Judge, I appreciate that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MOLTON: And I'm getting hoarse, Judge, so

maybe that's a part of the problem, too. Too much speaking.

But Paragraph 3 of Your Honor's order which is Document 812,

and I'm going to read an excerpt from it.

Any additional party or parties who wish to participate in the mediation, including without limitation any additional insurers, shall be included in the mediation if, one, all the mediation parties agree to include such additional party or parties in the mediation, and two, the mediators agree that the participation of such additional party or parties if necessary would be beneficial to the mediation.

I didn't draft this order, Judge, this was no doubt done through negotiated efforts by the TCC, the debtors and others, signed by you. But Mr. Stang's offer and our agreement to Mr. Stang's offer didn't get us into the mediation, Judge. What gets us into the mediation are all the mediation parties agreeing to include such additional party or parties in the mediation, as well as the consent of the mediators or the agreement of the mediators.

When Mr. Stang made the offer, in an effort to move this case along, because we also agree with the debtor and with the mediators that time is of the essence. We're really looking at a four-month window before things can start going sideways. And that's just not just my opinion, Judge, that's the opinion of a lot of folks who have done this sort

of case, these sort of cases for a lot of time.

So in any event, Judge, we did agree as Mr. Stang reminded Ms. Beville, and as we actually told Your Honor in our mediation motion that we would agree to a compromise.

That compromise was not accepted by the insurers, so we -- we asked for their consent and we were told, you know, we weren't given that consent. So that's why we made the motion, Judge, and there's nothing bad faith about it, there's nothing wrong about it. And indeed in the motion we fully advised you of those facts. So I just want to put that on the side, because my friend, Mr. Stang, wanted that to have an emphasis added, and I just thought you should know, you know, where we came from and what the actual facts on the ground were.

And second of all, Judge, the order that the parties negotiated gives the mediator standing to make an assessment to give -- to make an agreement that participation of such additional party or parties is necessary or would be beneficial to the mediation. And they did that yesterday, Judge, on a standalone pleading filed by debtor's counsel, where they said the absence of the Coalition at the mediation party has and will continue to hinder the mediator's efforts to guide the parties to a place of consensus, the time for which grows increasingly short.

Now, some folks may not like the fact that they

used the term "time grows increasingly short", or that they said based on their collective wisdom and opinion, that the absence of the Coalition as a mediation partner will hinder the mediator's efforts, but the order itself that was negotiated by, you know, no doubt one of the very parties who raised the issue of the mediator's statement, really gives them that ability, and if not remarkable, in cases for mediators to report on these and other issues. So I just wanted to get that behind us, Your Honor, because I think it's important to do so.

Judge, taking the Court's comments to heart from the last sharing where Your Honor did say at the end -- well, the mediator said, I know Your Honor scolded me, because in my haste I may have misspoke it, but you did say that, you know, nothing you're doing is stopping us from talking to the mediators, the mediators talking to them. We've been doing that, Judge, and we've been continuing to share information with them. We're continuing to meet their requests for information, for advice and for help.

And in so doing, we've also done it with other parties as well, Judge. We've been -- you know, with respect to the debtors, as Ms. Beville noted, and last time we'd given them robust data regarding, you know, at that time all the Coalition, what we said at that point, the 12,000, because I know people get hung up over these words. I'm not

going to use them, I'm just going to say the 12,000, because now we've agreed, per the US (indiscernible) limit our representation to those who file affirmative consent.

In that robust data, Judge, which described counsel at which the abuse may be connected which describes the individual, which describes the nature of the abuse, which describes location, is exactly what is needed for the mediators, the debtors and the insurers and the local counsel to move forward. I do want to note, Judge, that we just reached an agreement with local counsel who are interested in that data as well, because we have data that can attribute certain abuse claims to various local counsels and that's important in how they assess going forward in the mediation.

So we've agreed to do that with them. And we've also been in, you know, in contact with -- with other parties, too, about the sharing of information.

Interestingly, Judge, the insurers have asked us for that information. And so they want the benefit of our -- what we would do to participate in the mediation but without giving us that seat.

So in any event, I must say that until our position is -- certainly, we'd love to start sharing that information, you know, as I mentioned before at the last hearing, we're creating a database that's eminently usable and deliverable and manipulatable that is going to be of

unbelievable value with all of these claimants' claims in it, but we need a seat at the table. We can't get at this point without Your Honor's help. And right now there's two objectors. There's many mediation parties, but only two objectors, and I'm going to get to that in a minute, but we need a seat at the table. We need to be able to be privy to the fulsome discussions under mediation confidentiality of what's going on in that room between those three very talented mediators and the various parties.

Other parties agree with us on that, Your Honor.

I'm delighted to say that the debtors from the very get-go
have been supportive of our efforts to join the mediation.

We liaise with them constantly, we discuss various issues
with them, we don't necessarily agree with them all the time,
but that's the world we're in; that's bankruptcy. But in any
event, I think we all have a interest in moving the case
forward.

There are other mediation parties that are subject to the mediation order who are not objectors, Judge, who we've also been liaising with and dealing with. The FCR, Jim Patton (phonetic), the ad hoc committee of local counsel that I just mentioned, as well as the non-tort UCC.

So in any event, Judge, it's -- I think I mentioned it last time, if I didn't, I may have mentioned it to somebody else. It's as if we're in this with two hands

behind our back and our legs tied. And people want to use us, but they don't want us to be part in it, you know, part of the process. So in any event, our request to be a participant in the mediation that may result in a plan that certainly involves our Coalition members who comprise a significant portion of the pool of abuse victims is not -- is not remarkable and should, under most circumstances, have met little or no resistance.

And that gets me, Your Honor, to dealing with why. Why do we have the resistance? Why do we have -- it's almost like they protest too much and we've seen that, Judge, we've seen the attacks, we've seen the attacks against lawyers, we've seen the attacks against law firms. Interestingly, I want to deal with a few things. You heard about the conflicts. You know, the law firms that are associated with our Coalition, you know, are leaders in national tort. Great experience in NDLs, in bankruptcies, and I'm going to get to that in a minute, and otherwise -- and wonderful experience. No doubt that many of the parties who welcomed to the mediation treasure our wonderful experience in helping attain that old consensual, global resolution.

In any event, we've heard a little bit of what really is the elephant in the room, and I just want to touch on it before I go off -- go on, Your Honor.

But the elephant in the room, and I think it was

one of my insurers counsel friends, I don't know if it was
Mr. Schiavoni or Hartford's counsel, who basically said well,
you know, there's these other lawyers not in the Coalition.
Maybe he was referring to the ones who stand behind the nine
members of the TCC that had been doing this and work up their
cases and -- and have been in this field.

Well, the fact is, Judge, that the whole, you know, bankruptcy of the Boy Scouts is a national case, Boy Scouts is a national agency, this isn't a one-off diocese. You have heard it is a national case, the opening of the limitations windows and various big states with lots of historical Boy Scout participation has made it a mass tort.

And guess what, that's what this has become. And the bottom line maybe, Judge, that the folks who have been in this field for a long time don't like the fact that experience, sophisticated, mass tort lawyers are coming in.

And it's just a fact. And it's not true that the folks that the -- the law firm representative associated with the Coalition are new to the game. I don't think that's fair. I think the folks associated with abuse in scouting, you know, the Rothweiler, Eisenberg Firm have been at this for 25 years.

Also, others in our firm have had decades of experience dealing, you know, with not just national mass torts, but also on occasion abuse cases, but not necessarily

predominantly, but clearly there's something to it that, you know, hey, don't come in my sandbox.

And the elephant in the room is that -- and I'm going to get to what -- how I think it's shown in a couple minutes, but I don't think you can put that out of what's going on here, especially in light of the attacks we've seen. But the talent, Your Honor, that comes with our participation looking why it is that so many mediation parties, including the debtors and the mediators themselves say that, to use the mediators' terms, our absence will hinder their efforts.

The talent we're bringing is pretty impressive, and I'm not just talking and I don't want to toot Brown Rudnick's horn, but Brown Rudnick and myself personally have been involved recently and over 20 years in some of the most major mass tort bankruptcies in the country and have helped arrive at settlements and global resolutions that have resulted in confirmed plans, both in connection with our role as committee counsel sometimes, and sometimes as ad hoc counsel.

So the fact that the Coalition decided to hire

Brown Rudnick is a good thing, we think, although I have

self-interest in saying that, but we think it's a good thing,

because we bring a lot of experience to the table. You know,

and I'm going to get to that in a minute, but also the law

firms who are participant -- you know, are the

representatives of and representing our Coalition members individually have immense experience.

And part of that experience, Judge, goes -- you know, and Mr. Schiavoni mentioned it when referring to the Baron & Budd case, because these wars between the insurance company and national mass tort lawyers has been going on for some time. We've got lots and lots of case law about it, and the bottom line is that some of the most experienced, nimble and thoughtful people on how to deal with insurance companies in mass tort as part of the law firms that are in our Coalition.

And you know, we -- our Coalition law firm member rep has been recently involved in (indiscernible) which happened next door to you, where Judge Carey was the mediator. And you know, I represented the plaintiff's executive committee of the National Opioid MBL which was made a mediation party, and utilizing Judge Carey and, you know, with the work of many, we got to a solution. That case now is with Judge Dorsey.

Purdue, Your Honor, has a plethora of ad hoc committees, an ad hoc committee of hospitals, ad hoc committee of NAS (indiscernible) plaintiff, ad hoc committee of personal injury claimants, three governmental ad hoc committees. We represented the ad hoc committee of what we call the consenting states, that's about half of the states.

Municipalities including the PEC again (indiscernible), that
basically cuts the framework of the settlement with the
Sacklers and what could do in the bankruptcy.

As we wrote in our paper, Your Honor, Judge Drain, along with all the parties, including the UCC in that case of which all the ad hoc committees that I just mentioned were arguably represented by -- not just arguably, they were -- the UCC the fiduciary, all of them, even the government entities that can't sit on the UCC. The UCC is a fiduciary.

They all recognize the importance of -- of involving all of these constituent groups in the mediation. They -- some pretty talented mediators were hired, Ken Feinberg and Lane Phillips, and we've disclosed in a more recent paper, Judge, that the mediators issued a statement that set forth in our record on September 23rd, 1920 [sic], announcing much to Judge Drain's happiness, I'll say, he was pleased, I would imagine, that the -- those parties had come to terms at least on term sheets with respect to each of the individual opioid claimants and what they would be getting out of the estate.

I could go on, Your Honor. PG&E, another case that dealt with fire victim claimants, also had mediation and the TCC, there was a tort claimants can be there with -- together with a group of fire victim professionals were made mediation parties. And that (indiscernible) by Judge Montali

in that mediation actually, you know, was utilized on various occasions for various successes in various names.

So what we're asking for, Your Honor, here is really not remarkable. We think constructive, we think valuable. Lots of other folks in this case believe it to be the case as well. And you know, unfortunately, we've had to spend valuable time and resources getting to this place. And I don't think Ms. Beville was incorrect when she mentioned that, you know, if we had accepted the deal that Mr. Stang offered which we were willing to go through, you know, as noted, Judge, required to consent of all, we probably would've been having the same argument.

I mean, you know, who can read (indiscernible), but the bottom line is, we would have had to make a motion. So in any event, but what -- getting back to, Judge, what the nature of this case involves and why it's so important for us to be here.

The bottom line is there's going to be a lot of cases. And there's going to be a lot of claims. And that's not a function of what my friends from the insurance side call fake claims or ginned up claims. That has to do with the fact that you've now opened windows into lots of states, but also the bar date order here says, irrespective of whether your state has a window or not, you're required to file if you want to preserve your claim. That was the bar

date order that was negotiated.

And Judge, it should be noted, and I think Ms. Beville made the point, but you know, we know -- you know, what's publicly available from the -- what they call the perversion files, it's not my name on it, that's the name other people have ascribed to it, including I think the Los Angeles Times, that there are 8,000 known predators and that those files were not complete; there's more to them. And we also know, I think, and I've been told and seen information that, you know, with respect -- that enamored some people say as much as 117 abuse incidents per predator, but even if you accepted more conservative figure 10 to 20, and even in that 10 to 20, you knock it down to 10, you're really -- you're talking about 80,000 claims.

So the bottom line is it shouldn't be surprising under the context of how this bankruptcy came about, the fact that the Boy Scouts themselves, you know, and what happened there and the lack of control and the lack of supervision and the folks who were allowed to come in and harm young men over decades, it shouldn't be surprising that you're going to have lots of claims here. And this has become much, much to the chagrin of some of the folks on this Zoom room a mass tort; it's just the way it's become. And that's the reality of the situation.

In any event, Judge, I do want to note, because I

know that in the insurers' recent filing from last night they said that the number of claims cannot be squared with what existed in the court system prior to beat the BSA bankruptcy or prior abuse cases. So what? Is my reaction to it.

And I point them up to Judge Drain's courtroom in Purdue, where if you look at the amount of personal injury claims in the tort system before the filing was the minimus next to -- and I'm probably undercounting it, 114 -- 120,000 files proof of claims for personal injury in the Purdue bankruptcy regarding personal injury claims that barely existed in the tort system before the bankruptcy was filed.

So before I get to deal with each of the insurers' objection, I do want to deal with another elephant in the room, because it's one that I've had to deal with as Coalition counsel since, you know, I first saw the pleading from Mr. Stang that disclosed a June e-mail from Mr. Kosnoff.

From my perspective, Judge, I'm one -- and those who know me know and -- and the folks I represent will tell you, I look ahead. I don't look behind.

I don't know what happened in June that caused that e-mail. Listen, I've been in the business of dealing with plaintiff lawyers for over 20 years, I've seen some interesting e-mails, but in any event, I'd like you to note two things. First, Paragraph 37 of our pleading -- earlier pleading, which is I think at 1257 on the dock -- 1257 on the

docket, I hope I'm not wrong on that, if so, I'll get you the right one. But I'm going to quote myself because I think I wrote this.

These cases will not move forward with insults and (indiscernible) and disclosing noncurrent e-mails that may more truly reflect a writer's frustration or anger of the moment rather than some grand purported plan; end quote. I stick by that.

And I also stick by, Your Honor, look at deeds not words. Look at deeds, not words. Look at what this

Coalition has brought to this case since we first showed ourselves in front of Your Honor, I think it was in response to the advertising motion. They decided -- the Coalition decided to get serious and they hired bankruptcy counsel who has experience in this. We have weekly communications with the mediators, with the debtors, with other parties in this litigation -- in this case.

As I've mentioned before, the Coalition member representatives are utilizing Brown Greer, which is going to be a very helpful interface in dealing with the mediation as it goes forward in dealing with claim information. That's going to be one of the most valuable pieces of real estate, so to say, that's going to exist in this case.

On the advertising motion, and I do want to mention this -- and listen, I acknowledge that committees and

folk who are represented who are the fiduciaries of committee often as Your Honor well knows disagree. Sometimes they go at each other pretty hard, you know, that's not remarkable.

They can have different ideas. And our ideas and our views, which go back to who we are and what we're about, are pretty laid out in the advertising motion, Judge.

I think, you know, there were a few law firms that came forward to object, but none of the other parties to this case including the TCC, which remain silent, and I'm not throwing darts, I'm not doing that, I'm just stating facts, that they remain silent on it.

We stood up and said, hey, wait, it's important to these young men to get information. It's important not to chill the dissemination of free speech, you know, to the abuse survivor world.

We were the ones who stood up, as Your Honor knows, and put in principled opposition not just, you can't -- you know everybody's free to do what they want, not, you know, attack or misdirection of attack which is the word I use, but a principled opposition to some of what the debtors thought they needed. And I think Your Honor also at the get-go of that hearing remarked on the record said, hey, with respect to X or Y, we don't see an issue. Somebody stood up and -- and it's okay that we stood up, but we added value. I'm not saying that -- and I'm not trying to use that

in any ploy other than to say that look at our deeds, look at our deeds in this case. And we worked with the debtor, we worked hard with the debtor to come out with an order that Your Honor signed that did address the misrepresentations that were long and material and which we helped the debtor with. And you know, it's -- it's our goal to continue that effort.

Judge, again, the robust data that we provided.

Now, you know, I don't know if other parties in this case are doing what we're doing, but they can make their own decisions and that's no criticism one way or another, but it's a fact that we're moving this case along.

Number three, there's a motion that's going to happen after this motion, and I don't -- what I'm trying very hard not to do, because all sorts of things came into the 2019 motion this morning, hearing, but the attorneys' signature motion is one that our group is really thinks is important, and you'll hear from my colleague, Eric Goodman on that hopefully very shortly. But you know, that's a motion that, again, we think eases the burden on a claimant, eases the burden on victims, subscribes with the aspirational statements made by the debtor the first day that all victims, all victims should be heard and have a right to file proof of claims.

And in this COVID situation, Judge, when I'm

sitting here in my home office for the how many hundredth day, we all know how difficult it is for us professionals that have unbelievable resources at our disposal to communicate and do things, compared to the universe of victims out there, many of whom aren't as fortunate as we are.

So you're going to be hearing more about that, but we think that, again, something we've added value to in this case and has shown deeds. And again, in turning to the mediator's statement, Judge, they too, think the same thing that they put on the record that it would hinder their efforts if we weren't involved. So dealing with what I call the second elephant in the room, the Kosnoff e-mail.

Eisten, I'm not going to sit here and make up explanations for it, I wasn't there, I'm not going to make up excuses for it, I can't. But I'm going to say, look what we've done and look who we are now. Look at the firm representative who have joined us, all of whom have qualified bona fides in the mass tort bankruptcy world and in the mass tort world. So that's how I tried to deal, Your Honor, with some of the -- some of the things that were said earlier in anticipation, but trying to really flesh out what's really going on here.

Dealing with the substance of some of the objections and I think I'm short and really Judge, I really

tried to be concise, you know, Century and related insurers object that the Coalition's former counsel (indiscernible) was conflicted. They're go on -- Stanley Tarr (phonetic) who was their counsel who is no longer part of this and Rachel Mersky. So I think that's gone.

And also, Judge, the whole issue then that was raised today about conflicts among parties among the members of the Coalition, sure, there may be a member of the Coalition who has a different claim for damages or whatnot. I don't think that really creates a conflict per se in terms of the collective interests that we're -- that we're representing, Judge. And I do want to say that the ad hoc committee of local counsel who we've been dealing with for some time arguably has the same issue.

They've got local counsel there who have had lots of property, they've got local counsel arguably within their Coalition who doesn't or has very little or no property.

They have local counsel which may have many claims against them, they also have local counsel that may have no claims or few claims against them.

In any event, that's a red herring it's not a reason for either addressing the 2019 or putting up a disqualifier with respect to our mediation motion. And again, and I'll just point -- another principal argument compliance with 2019 the Coalition should not be permitted to

1 | participate. I think we've resolved that.

I think we've jumped through a lot of hoops and done a lot of work and worked very hard with the US Trustee and others to resolve that.

And again, you know, I don't think it's a coincidence that the two parties who are objecting to -- put in objection papers to the 2019 are the same ones that are doing with our mediation motion. Hartford objects to the presence of the Coalition is inappropriate, because the Coalition's members interests are represented by the TCC and the Coalition seeks to undermine the TCC.

Well, Judge, Your Honor's seen enough bankruptcy cases to know that sometimes ad hoc committees get created even though arguably, or in truth, their fiduciary is the TCC, and they have different views and different opinions. And guess what, sometimes they disagree like today on the attorneys' signature motion where the TCC is, I believe, taken an opposite view or sometimes they agree, like today, when we did not object to the TCC's discovery motion.

So that's just part of bankruptcy case and there's nothing (indiscernible) about an ad hoc committee that has within it creditors whose fiduciary is the TCC. And again, I would point you to the cases that I cited earlier that are cited in our more recent ones, Purdue, certainly, (indiscernible), PG&E, you know, I just want to let you know,

Judge, that I think at 3 o'clock today the Malencar (phonetic) case has its first day hearing in front of Judge Dorsey next door, arguing next door, or digitally next door.

And in that case, I'm honored to represent an ad hoc committee of almost all the states as well as the opioid PEC and walking that case into bankruptcy with an RSN.

And there's going to be a committee in that case and that committee represents the governmental entity.

It's -- it's not unusual, but what it does show, Judge, is that the ad hoc committee such as the one that I've been given the honor to represent can be very forceful, helpful, constructive party in a bankruptcy case that can lead a case to resolution.

I think that that's been recognized here by some significant mediation parties, including the debtor. I think it's been recognized -- it has been recognized by the mediator. And we'd ask, Your Honor, respectfully that it be recognized by you as well, and that we can start the process getting there, roll up our sleeves and get to work in that process.

I do want to note that we're not there.

What does that mean? It just means the way,

Judge, and it may confound whatever deal is entered into

behind the cloak of mediation with our participation. And

certainly that's why -- that's why the majority of mediation

parties and the mediators themselves have recognized that if we're going to do this, and if this has any possibility of success of working, it will be a hindrance if the Coalition is not involved.

So unless Your Honor has any questions, I have a few more things, but I -- I don't want to repeat myself and I think I've taken enough time and I think I've addresses the points I've wanted to take. I appreciate Your Honor's attention.

THE COURT: Thank you. I do not have any questions. Let me hear from (inaudible) .

MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, Tancred Schiavoni for Century. If I could just get -- cut right to the chase here. This motion is an enormous red herring. It's enormous. If you just listen, if you took notes like I did on what was just said, what you heard from Mr. Molton is that he's in, quote, weekly communication with the debtors and the mediator, unquote.

You heard him say, quote, we have been talking to the mediators, comma, sharing information, closed quote. You heard him say, we've been talking to the debtors constantly, quote/unquote on constantly. He didn't identify a single thing, anything that's been done that could have been done or that he wants to do in the mediation that he hasn't done. He's been an active participant, he's been talking to the

mediators and his lawyers, individual lawyers, if we had deposed Mr. Kosnoff, you would have found that he's been talking to the mediators and you'd find that Joe Rice has been talking to the mediators. They've been fully engaged.

There is nothing -- and we said it at the last hearing, the mediators are free to talk to whoever they want to, they have been, they are. What is this about? Our objection here was really sort of technical in nature. In the protective order the Court defined the word "mediation party" is a defined term. And the obligations of confidentiality flow through that order.

We don't want highly confidential information shared with people who have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Mr. Kosnoff and some of the others have not made an appearance before the Court, they haven't submitted to jurisdiction, we do not want highly- confidential information disseminated to a huge group of people into an enormous group of claimants for which it then ends up being used in other proceedings, or it ends up being posted on the Web site of the LA Times which attributes the postings to Mr. Kosnoff. So that's the issue.

We think that if Mr. Molton had reached out to us directly on this motion and met and conferred, we could have basically shaped something to satisfaction, but nothing --

nothing prohibits him from mediating. He has been mediating, he's been fully engaged on the mediation side.

With respect to what else you heard, Your Honor, the most noteworthy thing is what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any offer or explanation about anything that the Coalition brings to the table that's different from the TCC. You didn't hear any distinction between the client that theoretically the Coalition represents and those of the Coalition. And these other cases that you heard, opioids and whatnot, there are subgroups which are defined subgroups within the claimant groups. That's not what you're hearing here.

What you really heard was a preview. It's a preview to a motion for substantial contribution, it was a substantial contribution argument; that's what you heard. There's no problem with these folks talking to the mediators, negotiating with the mediators, participating in the mediators; that's what they've done. But there shouldn't be a blanket provision of all highly confidential information of anybody who claims to be under the umbrella of the Coalition.

With respect to what these groups -- what these entities bring to the table, I mean, it's truly putting lipstick on a pig to say that it's a positive for the Coalition to bring to the table a group of asbestos firms that have joined them. The Motley Rice Firm is the subject

of published decisions by the Third Circuit, by the Superior Court of New Jersey, which found that Mr. Rice had specifically concluded with Scott Gilbert, blowing the coverage in a (indiscernible) case there. In the CE case the Third Circuit specifically targeted his demands for arranger fees in that case.

The notion of what's happened in these -- and how the asbestos cases have been driven off the rails by large inventories of unimpaired claims is -- is this type of -- it's lore in the area of mass torts.

That is not a positive here.

It is not a positive that firms have come in through the Coalition that have never brought a claim against the Boy Scouts ever. It's not a positive. But this isn't an issue about positives or negatives, it's an issue about theoretically can they talk to the mediators, can they negotiate? Yeah, they have been.

You heard from Mr. Molton that they've been doing it constantly, and he's going to continue. Nothing's going to change in that (inaudible).

As far as if he wants some sort of modification to the protective order, it's like we're happy to meet and confer with him on it, but there should not be a blanket turnover by his designation as a mediating party of all highly confidential information to a broad group of

plaintiffs firms including ones that have never brought a claim here and have every interest in pursuing nondebtor claims against nondebtors that have nothing to do with about bringing this case to conclusion.

And those are our concerns, we've done nothing -I don't even think, frankly, the mediators understand that,
because they never spoke to us about it, right? In the
mediation statement is a statement from them that, look, if
they comply with 2019 we're fine with them participating.
But they have been participating. Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Jim Ruggeri.

MR. RUGGERI: Your Honor, briefly.

Hartford joins in Century's comments. Our objections were fourfold in the 2019 disclosures which we talked be at earlier. And as for our paper, too, the access to information people not before the Court and who aren't entitled to it and the potential that the access to the information could be used elsewhere. Three, the concern that this is an end-run around the TCC, in our view that if so, that could frustrate the progress of the mediation, not facilitate the progress of the mediation.

And I do believe Mr. Molton went too far in trying to draw the analogy for the explosion in claims here to the opioid situation where folks don't know they were insured.

These are sex abuse claims and this is a

defendant, the Boy Scouts who is somewhat a mature defendant in the tort system. So it's not an analogous situation. In my view, and we'll deal with this as we go forward, it doesn't explain the unprecedented explosion in claims that we've seen in this case. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone else who filed an objection? I think there's just those two.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ STANG: Your Honor, the TCC filed a pleading early on.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Stang.

MR. STANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I have been representing committees in sex abuse cases since 2004, I've represented over 20 of them. And while Mr. Molton may think it's disarming to call me his friend, in this instance, these cases are very personal to me. And these constituents are very personal to me, and when he says that my non-committee members and Ms. Beville said this without reservation are trying to stop victims from being heard, I am not his friend.

The mediators chimed in in a publicly-filed document, and I don't want to spend a lot of time on the mediators, but they put their fingers on the scale.

That order did not authorize them to file a public pleading, it didn't prohibit them from doing it either, but it didn't contemplate it the way Mr. Molton described it. If

all the mediation parties agreed to admit a new member, a new party, and the mediators agreed, then they're in, but I think he's reading way too much into the order.

And Mr. Molton talks a lot about "we". And it's hard to tell sometimes whether the "we" is the Coalition or the "we" is the various lawyers and I thought he did a great pitch. I mean, I've been through a lot of pitches, his was about as good as they come.

But we said to him and his partner and all the attorneys in August; you are welcome to come to the mediation on behalf of your clients.

And maybe I don't understand, maybe we have two elephants in the room, maybe this is the third elephant. Why did they go the route they went? They wouldn't have been up against the insurance companies if they had gone the path that they accepted from us, by the way, without reservation.

But they decided to go the other way. So to me, the third elephant in the room is why? And perhaps, counsel for the insurers have hit upon it, that they are trying to set themselves up for substantial contribution claims, which, by the way, Judge, to the extent there's a reservation of rights by the US Trustee regarding that, that should obviously extend to everybody.

And this will be my last point, Your Honor.

Mr. Molton doesn't want to look at history, but those who

don't study history are bound to have it repeated. What

Mr. Kosnoff said in that e-mail refers to the term -- he used

the term "our Coalition". So his Coalition wasn't formed on

July 18th, it didn't spring fully formed from the head of

someone like a Greek God does and suddenly occur for the

first moment on July 18th.

These lawyers who were at the time the originators of the Coalition sat in on committee meetings without disclosing to the committee that they were -- had formed or in the process of forming a Coalition that ultimately caused their clients to fire them. And in one case of the two committee members, there were two committee members who had members of the now Coalition lawyers voting representatives, and they don't represent him anymore. And it was that bad.

So they sat in on committee calls. The people that we're being asked to deal with now sat in on committee calls without telling us. Second, he advertises that they've retained Brown Greer. Well, you may not know this, Your Honor, but the debtor has arranged after consultation with the committee to have Omni provide the exact same platform that Brown Greer is going to provide to the Coalition. And by the way, Brown Greer interviewed with the committee for that role, Omni was picked over them. The debtor -- I don't know if they talked to Brown Greer, but we told them about Brown Greer, the debtor selected Omni.

So that's now a duplicative service, so this contribution Mr. Molton talks about; already done, thank you very much. And finally, Your Honor, the Coalition stood up for survivors at the hearing on the false -- on the false advertising. When I heard that, all I could think of, it was the old joke about the orphan who kills his parents and then asks for mercy from the Court. Some of the lawyers who are now Coalition members were the ones who were doing the advertising.

So you know, we rest on the papers that we submitted before, but I simply could not stand by and listen to Mr. Molton talk about -- and Ms. Beville talk about an attack. The TCC, the attorneys who represent those members in State Court who have spent, in some cases, their entire professional careers protecting children. And now, Mr. Molton wants to present this as effectively sour grapes. So thank you, Your Honor, for your time and appreciate the opportunity to address Mr. Molton's comment.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Molton, how do we address the confidential information issue that Mr. Schiavoni raised in that making you an official mediation party, permits access to confidential information that plaintiffs' attorneys would not otherwise have access to?

Mr. Molton, you're still on mute.

MR. MOLTON: Lesson of our times, Judge. Thank

you. One of the things that we -- why we're moving to become

mediation parties is we can't receive that information unless

we're mediation parties. That's what we'd asked the

mediators, we've asked others, and everybody is hesitant to

go anywhere close to even talking to us about it without us

becoming mediation parties.

You know, listen, there's protective orders in this case, there's protective orders that have pretty firm, you know, provisions in them. And we're willing to live by them and abide by them. So I mean, what Mr. Schiavoni said is, from my perspective, is logistics that's done in mass tort cases and commercial bankruptcy cases, financial bankruptcy cases, you know, we'll be able to arrive at protocols in which we're going to be able to protect the information from being misused. So that's my answer, Judge.

And also, listen, I'm not going to get into responding to the attack other than to say I think what Mr. Schiavoni said actually shows the fact that we should be mediation parties. Yes, we've been talking, yes we hit a wall, we can't go further and that's why the mediators want us in. That's why the debtor wants us in. That's why other parties who are significantly have interest in this case have not objected, because Your Honor, my view, and my submission is, you know, they understand the value we add. And again,

so that's it. I don't think I have to say anything else unless Your Honor has any other questions.

THE COURT: No, I don't have any other questions. Okay.

MR. ANDOLINA: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANDOLINA: Hi, Mike Andolina, White and Case on behalf of Debtors. May I be heard very briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANDOLINA: So, Judge, first, let me point out that I strongly disagree with some of the comments that Mr. Molton made regarding our organization. You know, one victim is obviously too many, but in particular since the late 1980s the Boy Scouts child protection efforts are -- have been gold standard. You're also going to hear from Mr. Linder about our very strong disagreement with the Coalition's position on the attorney signature issue.

That said, Mr. Molton and Ms. Beville and their team have been cooperative, they have shared preliminary claims information with the debtors, and they have also agreed to share that information with the local counsel. Their group does include law firms with substantial claim that that's just a fact. And as the debtors have said from the beginning the equitable compensation of survivors is one of our dual goals.

I will also acknowledge, and we appreciate that, in particular, in the last several weeks we've had a very cooperative relationship with the TCC. As our discussion this morning with Mr. Morris and the ad hoc committee represent, although unartful, we did reach a very important agreement and we have very important discussions upcoming with respect to the extension of the preliminary injunction.

Our view, Your Honor, is that we need to be fully engaged with both of these constituencies as well as the insurers and the UCC who's been involved in the preliminary injunction discussion to get a deal done as quickly as possible.

There's something that Mr. Stang said with respect to the Coalition that I feel the need to push back on. The timing issue from the debtor's perspective here is not a race to the bottom. The timing issue is that we are an American institution that needs to get out of bankruptcy. We're facing a pandemic that as Your Honor knows has cut to the heart of our ability to maintain membership, serve the young and — young men and women of this country, and the same holds true for the local counsel.

So we think that this issue has been debated extensively, we appreciate Your Honor's thoughtful consideration of the 2019, but from our perspective, getting everyone up to speed and involved in the mediation as quickly

as possible is paramount to getting us to where we need to be preserving the mission and to making sure that survivors are equitably compensated.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, I just got an e-mail.

Mr. Rice who was attacked both this morning and this

afternoon is online, it's a live line. He's asked me if Your

Honor would allow us that he have a moment.

THE COURT: Sure. He can have a few minutes.

MR. RICE: Your Honor, this is Joe Rice.

Can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICE: Thank you very much. I feel that you've heard a lot today that is premised on people promoting their own positions which is expected. I have a significant history with both insurance counsel in the case as came out.

We have been adversaries in many bankruptcy actions. And they talk about some issues from 15 to 20 years ago they fail to get to the end of it. For instance, in the combustion engineering the Third Circuit remanded the case to the District Court and the District Court affirmed the agreements. But those are historical issues.

What you have now is a debtor that is in dire need of moving this case along. And you've got, for whatever reason, it doesn't matter what they are right now, you've got

so much distrust between the constituencies that have to get together that nothing's moving, and that's the frustration that the mediators have expressed, I believe, in what they (inaudible) with the Court.

years solving these kinds of problems is what I've done. I was counsel to 20 states in the national tobacco litigation and was lead negotiator for the states in that. I was lead negotiator in the BP Oil spill case from Judge Barbier, and was able to bring that to a conclusion within a matter of months.

I was counsel in the Volkswagen case that led those negotiations in front of Judge Byer and brought that to closure. I resolved -- part of the negotiation team that resolved thousands of asbestos cases against these insurers and others in the Third Circuit for over 20 years. And I've done many complex cases, the latest one being the Takata bankruptcy where Mr. Stang was my counsel. And we have a great working relationship and the adversaries in that case representing the Honda Motors were counsel for the debtors here, Mr. Andolina and Ms. Boelter, and I have great respect for their work. So I've worked with all of these people before.

And I think one of the reasons people ask me to get involved is because I can bring some civility, hopefully,

to this process as well as a lot of experience in putting complex cases together. And many of the members of the Coalition have great experience in this litigation, but zero experience in the bankruptcy world. And having the ability to try to pull everybody together to get on the same page is what's needed here. And that's what the Coalition is trying to do.

And the objections from the insurers is fully expected, because they know the more cases that are out there and the better those cases are and the more competent counsel is at the negotiating table, the more money they're going to have to pay if they're going to get closure in this bankruptcy suit, and they don't want to do that. And that's -- I understand that's their job. But this case needs to move and the only way it's going to do that is if we get everybody in the same room at the same time.

And I think that's the frustration that the mediators are begging the Court to help them accomplish, because right now, for instance, we're not able to see the insurance towers so we can't have an intellectual conversation with the mediators about what the available insurance is, because it's a confidential document.

None of the other parties want to talk to the Coalition freely for fear that they will be challenged by the insurers that they are not cooperating with the insurers or

somehow putting the insurance coverage at risk. And until you get into the mediation you don't solve that problem.

So I respectfully ask you to consider what's the goal in this case is and try to bring these parties together. And I -- I'm not going to respond to insurance counsel's personal remarks, I'd be glad to, if the Court has questions, but I think my history of work in the bankruptcy courts and in the courts generally speaks for itself. And I'm now national lead in the opioid litigation on behalf of all of the public entities, so recently appointed to that last year. So I just wanted to give you my 2 cents' worth for Your Honor to consider if you want to. And thank you for letting me speak.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

Okay. So what's our next matter?

MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor on the agenda it's Item

Number 8, but I leave it to the Court I think that was

largely for the parties. I think that was largely subsumed

in our discussion of Number 5. So let me just ask counsel of

Century and Hartford if they feel like they need additional

arguing on that, or they believe that's been covered already.

MR. SCHIAVONI: I'm sorry, the agenda item Mr. Abbott, is our motion to compel compliance?

MR. ABBOTT: It's to submit disclosure as required by the rules on 2019, yes.

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MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, Tan Schiavoni. We don't need to argue that separately, I think you've heard argument, but I think just the important thing is that these two motions do go together, and we just would respectfully request if you look at the order that was entered that flowed from Baron & Budd that's exhibited, because I don't think the -- I think the better way to deal with this is an order compelling compliance and setting a certain day. If they say they've complied, so be it. But without that order, we don't know whether the economic interest information in the discovery -- and especially without the discovery we don't know whether there's been compliance. So it approaches the same problem from a different angle. And we'd ask you to consider how those other courts dealt with that. Similarly, the Baron & Budd court thing and the order that they entered. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor, I think that leaves us agenda Item Number 10 which is the TCC motion regarding electronic execution of abuse groups of claim. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LUCAS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is John Lucas, Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl and Jones for the TCC. Can you hear me? THE COURT: Yes. MR. LUCAS: I have my hand up.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lucas.

MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, as set forth in the motion the bar date order and the sexual abuse proof of claim form simply requires or simply states that it needs to be signed. And there's no definition of what signed means. There are a variety of ways that the document can be signed, and inquiries have been made to the TCC as to what it means and whether or not docu-sign and the like are acceptable means of executing the proof of claims. And we communicated this concern to debtor's counsel, and this has been the result of those discussions, Your Honor.

I don't think I need to go into any more detail.

I believe that the USC filed a limited objection to the motion, and I think that the USC sort of misunderstood sort of the timing requirements with respect to the subsequent filing documents for the verification for those who have already executed and filed proof of claims to date. And I'm happy to go into the details of the mechanics of the order if you'd like, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, yes. Why do people have to reexecute proofs of claims that have been filed?

MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, I don't disagree. Your Honor, I mean, this is part when we brought this issue to the debtors, this motion was the result of what came out of that.

Originally, it's our view that proofs of claim

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don't?

1 that are executed in this manner should be treated as presumptively valid until somebody contests or objects something like that. And so there was inconsistent 3 information coming from the debtor's side as to what's 4 5 acceptable and this motion is the result of trying to clean 6 that up, Your Honor.

I hear Your Honor's concern about -- we're not asking anybody to re-execute anything. What we're asking, Your Honor, is that, for example, proof of claim Number 65 has a docu-sign signature that that counsel supplied the verification document so that Omni can sort of put it on the back of proof of claim form that was filed. It's just --THE COURT: What if they don't? And what if they

MR. LUCAS: Nothing in the order, Your Honor, says that the claim is disallowed or anything like that. And I believe, Your Honor, if that the claim was subsequently objected to on that basis, I think it would be affirmative defense that the objection could be rebutted by supplying information of some sort of verification that the proof of claim was documented or executed in a valid manner.

THE COURT: Okay. The reason I ask these questions is because I am concerned about people who've already filed their claims. And our local rules, which granted is more directed toward clerk, the clerk, but we have

a local Rule 9011-4 which says that the filing of a proof of claim electronically with the clerk shall constitute the filing claim as approved signature by law. Electronic claimants are not required to be registered CMESC users. So again, it's really more filing it with the Clerk's Office. Electronically filed proofs of claim are deemed signed when electronic submission -- upon electronic submission with the clerk.

And of course, we also have a local rule that says that if there are more than 200 creditors, you have to get a -- certainly have to get a noticing agent, I think you also have to get a claims agent. So when you put those two rules together --

MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, we don't disagree with what you're saying, the tort claim committee does not disagree with what Your Honor's saying. We understand how Your Honor is connecting the dots there. And Your Honor, in so far as to keep concerned we also believe that this submission of proofs of claims in this manner without the verification should be valid, but we were trying to reach consensus among the various constituencies in this case to put a process in place.

And so Your Honor, your comments are heard, and you know, if it's up to the TCC alone, Your Honor, we're fine with the way that proofs of claims are being submitted. But

parties are concerned and we're asking for clarification about whether or not they may execute a document electronically. And so because of the mixed communications coming from various constituencies in this case, that's why the motion was filed.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay, yeah, we also have a local Rule 3003-1; any entity filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 11 case shall file the original and one copy of the proof of claim with the claims agent and shall serve a copy on the Trustee, if any, unless the claims agent accepts claims electronically in which case only the electronically filed claim shall be submitted.

I think it's been -- if it's been submitted electronically through -- to the claims agent, I think it's been submitted. And I assume it's signed in some fashion and what you're telling me what some kind of docu-sign but they didn't attach the verification which, quite frankly, I didn't even know there was such a thing, but okay. But the person has filed it. I think to create a situation where the -- they have to refile something, and another document just becomes confusing.

And I suppose if somebody wants to object to a proof of claim on the basis that they didn't have the verification page, I'll deal with that. But I think people can hear from me that that's not going to go too far.

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MR. LUCAS: Understood, Your Honor. So then may I -- may I suggest respectfully that the proposed order if the Court would consider it, would just verify that electronic execution or just cite to the local rules to give various counsel to survivors out there that are filing claims comfort that this is going to be satisfactory rather than having to do wet signatures or ink signatures whether they be mailed in or electronically uploaded with the claims agent? THE COURT: Yeah, we also have a rule on wet signatures, and I don't think it applies to proofs of claim. We've kind of carved them out as I -- I was never on the Rules Committee, but we kind of carved them out, I think, to make certain that parties could themselves file proofs of claim, they don't have to have a lawyer, they don't have to have an ECS number, they file with the claims agent. not supposed to be a -- there's not supposed to be barriers. In terms of the order -- let me see the order. Yeah, I don't know what you do with the order. MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, I believe what given what Your Honor has said to date, I mean, this order does not work it's not consistent with your concerns, I mean, it would have to be revised substantially, you know, to reflect the local rules that you had referenced to give parties or the

clarification and comfort that signed means what it means

under the applicable local rule that you referenced, Your

Honor.

I believe that the proposed order's going far beyond what you think is necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you circulate something and see if there's agreement. And if there is, I will probably enter it and if there's not, I'll take a look at it. But in my view, parties who have filed with some sort of an e-signature but it just doesn't have that verification page, I don't think is -- I mean, how is that different than if I sign my name on something and you don't know if I signed it or didn't sign it, I signed it. So I'm not understanding the issue, maybe I'm too much of a dinosaur, but I'm not sure what the -- quite frankly, what the purpose of that verification page is. What does it say?

MR. LUCAS: For example, Your Honor, I believe that the -- I've seen them. The verification pages will state who was the originator of the document. And so, for example, Your Honor, if I represented a survivor and I send out the proof of claim form for a survivor, it will state my e-mail, and it will state the time of day that the e-mail was sent and to whom it was sent, an e-mail the recipient and when the recipient opened it up, whether the recipient adopted an electronic signature or sort of scribed one into the program and how it used those, and when the signature was applied and when the document was sent back. And so it's

that trail was the type of document that we're looking to attach.

THE COURT: The trail, okay. So it would be like if I -- show my age, it would be like if I faxed proof of claim form to my client and they signed it and sent it back to me for filing.

MR. LUCAS: Right, and Your Honor, I think so. I know that there are verifications to faxes, but I'm not sure what they look like either so.

THE COURT: I know what they look like. Okay. So but -- so it's that paper trail you're looking for. To me, the signature's the signature or it isn't the signature. And the paper trail as to how you got the signature doesn't either make it valid or not valid. Maybe electronically it verifies something.

MR. BUCHBINDER: Your Honor, this is David Buchbinder. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. BUCHBINDER: Yes, this is Dave Buchbinder on behalf of the United States Trustee.

Given the Court's concerns about these signatures, which we agree with completely from our limited objection, and given that we aren't going to go back and make people jump through hoops and refile claims, I'm wondering why we need an order at all.

If someone wants to object to a claim later on and challenge the verification as the Court has noted, someone can do so, and if someone's used an electronic signature program, presumably they could use that as part of their evidence, but given the Court's comments, I don't even know why we need an order at all here. The motion should either be denied or simply withdrawn.

THE COURT: That's what I'm struggling with Mr. Buchbinder. And the other thing is, obviously on a goforward basis, I don't want anybody to feel comforted that they don't need to have a signature. They need to have a signature. All this thing was some verification that there was a signature. There needs to be signatures. We can talk about who in a moment, but there needs to be a signature on the proof of claim form. But when it's done electronically, then it is.

And that doesn't bother me. So I don't want people to think, oh, I don't have to worry about getting a verification page, maybe they should get one just to have it, but to me, it's either signed or it's not signed. And that could go back to old school where you mail it to somebody and -- or fax it or it can be, you know, current and electronic.

MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, this is John Lucas. My suggestion, if it works is that I can reach out to

Mr. Andolina and perhaps, I think, discuss some very simple language, not any intention to overcomplicate things, but I think really just to clarify that the use of the word signed and signing in the bar date order in the form so that I think people aren't left -- so that claimants and their counsel aren't left to believe that it must be a conventional, handwritten signature.

And then (inaudible) not sort of given sort of comfort about sort of what's valid or not valid, you know, if there's some sort of question about how or a party executed the proof of claims, then that's just left for another day.

THE COURT: Okay. You can give that a shot and I'd like you to run it past Mr. Buchbinder as well.

MR. LUCAS: Of course. I didn't mean to exclude you.

THE COURT: Because the proof of claim form obviously reflects the fact that they -- claims can be filed electronically through the electronic filing system that was set up on the Omni site. And I assume that mostly that's the preferred way is that they'd like to get them, because it's probably easier for Omni than to get things through the mail.

But it was contemplated that things would be electronically filed in the -- certainly in the form as I'm looking at it. I don't know if that's reflected in the order, but certainly in the form. But sure, you can do that.

Run it past Mr. Buchbinder.

MR. LUCAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. RINGER: Your Honor, this is Rachael Ringer from Kramer Levin. If I may be heard just very briefly on this?

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RINGER: Rachael Ringer from Kramer Levin on behalf of the unsecured creditors' committee.

I will tell you, I think in response to the volume of paper that has been filed on this issue, we've started getting some inquiries from not only these claimants about whether e-signatures are sufficient for the general proof of claim forms, so I would just ask Mr. Lucas and Mr. Andolina to include us in that discussion to the extent we're having any order clarifying that e-signatures are acceptable for the abuse proof of claim form, I would just ask that it also apply for the general proof of claim form as well.

THE COURT: Certainly. I have to say, this is the first time I'm getting this issue in any case.

And at this point so many proofs of claims are electronically filed. So I'm a little surprised at the question, but it could just be my -- like I said, my lack of tech savvy.

MR. BUCHBINDER: Your Honor, this is Dave

Buchbinder again. I'm completely with you. Just because a

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motion gets filed doesn't mean there has to be an order. There's no need for an order here. It's entirely redundant and utterly unnecessary given the Court's comments. THE COURT: I'll give him a shot and I'll take a look at what there is submitted, and I'll make a determination as to whether I sign it or not. Okay, next. MR. ABBOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. We've talked about how things get signed, now it's time to talk about who gets to sign them. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. ABBOTT: Item Number 11 is the Coalition's motion for allowance of attorneys' signature, authorized counsel's signatures rather than claimants' signature. So back to our friends at Brown Rudnick for this one. THE COURT: Mr. Goodman, try again. Yes, now. MR. GOODMAN: So much for that headset, okay. Good afternoon, Your Honor, Eric Goodman, Brown Rudnick, counsel for the Coalition. Your Honor, I will begin by stating that creditors that have legal counsel do better, is it obviously true of tort claimants. Before this case I served as counsel on the official committee of tort claimants in the PG&E bankruptcy. I helped write the claim form in that case for the fire victims. Some of our committee members lost their children,

others lost their homes. Out of respect for them, I

personally made certain that the claim form complied with the bankruptcy rules, that it permitted attorneys' signatures, and it generally made it easier for fire victims to file proofs of claim before the bar date.

We had a very robust turnout in PG&E; it made a difference. And Your Honor, today I'm here today I think fighting essentially the same battle but in a different case. Your Honor, there are three bankruptcy rules in play here. First, the bankruptcy Rule 3001-B that provides that a proof of claim shall be executed by the creditor, by the creditor's authorized agent.

Second, the bankruptcy Rule 9009-A which was recently amended in 2017 and precludes modifications to the official form other than minor changes not affecting wording. The wording in the official Form 410, specifically Part 3, permits attorneys' signatures.

Third, there's bankruptcy Rule 3001-A which provides that a proof of claim shall conform substantially to the appropriate official form. And again, the official Form 410 specifically permits attorneys' signatures. Based on these rules we would expect that proofs of claim filed by sexual abuse survivors in these cases could be executed by authorized counsel, but there is a question as to whether or not a bar date order eliminates this right. And that is a problem.

Just for a moment, consider the logistics of filing one claim which forces a victim to recount being raped when they were a teenager. Now, consider filing thousands of them that your clients do not get victimized again. And now add to that all of the victims that may come forward in the next month and retain counsel and file claims in these cases that they're not left out.

Your Honor, we do not assume that all sexual abuse survivors have computer access or iPhones. I'm sure that many do, but some do not. And we have to consider victims that are homeless or in prison, and we have to consider someone who just hires counsel the day before the bar date. No survivors should be left behind. Your Honor, the Coalition first appeared in these cases after the bar date order was entered.

Literally, I'm a stranger to it, because I was not here back in May. When we flagged this issue, we asked whether the debtor undertook any kind of extraordinary noticing that we think would need to happen to negate a bankruptcy rule. The answer appears to be no.

The bar date motion, as you know, was a first-day motion in this case, it was noticed on a core service list.

That core service list did not conclude the majority of the law firms that are part of the Coalition. Based on our review of the debtors' affidavits of service, notice was not

given to over 17,000 sexual abuse victims or their legal counsel.

Debtors say, well, Your Honor, you gave them notice of the bar date. Not the point. Victims were not given notice before the bar date order was entered. And the bar date order creates the problem that we're trying to fix, potentially.

THE COURT: Okay, I understand that, but -- but bar date -- bar date orders, bar date motions are not generally served on the entire creditor body. So I'm not -- I'm going to hear this on the merits, okay.

I'm not going to hear it based on, we didn't get notice, because I think notice of the bar date motion was appropriate. In fact, I can issue them ex parte under our local rules if they meet certain requirements, which this one, except for the fact that it's been substance deviated, that met. So notice was appropriate, and now we're just going to talk about this specific issue which I think is worthy of a discussion. So let's just hear the specific issue.

MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. So we further analyzed the transcript from the May 18th hearing on the bar date motion. And the statements that were made by the Court seem to reflect, in our view, an expectation that the bar date order would be consistent with the Bankruptcy

Code and the Bankruptcy Rules. That gave us some hope. And to be clear, we think that there is an inconsistency.

Again, Rule 3001-B provides that a proof of claim shall be executed by the creditor or the creditor's authorized agent. That means that the creditor's authorized agent should be permitted to sign the claim. Rule 3001-A provides that a proof of claim shall conform substantially to the official form; again, the official form permits attorneys' signatures.

In Rule 9009-A precludes modifications to the official form other than minor changes not affecting wording.

And again, the wording in the official form permits attorneys' signatures.

I will note, Your Honor, that in the PG&E case when the tort committee proposed a claim form for tort victims, we did not try to preclude the victims from using official Form 410, we just wanted a simplified form approved to make it easier for victims to file claims before the bar date. Simply making the request that the official form not be available, of course, it was indicated the TCC's form did not substantially conform to the official form.

We don't think that we should be in a world where sex abuse victims can file a claim that conforms substantially to official Form 410, complies with every bankruptcy rule currently in effect can be treated as having

violated a court order.

Your Honor, we filed a motion trying to correct the problem. Our solution is a very simple fix. We just want an order entered clarifying that authorized counsel may sign the claim forms; that's it.

Shortly after we filed the motion, the US Trustee contacted us and asked us to withdraw the motion as quote, unnecessary and moot, because the relief sought already exists. He told us that the Court- approved form is consistent with the official form and that the Court-approved form permits signature by the claimants' legal representative. We thought that is wonderful. That's how sex abuse victims should be treated. The problem though, is that the TCC, the debtors and the insurers vehemently disagree.

The TCC, the debtors and the insurers assert that prohibiting attorneys' signatures in these cases was the product of negotiations among them. Think about that for a moment. Product of negotiations among them. They, from my perspective, appear proud of this. They further state that they believe that it is essential that attorneys not be permitted to sign claim forms, even though three bankruptcy rules indicate that they can. Think about that, how could that ever be essential?

Your Honor, if this Court understood back in May

that attorneys' signatures would not be permitted,
notwithstanding Rule 3001-A, 3001-B and 9009-A when the bar
date was ordered, bar date order was signed, there may be
very little that I can say right now that would change
anything, but I feel like I need to try.

And if it was not adequately disclosed to you and the US Trustee, then let's just fix it. I'm here today to simply ask the Court to make it clear that when it's the day before the bar date and victims are scrambling to get everything completed so that their claims are not barred, that they can rely on their authorized counsel to execute and file the proof of claim form for them. I think we all know that if anyone comes in here late, even by one day, Century and Hartford are going to strenuously object.

We obviously do not want fraudulent claims in this case. We're not looking to make it possible for unauthorized attorneys to execute proofs of claim. We are simply asking that sexual abuse victims have the same rights as trade creditors and bond holders in nearly every bankruptcy case pending in this district to have their authorized counsel sign the claim form. And if the right to have counsel sign the form is going to be restricted or denied here, we think that it needs to be extremely clear that this is what's being done.

Again, the fact that the US Trustee informed us

that our motion is unnecessary and moot after it was filed indicates to me that we need clarity on this issue. And in my view, clarity means that the authorized legal counsel should be permitted to execute the claim form consistent with the Bankruptcy Rules.

Thank you for hearing me out on this, Your Honor. I don't have anything further.

THE COURT: Thank you. Well, let me -- I did read the papers. Let me hear from the objectors as to why a lawyer who's authorized -- the rules speak to authorized agent as to who may execute. It doesn't actually say signed; that's interesting. But an authorized agent shouldn't be permitted, not whether it's a good practice or a bad practice, because quite frankly, as a former lawyer I never did it. I don't think it's a good practice. Okay? But it doesn't mean it's not -- it may not be permitted or that it may not have consequences if you do, as a lawyer, sign a proof of claim form.

And I notice that some of the cases that were cited suggested that you might be able to be deposed. And I don't know, because I'd never had to think about that. That wasn't the reason that I didn't sign them for my clients.

I'll take it back, I think I did it once in an emergency situation, pre-electronic filing. Pre-electronic filing, okay. But why shouldn't a lawyer who has authority

from his client be able to sign -- why should they not be able to sign the proof of claim form? Let's start with --

MR. LINDER: Your Honor, Matthew Linder, White and Case, proposed co-counsel for the debtors. I just want to start, Your Honor, by making clear that Boy Scouts of America want to equitably and timely compensate survivors of abuse Mr. Andolina (inaudible) that but I think it bears emphasis again here in the context of executing and submitting proofs of claim.

Your Honor, counsel referenced the three Bankruptcy Rules at issue here. Rule 3001-B, 9009-A and 3001-A. Two of those three rules, Your Honor, came to the rules coiled (phonetic), you'd have a hard time discerning how the Court could approve a proof of claim form that deviates significantly from official Form 410.

From our perspective, Your Honor, it's critically important that the claimants themselves, due to the nature of these claims, be the individuals to execute the claims.

Counsel also referenced putting survivors on the same plain giving them the same flexibility to the execution of claims as bondholders and commercial claimants. These claims, the nature of these claims, Your Honor, could not be further from a commercial claim, a bondholder claim and other similar claims where you could look at a contract straight through the argument, as an attorney, fairly quickly and then with

the reasonable belief that's what they're asking you the contents of the claim, submit that claim.

Here, it's just not -- it's difficult for the debtors to see in the explosion of claims on the part of the Coalition, how that process which is required and, of course, Rule 90 (inaudible) which is a rule that counsel did not reference comes into play here. It's difficult to see that explosion of claims how counsel could, on the one hand, adequately represent interests of his clients and on the other hand, be executing the volume of claims and forming the belief that -- the reasonable belief that the content of those claims at that rate.

August 26th, the Coalition had 12,000 claims. Today I believe the Coalition is comprised of 28,000 claims. If you were to do just the division, that's a rate of increase of 3 and a half claims per minute. To actually go through the exercise, I'm assuming there are telephone calls, there may be other rules by which these claims come in. They actually go to the exercise that as an attorney conducting that reasonable investigation of the allegations set forth in the proof of claim to the extent where you're comfortable executing that claim under penalty of perjury and submitting that claim to us, that is a difficult proposition.

Counsel also suggests in its papers --

that. And I also, have that concern that how many people do these law firms have that are communicating with clients, and so that they are comfortable that these claims are valid. I have that concern, too. But you want me to assume they're not doing their job. And why should I assume they're not doing their job? And what does that have to do, in any event, with what the Rule requires and what the Rule says?

MR. LINDER: Your Honor, on that point, I think we just circle back to what happened preceding the hearing on the bar date. This was -- this was one component of a proof of claim form that was heavily negotiated between the tort claimants committee, the debtors extensively over the course of six plus weeks who traded numerous drafts. As you know, there was a lengthy evidentiary hearing at which the TCC proffered the testimony of Dr. Conte (phonetic).

At that hearing, counsel represented to the Court that the survivors themselves had gone through the proof of claim form, line by line, to ensure that every line of the proof of claim form made it easier for survivors to execute the claim.

There were no less than four versions of the claim form that was submitted to the Court filed on the docket, (inaudible) version all. One thing it did not change was the signature requirement, because that was one point on which

the debtors and the tort claims committee, the fiduciary for the interest of all survivors, that's one point on which we agree.

So in the expert opinion of Dr. Conte and in the view of the survivors that comprise the tort claims committee, this was a component of a proof of claim form that, in their view, was appropriate with --

THE COURT: I don't recall -- I don't recall Dr.

Conte testifying about signatures. I don't believe that was part of his declaration. I could be wrong. But this issue was not put in front of me squarely to rule on, and I do not recall Dr. Conte's testimony to include who had to sign the form. Am I wrong?

MR. LINDER: You're right. And I did not mean to suggest, Your Honor, that you did squarely opine on that issue. Our concern really stems from reopening this issue five months after a final order was entered where despite the arguments of counsel, everyone had the opportunity to appear at the bar date hearing. It's argued that this was an inappropriate provision of the proof of claim form. Now, five months later we're faced with -- and one month out from the bar date, we're faced with the request to materially change the signature requirement on the proof of claim form.

THE COURT: Yeah, but I don't know that the parties get to negotiate the signature of the form. Why do

the parties get to negotiate a deviation from the rule?

MR. LINDER: Again, Your Honor, it's really we do it as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the claims process. You've alluded to the case law that illustrates the nature of the problem which is that by signing a proof of claim form, an attorney is becoming a fact witness. They're attesting --

THE COURT: They might be. They might be and they may be subject to a deposition. So they ought to think long and hard before they sign that proof of claim form. I don't know, because I haven't ruled onit, but I found those -- whoever cited that case, it looks kind of interesting.

MR. LINDER: And our concern, Your Honor, going back to the first statement that I made, we are focused on delivering equitable and timely contribution to the holders of valid survivor claims. And if you play this process out, we could have thousands, maybe even tens of thousands of attorneys signing proofs of claims and putting themselves in a position where they could be deposed as to the contents of that. I could see that very easily having -- posing major issues for the administration of a potential settlement trial.

We're focused on efficiency, we think this deviation, if you will, from the default rule under official Form 410 is not only permissible, we think it actually

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advances that goal of making sure that survivors who have valid claims proceed timely and equitable contribution for compensation. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINDER: And it's not without precedent, Your Honor, I would just note parenthetically in this circuit or in this district on --THE COURT: What precedent is there? There were orders that were submitted, I have no idea that any judge actually ruled on this issue. All I got was a string of orders. MR. LINDER: That's right, Your Honor, it's not without example is a more precise way to put it. THE COURT: Okay. So there's no precedent. MR. LINDER: To my knowledge, no Court has considered squarely whether or not it is permissible to alter the default rule on official Form 410, that attorneys be permitted to sign. THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything further, Mr. Linder? MR. LINDER: No, Your Honor. I'd let the other objectors (inaudible). THE COURT: Thank you. Let me hear from other objectors.

MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, it's Tan Schiavoni for

Century. Rule 9009 authorizes the Court to use forms, quote, with alterations as may be appropriate. There's at least two circuits that have looked at that and said that's allowed alterations. In re; Robins is one such case in the Fourth Circuit 862 F 2d 1092. Eagle Pitcher is another case out of Ohio, Rule 3001-A likewise contemplates that a proof of claim form may deviate from 3001-A. It doesn't say there must be a signature from an attorney, it says the Court may accept if it's either the signature — it gives the Court the option of accepting the signature from the claimant or from the attorney.

There is authority that we've cited to you of other courts, in re; Arch Diocese of New Orleans is an example of the Court entered an order of authorizing a proof of claim form that requires the abuse -- the abuse claimant to sign.

Another case is Arch Diocese of Harrisburg. And Your Honor, you know it's plain what's going on here, it's like there was a -- it's something, there was a back-and-forth between the TCC and the debtors in advance of the bar date order. The insurers weren't part of those negotiations, I think we made clear in the bar date order. But the whole bar date hearing was about, in essence, these questions that are posed, are they really adequate to deliver sort of a presumptive validity for these claims.

And the Court overruled us on that, we wanted more questions, but the debtor in the TCC in advancing to the Court that what it had was enough specifically pointed the Court to the fact that the proofs of claim would be signed under oath and that these questions would be verified under oath. And Your Honor, you took note of that on the record at that hearing, it's on I think Page 70, Lines 9 through 14 where you noted that (inaudible) proof of claim form, I can look at it and understand it, it is what the claimant has alleged and sort of (inaudible). And if it's signed under oath and otherwise meets the requirement that it's a valid proof of claim.

And obviously, the Court can change its mind and maybe the Court meant other things, but what's more important is what prompted, I believe, that comment was the back-and-forth between the parties in making their presentation, the debtors and the TCC were saying look, what we have here as questions are adequate, because in essence, we're going to get verification of the truth of the statement by having it signed by the claimant.

And the form, that's really important, because the form provides on it that the signatory -- and look, I've had the same problem as Your Honor mentioned in private practice, like you know, being presented with these forms at the last minute and signing them and questioning myself about what I'm

actually verifying, but it's very different for someone with
personal knowledge to sign that perjury statement than
somebody who's an attorney, right? Because what the
statement says is that you as the signatory are affirming
with a reasonable belief that the information is true and
correct.

And but these types of claims, if the affirming party is the actual claimant it has (indiscernible) to say that they have a reason to belief the information is true and correct. If it's the attorney, it's a totally different animal, okay.

And if you look at if they don't have personal injury of the fact. All right. If you look at this specific fact we're dealing with here, if we had been able to depose Mr. Kosnoff or Mr. Vanarsdale, I think one of the things we would have pursued is that all of them are solo practitioners, they both claim to have the largest collection of claims among the Coalition.

Mr. Vanarsdale graduated law school in 2018, he owns an advertising company, he is a solo practitioner. The office he claims to have is just a storefront. With Mr. Kosnoff, the only office he listed is in Houston, there's another one that's in a marina in Puerto Rico. He's not licensed in either of those states. One's a mail drop, the other's a condo.

There's nobody -- any notion that there's people verifying that those two lawyers are verifying the largest number of claims so that they can assert under a reasonable belief that they're accurate is just -- it defies ascription to think that that's really what's happening here.

So this has -- it has impact, it has a real impact on the proofs of claim, especially in the context that the Court saw what the advertising has said that has led to this massive increase of claims that what they've asserted,

Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale -- not asserted, it's like in their Gateway Web site where all the advertising channels them is that you don't have to appear in Court, you don't have to be deposed. You can remain anonymous.

You take away the signature requirement and it's like it opens the floodgate to just about anything, okay, coming in the door. And sadly, I think that's what we're going to see. And I think what you had in the back-and-forth in that hearing was some acknowledgment that the debtors and the TCC, the TCC here wearing its fiduciary hats, they're lawyers recognizing this was an important requirement and had some impact here and was valuable to put in place.

And that's what they put in place? The Court had authority to enter the order it did. I don't see, there's been nothing offered that really provides a real basis to reconsider that order. COVID-19 was around then, the notion

that signing the proof of claim provides any real barrier, everybody knew that -- you know, whatever there was, no evidence was put on it then. Many of the Coalition lawyers were in the case at that time and didn't have anything to say about it. But my goodness, like in November it's supposedly 80 million Americans are going to vote by signature ballot by mail. There's no reason that a proof of claim signed by -- you know, signed should get any sort of different type of treatment.

So we'd suggest that the Court, you know, that this is, in fact, an important requirement and that watering it down will open the floodgates, especially in the context of the Court's order that there's presumptive validity. And on the advertising, you sign, you get money, and not linking that to any kind of signature under oath could have just catastrophic effects here. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. You did say, and I think you said this before that the order says something about presumptive validity. The order says nothing about presumptive validity. I think there was something in the order, I took it out. And I did so because — at least I think, if I'm wrong, people can correct me. But the Code provides what the evidentiary effect of filing a proper proof of claim is. I don't decide that, the Code says that and/or maybe the Rules. But so I didn't deviate from the Code or

the Rules with respect to that.

And I agree, there's no new evidence, I agree that this is not COVID related. People have had six months, I believe, to file their proofs of claim. This is a question of what the Rules require. And I think the Rule has been amended since the cases that you cite were decided. The Rule says right now, 9009-A; the official forms prescribed by the judicial conference of the United States shall be used without alteration except as otherwise provided in these Rules in a particular official form or in the national instruction for a particular official form.

Official forms may be modified to permit minor changes not affecting wording or the order of presenting information.

And then it goes on. And I'll be candid, I was not -- I haven't read this rule before. So my concern is that -- is that this isn't a minor change.

But let me hear from other objectors who might want to address that. My concern is this is not a minor change. I share the concerns, Mr. Schiavoni, that you've raised, and that Mr. Linder has raised that -- that lawyers not be signing proofs of claim forms where they have not done the due diligence necessary to sign it.

And if you've had enough communication with your client to fill out this form and the back-and-forths, I'm not

really sure why the client can't sign it, certainly, in some electronic form as I've just indicated it's, you know -- send the form to your client. And yes, I recognize there may be some people who don't have access, I think that is real, I don't discount that, but there may be some people who don't have access to the Internet, although most people have access to phones, but they may not have access to a computer, certainly if they're homeless they may not have access, but that is not going to be the bulk of people, I don't think.

So there should be a way for claimants to sign these -- the proofs of claim form. And if we get a thousand signatures by an attorney on proofs of claim forms filed at the last minute, I think that raises questions. I just think it does and we're going to have to deal with it. So I don't advise that, but what I'm really struggling with is the Rule; is an attorney encompassed in this authorized agent in Rule 3001, I guess, or is that really more thinking about how you would necessarily think of an authorized agent, rather than it doesn't say attorney, it says authorized agent.

Although I think I had the proof of claim form, I don't know what I did with it, but the official form. But my big concern is that it doesn't look like I'm supposed to deviate from the Rule.

MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor, I think these two cases I cited, the Diocese of Harrisburg, Mr. Ruggeri may actually

have the dates for it. Mr. (Inaudible) and the Arch Diocese, the bulk cases in the last year to year and a half. I -- I don't have the specific dates right in front of me, perhaps he does, and he can tell you, but they're not agent cases.

THE COURT: But did they decide it? Is it just orders? Because they may be like me, these judges may be like me, they never read the Rule, they didn't know this rule existed.

MR. GOODMAN: The Court had entered the orders, that's possible.

THE COURT: Yeah. They may be better than me, they may have all the rules memorized, but you know.

MR. SCHIAVONI: But Judge, I think the one thing those courts shared in common with you is that you were asked to deviate from the -- from the official form, as were those courts, to put in these questions.

And the question is, you know, like here it was very clear that like the nature of the questions were dovetailing with -- the modifications allowing the questions were dovetailing with the request that the order itself say that the signatory be the claimant.

The two were tied together.

THE COURT: Yeah, you may not want to go there. You just may not want to go there with that argument given the Rule 9009.

MR. LINDER: Your Honor, it's Matt Linder again 1 2 for the debtors, if I may? THE COURT: Sure. 3 4 MR. LINDER: You know, I would note, Your Honor, 5 that prior to 2012 it was a requirement that the official 6 Form 410 that an attorney signature be accompanied by 7 evidence of the authorization of that attorney to sign on behalf of its client. The form was amended in 2012 to renew 8 that as a requirement. You know, I would suggest, Your 9 10 Honor, that you're inclined to grant the motion by the 11 Coalition it was -- it's removed as a requirement that proof be provided, but it didn't prescribe as a fact under the 12 circumstances comparable to (inaudible). 13 So I would suggest, Your Honor, that if possible 14 15 the Third Circuit Law be clear here that in order to file a claim on behalf of a client, an attorney needs to have 16 17 expressed authorization before filing the claim, or that it 18 needs to be ratification of that act prior to the bar date. 19 That's the WR (inaudible) decision that was affirmed by the 20 Third Circuit. I could give you a pin cite if you need it, 21 Your Honor. 22 It is 356 BR 302 and that was affirmed at 316 23 Federal Appendix 134. 24 THE COURT: Give me that again, 36 --25 MR. LINDER: 316 Federal Appendix 134 is the Third

1 Circuit decision, but the underlying Bankruptcy Court 2 decision at 366 BR 302. THE COURT: Okay. That's not a precedential 3 4 decision though, but okay. Because it's in the Federal 5 Appendix. MR. LINDER: It was affirmed by the District 6 7 Court, Your Honor, that on the way up. But --8 THE COURT: Sure. 9 MR. LINDER: -- in any event, we would just suggest that is an alternative to assure -- to assuage part 10 of our concern. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. So say that again for me. prior to 2012, the official proof of claim form required 13 proof of authorized agency be attached; is that what you're 14 15 saying? Did I get that right? 16 MR. LINDER: That's correct, Your Honor. That was 17 an expressed requirement as noted in parentheses right under 18 the check box as to what kind of a signer was executing the proof of claim. 19 20 THE COURT: In the --21 MR. LINDER: As a requirement after 2012. 22 THE COURT: Well, doesn't that tell us that they 23 wanted to make it easier? 24 MR. LINDER: I think, Your Honor, in this case,

you know what we've outlined in the signature box in the

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survivor proof of claim is that the only instance where a 1 2 non-claimant can execute is where the claimant is deceased or incapacitated or is a minor. I think my supposition, Your 3 Honor, is that Congress didn't likely have -- the Rules 4 5 Committee didn't have mass tort abuse cases in line when it amended the Rule. 6 THE COURT: You guys just really don't want to go 7 here. You are going the wrong way on this. You are going 8 the total wrong way on this. I don't know why you don't 9 10 understand that. Mr. Ruggeri, do you have anything to add? MR. RUGGERI: I'm a little nervous about adding 11 12 anything now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: (Laughing)

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MR. RUGGERI: I would add, Mr. Schiavoni's right with regard to the order entered in the Harrisburg case. It was this year in 2020. It was this --

THE COURT: But did the judge who entered it -- I forget who's sitting in Harrisburg now, it's not Judge France anymore, it's -- but did the judge sitting there, rule on this issue? Or just entered as agreed- upon order?

MR. RUGGERI: Yeah, I can't represent one way or the other on that issue. I do think it's worth mentioning that these claims are different, obviously, than your typical commercial claims in that there's no requirement to provide documentation which serves sort of as an evidentiary basis,

if you will, for your claim. And we're not going to go down that path, but it's important that the one affirming that's really what we have in terms of the proof of the claim.

Simple math. 28,000 divided by 11 firms as we've heard today, it's 2,500 per law firm. And then the other point I would make is, as I think the Court recognized, that there's no evidentiary basis for the speculation that any survivor is going to be left behind or that the survivors who don't have access to iPhones or computers don't have access to mail. I think that is just supposition and speculative.

I think that the bar date order, all of the notice that's gone out is making sure that there is no legitimate or alleged survivors that's going to be left behind here. And I don't think we need to change the process that's put in place now. What I think is important to have that, if you will, affirmation by the claimant particularly the nature of these claims. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, I hear that, and I think it's fair. And it concerns me if I'm going to have, as I said, a thousand claims signed by a particular lawyer. And I think that lawyer ought to be concerned about what impact that could have on his -- on his clients.

MR. RUGGERI: And Your Honor, I will say -- not to get ahead of ourselves, but we see how much the lawyers relish being deposed. It's not easy for us to get the

lawyers to represent these claimants on other issues to agree to sit through depositions as you are going to hear from Mr. Schiavoni in a little bit.

THE COURT: I think that's fair, except now they've signed something under penalty of perjury not just as a lawyer, but they've signed something under penalty of perjury. I view those as two different things which is why I did not sign proofs of claim forms.

Mr. Buchbinder, do you as Trustee have a position?

MR. BUCHBINDER: Your Honor, Dave Buchbinder,

again, for the record on behalf of the US Trustee. And our

response we noted the ambiguity between the bar date order

and the official form, but we did not take a position on how

the Court should rule, but it would be helpful for the estate

to clarify the issue.

I've been working on official Form 410 as we speak, too, Your Honor. An official Form 410 at the signature box Part 3 says it can be signed by the creditor, creditor's attorney or authorized agent, by a trustee or by a guarantor, and at least the warnings or admonitions on Part 3 say the person completing the proof of claim must sign and date it. If you file this claim electronically, FRBP 505 A2 authorizes courts to establish local rules specifying what a signature is.

And finally, in bold type; a person who files a

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fraudulent claim could be fined up to $500,000, imprisoned
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    for up to 5 years or both, 18 USC Sections 152, 157 and 3571.
    And that's the signature block on the official form, Your
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    Honor.
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               I would also note, and I'll ask Mr. Molton or Mr.
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    Lucas to correct me. I have the Takata case in this district
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    and I was on a special team -- or I am on a special team
    involved in the PG&E case. And I don't recall that this
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    issue was problematic in either of those two cases, Your
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    Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, David Molton. Can I
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    respond to that?
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               UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, may I be heard really
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    quick? I just have a few points --
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               THE COURT: Go ahead. Mr. Lucas.
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               MR. LUCAS: Your Honor, just a couple of comments.
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    And I wanted to sort of respond to Your Honor about Your
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    Honor's reaction to the other orders that were entered in
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    other cases and where you said they were agreed orders.
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    Movants here are treating this as if it was a surprise.
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    I think that sort of not true. Because Mr. Kosnoff,
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   Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Goldbar (phonetic) were all the leaders
    of abuse in scouting were at the table and providing comments
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literally to the proof of claim form in connection with the

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negotiation with the final form.

In the end, the form was adjudicated and ultimately approved by the Court in the form in which we see it. But Your Honor, to single out the signature line as sort of only provision, it was not a decision that was disputed, but this was a package, Your Honor. This was a 12-page package that was really hard fought over six to eight weeks of Mr. (indiscernible) and that it is the committee -- the tort claims committee finds as sort of unusual that the same attorneys, not only participated in the form relation of the form and approved the whole form as it went before the Court, are now standing here complaining about the very thing that they had approved before.

That's it, Your Honor. And oh, one other thing,
Your Honor. If you look at the claim register, the date, the
law firm under the Movant here, have already filed thousands
of these claims using electronic execution. And it doesn't
really seem to be a problem for them to do what they're doing
today. Nothing further, Your Honor, unless you have
questions.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Goodman.

MR. GOODMAN: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. First off, the question was posed about the PG&E bankruptcy case. I feel like this is a bit of an unfair quiz to give to me, because again, I was one of the authors contributing to

drafting the proof of claim in that case for the tort victim.

Rule 9009-A was very much a concern that we had in that case,
which is why, one, the attorney's signature is permitted on
the claim form that was approved by the Court for tort
victims.

And again, we also in the motion that the tort committee filed indicated that the tort victims, if they wanted to, should be permitted to use the official Form 410, which, as Mr. Buchbinder just pointed out, in Part 3 explicitly permits attorneys or authorized agents to sign the form.

We did look very carefully at the New Orleans case. That order was actually entered two weeks ago, just hours after we filed our motion on this issue. We went through and we reviewed all of the pleadings in that case, and we could not identify anything to indicate to us that the counsel had flagged this issue for the Court. I guess on that point, someone could just as easily walk into the Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana and present your order to that judge indicating that this is all fine and good.

The Arch Diocese of Harrisburg case, that order actually was entered 12 days before the May 18th hearing on the bar date motion. We also went through and reviewed the record in relation to that order as well. And we did not find any indication that this issue was, in fact, flagged for

the bankruptcy court in that case. The one case that we did find that may be somewhat on point, there was recently a published opinion entered in the Buffalo case where the Court recently rejected the use of a claim form for sexual abuse survivors on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the official form, and therefore, violated Rule 9009-A.

And again, as the Court pointed out, 9009-A as amended in 2017, now explicitly states that the official form prescribed in the judicial conference of the United States shall be used without alteration, and of course, an alteration that would affect a change in wording such as knocking out the explicit wording in Section 3 that permits attorneys' signatures would be an impermissible change.

I'm not going to go back and talk about -- I'm sorry, I'm blanking on their names Mr. Schiavoni probably knows them better than I do. Mr. Vanarsdale and Mr. Kosnoff, I just view that as a distraction, Your Honor, but I want to close on this point. We are not defending anyone who is not doing their job. I am not here to help anyone who is not doing their job.

If there is improper conduct by any attorney, then they're going to have to face the consequences for those actions. I am simply here advocating for compliance for Federal Bankruptcy Rules. And someone can take this transcript and they can send it to my friend Andy Vera and

let him know that I stood up here today and I said these things.

And again, it's a meaningful thing in this case, you know, the statement that was made by Mr. Linder about tort claimants versus commercial claimants, there's no distinction in the rules, there's nothing in the rules that say that they don't apply to tort victims. And again, I — this may end up being a nonissue for the vast majority of claimants to come in in this case, but for the ones where it does matter, it matters.

These are victims of sexual abuse, Your Honor.

And if someone retains counsel just before the bar date, they give them all the information, they provide them with the requisite authority, and they cannot get the claim signature in to the attorney in time, that attorney should be given the right and should have the right to sign that claim form on behalf of their client just as the Bankruptcy Rules say.

And again, if it matters to one person, it matters. It matters. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Well, I'm going to permit the signing of a proof of claim by a lawyer who is authorized to do so. And I'm doing it because of Rule 9009, which would seem to give me very little option on that front. This does not have anything to do with there being evidence, because I have none that people -- that claimants cannot

themselves sign the proof of claim form.

This was not an issue I focused on at the hearing, and consistent with my ruling that a proof of claim form has the effect that it has, based on the Rules in the Code. And I don't make up the rules, I don't make up this rule either. I don't think the parties -- I understand the parties negotiated, I also understand that members who are now lawyers who are now part of the Coalition may have been involved in those negotiations.

So it does seem a little ironic and perhaps maybe unfair that they're bringing the issue up now.

But nonetheless, I'm looking at the Rules. And they permit signature by an attorney, no matter how ill-advised that practice might be and no matter what consequence that might have in terms of a future deposition of that attorney, or what it might mean with respect to that client's claim or attorney-client privilege. I am not making any rulings on those, but the rule permits it. So I will.

And if I were that attorney, notwithstanding what I just said about authorized e-signature, I'd have that authority witnessed, which also might suggest that the client could sign the proof of claim form. I don't know that I focused on the order that was provided or that any parties focused on the order.

Mr. Goodman, why don't you circulate that order

among counsel and see if there's any comment and then submit 1 2 it under certification, but it should be simple. It should 3 be simple. MR. GOODMAN: We'll do our best. Thank you. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you. * 12 MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor, Derek Abbott from Morris 6 7 Nichols again. Moving along the agenda, the next motion is 8 docket item -- excuse me, Agenda Item Number 12 which is Century's motion to compel depositions. So once again, I'll 9 10 turn it over to Mr. Schiavoni. THE COURT: Okay. I'd like 5 minutes. So let's 11 12 take a recess for 5 minutes, please. 13 (Pause) MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor, Derek Abbott again. That 14 15 does bring us to Agenda Item Number 12, Century's motion to 16 compel depositions. So I'll turn it over to them. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, we brought a motion to 19 compel and then the Coalition responded to it. Also there's a 20 separate motion to quash by Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale. 21 As a threshold matter, one of the most revealing 22 things here is that the motion is opposed by not really by 23 Mr. Vanarsdale but by the Coalition itself. Mr. Kosnoff and

Mr. Vanarsdale are founders of the Coalition. Mr. Kosnoff

hold themselves out as such on video that's posted on the

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Internet but has since been taken down. This is signed either he or Mr. Vanarsdale (inaudible) didn't sign the stipulation that was submitted last night by the Coalition that makes various assertions or makes various agreements, so to speak, with the claimant that are offered to sort of move the objections to their 2019 applications.

They represent, these two, what appears to be the largest group of the Coalition claims, at least 9,000 if not more claims. Each of them are solo practitioners. If my fellow counsel could just put up on the video their intention agreement, which is exhibited — if you could see on there they sort of held themselves out under the title of AIS, as if it's sort of a law firm or not law firm but kind of like an entity working for Boy Scouts.

They then list their current -- they list themselves like large law firms often do, they list different offices, like my firm has Chicago, New York -- -- I guess we don't have Chicago, but we have Los Angeles, New York. They list themselves that way as if they're all members that they're sort of separate offices of AIS, but and then they describe the firm as Kosnoff and ABA group with comments between them basically one law firm or one entity. But in fact, it's three separate firms with three separate groups of claimants with Kosnoff and Vanarsdale having the largest group.

Not only did they not find the stipulation that was submitted last night and they say that claimants still part of the Coalition just that they've resigned. But they haven't disclosed what they resigned from, okay. They have -- none of the documents explain what, quote, positions they had with the group. That suggests to us that key documents about how the Coalition is organized, and the financials haven't been disclosed. Because they've asserted that they're not, quote, members in the first place. So the resignation would have sort of impact.

The other thing they haven't disclosed are the cocounsel agreements through which they can represent clients
in states other than where they are located. Critically,
Mr. Kosnoff lists his office, you'll see in that letter,
Puerto Rico. And on his Web site he puts Houston. Neither
of those -- we sent private detectives to the Houston office,
and we also sent servers to the Puerto Rico place. Puerto
Rico is a marina where they're selling like maybe condos.
And the fact -- but it's not a law office, so to speak, even
though it's listed as such, it's held out to the public as
such.

The Houston address is just a mail drop.

It doesn't appear that they're members of the bar,
Mr. Kosnoff, in either of those locations where they hold
themselves out as having offices. It's illegal in Texas to

hold one's self out for a Texas office as being a practicing member of the Bar when they're not. I think the Rule's going to be the same in Puerto Rico or certainly kind of a concern.

In Mr. Vanarsdale's case, he -- as I indicated, indicates that on his Web site that he graduated the Bar in 2018. He represents these (inaudible) in these ads thousands and thousands of claimants, but there's no record of him ever trying a case or actually doing -- personally appearing in any kind of action. When you run a search on him, it comes up that he does own an advertising company, and he's owned it for years. So it appears to really own the advertising company that has run a lot of the ads, which the ads have been run themselves.

The (indiscernible) that the e-mail that we had from Mr. Kosnoff makes a number of assertions that indicate that there's a range of voting lock-up agreement that he somehow controls it, that he's deployed that in various ways and he proposes to deploy it. We've heard all kinds of mea culpas about that e-mail today and suggestions about what it is and what it isn't. But without deposing Mr. Kosnoff, these are just -- you know, it's just lawyer advocacy, okay.

It's like all of that material is relevant directly to their 2019 submission, you know, speaking of whether or not they've -- because their clients are both members of this group. And you could apply each of those

elements of 2019 to them and say how -- how do they qualify, and it's clear there's information missing with respect to (inaudible).

We made efforts -- when we went to the Coalition and said we want to depose them, we were told first, like gee, they're not parties, you have to subpoen them. They gave us addresses. The address turned out -- we got the Houston, turns out to be a mail drop, (inaudible) serve them. Mr. Vanarsdale addresses a storefront in San Diego that we were given by the Coalition and it's closed. There's nothing there.

We also sent someone by what appears to be his home, and no one would come to the door. So either he's not really there or he sort of ducked service. Since then, they filed a notice of appearance through David Wilks stating in the notice, that they're, quote, parties of interest in the case in which -- and they are. I mean, they're -- the submission of their letter agreement indicates that they hold a very significant dollar amount of the claim of the claimants themselves and they have a huge financial interest in these claims.

They cited case law on the motion to dismiss that says you don't need a subpoena for someone who is a party in the case. They themselves filed something saying they are a party. So we thought the notice that we served was adequate

in light of that filing.

Mr. Wilks is a terrific lawyer, we met and conferred with us on this, but what I would -- and he will make a long presentation about how somehow we delayed in deposing Mr. Kosnoff, et cetera, but here's the bottom line. It was obviously after the last year that the 2019 had to be amended. We knew it was going to be amended, and we made it clear that we wanted to depose Mr. Kosnoff after it was amended. What the Coalition did was, they purported to offer us a date before they filed the 2019 amendment so that would have made the deposition -- it would have completely frustrated the deposition to depose these fellows without the amended statement.

But besides that, you know, the other thing that happened was they hung all kinds of conditions on them appearing, that we had to almost essentially give them the question outline of what we were asking about. When, look, if we ask anything privileged it was, you know, clearly, they're lawyers, they're all lawyers.

They could have invoked privilege and we could move on, but they wanted agreements on that up front. But the main thing here was we needed (inaudible) after we got the amendment.

The Coalition waived it until the very last day to make that amendment. They made it (inaudible) when otherwise

briefs were required before this hearing, they then -- we went back to them and said in advance of that notice that they -- for the Friday after when we suspected they would file it, which was the last day.

Then they told us, no, he's not going to appear and that's when, you know, we moved immediately to compel, they moved to quash.

The information on this is -- it goes beyond -- it's important. It goes to like the substance of the (inaudible) really, ultimately where the case would go. And it's essential for the 2019 issue.

Whatever the Court decides to do with the 2019 issue with, in a sense, the larger Coalition, it's -- a deposition with respect to these two fellows is key with respect to their 9,000 claims that are in the Coalition.

I would tell you, Your Honor, that it's important to whether or not the Coalition 2019 should be allowed to go forward. Again, we don't want to hold up anything in the mediation, the Coalition lawyers, the individual -- they're all talking to the mediators, that can continue. If you want a stipulation that somehow (indiscernible) we'll even engage in that. But that is -- it's a total red herring that any of this is holding up the mediation.

In the entire history of the mediation I've had three audiences with the two mediators, both very short. And

it's, you know, we are not in weekly contact like Brown
Rudnick is with the mediators. They are fully exercising
their ability to talk to them. I would ask that we could be
permitted to go ahead with the depositions and that
Mr. Kosnoff disclose where he is, because we have -- we have
sent servers through the Caribbean.

We actually thought we might catch him because he's alleged to be on a very large boat in the Caribbean. We thought we might catch him in a port in Puerto Rico, but he eluded us, I think, in that regard. But we'd depose him in person or if he has COVID concerns, we could do it, you know, electronically. But we ask your permission to go forward with that. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Wilks.

MR. WILKS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to start by addressing some questions that I think were bothering Your Honor this morning. Your Honor pondered questions about what precipitated Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale to resign from the Coalition? And were those resignations bona fide, were they legitimate? I've been waiting for hours, Your Honor, to answer those questions and I'd like to do that right now.

This case is about victims, Your Honor, this case is about victims of sexual abuse that had occurred to children; that's what's important in this case. The insurers

have seized upon a confidential e-mail which never should
have been made public, which expressed an attorney's views on
how to best advance his client's interest. And this morning
Your Honor said there's nothing nefarious about that. That's
what we're all supposed to do for a living.

I mean, smart lawyers, experienced lawyers, aggressive lawyers should in every complex case have different views and air them. And good lawyers do air their viewpoints with each other, at least I hope they do, because we're supposed to do that.

Well, here, the insurance companies have seized on that as some sort of smoking gun of some sort of awful intent. And they're using that and my clients as time-wasting distractions, Your Honor. Seeing that that's what the insurance companies are doing, putting their clients first, the victims in this case first, my clients took themselves out of the equation.

If they're the ones that are getting in the way of progress towards a 2019 statement being approved, they'll step aside and they'll get out of the way, and that's what they did. They put their claimant clients first.

Your Honor, you've heard a lot today, it's imperative that we get in case moving toward a resolution, an effective mediation is imperative to help that along. My clients took themselves out of the way. They resigned from

the Coalition. That's why they resigned and they're not going to call the shots from behind some curtain somewhere, because that might frustrate that purpose. They are not on the Coalition's calls, they don't participate in Coalition correspondence, they have no voting authority, they're not calling the shots for anyone except their clients.

Make no mistake, Your Honor, of course, these are advocates, these are lawyers in a case. They will continue, of course, to represent their clients. They're not going to be calling the shots for anyone else's clients. So I hope that puts Your Honor's questions to rest, because that's exactly what's going on here.

Mr. Schiavoni seems to give me a lot more credit than I'm entitled to, I think. He thinks that I've coordinated all this with the Coalition and timed it with the filing of an amended 2019 statement. I had nothing to do with that. I've never represented the Coalition; I've never done anything for the Coalition.

I represent two individuals, and those two individuals are lawyers in this lawsuit who have been sort of targeted now for deposition as a sideshow.

The timing of the depositions -- I offered my clients for deposition. I gave dates certain and times certain for Mr. Schiavoni to take those depositions. I took it upon myself to lay out some ground rules so that we

wouldn't have one of these obnoxious depositions that we all know about where everyone is asking questions that call for privileged information or confidential information. They're instructed not to answer, transcripts and videotapes go to the Court, it's a wasteful exercise.

So I laid out what I thought was a great set of boundaries for a deposition. I put them up on dates and times certain. And the insurance companies ignored it. They completely ignored that. They didn't respond at all. The day before the first date that I had offered, I reached out to them, said hey, I assume you're not going forward. And by the way, as you know, my guys had resigned from the Coalition so there's really no reason to go forward anyway.

It was then that we restart this conversation.

But it seems clear, Your Honor, these are not depositions that the insurance companies actually subsequently want to take. And I'll kind of tell you why I think that. There's a few reasons. First and foremost, the first time they demanded the depositions before I was involved in the case, which is the reason I became involved in the case, they asked for depositions on the Friday -- the Friday evening of Labor Day weekend and noticed them for the day after Labor Day.

So you get it on Friday night of a holiday weekend, you're supposed to show up for a deposition on that Tuesday. That's just not a serious way to proceed if you

actually do want to take a deposition. At least that's not the way I've ever practiced in my 30 years. I've never seen anybody else do it that way either.

Your Honor, in short really, the recitations in this lengthy, lengthy motion to compel really have nothing to do with what's at issue before you, Your Honor. The Coalition's amended 2019, I think there's been a supplement to seem to answer all the questions that were raised in the motion to compel. There's a lot of innuendo about unethical conduct, I think that 2019 answers that also. So really here, there's lots of distracting extraneous debris on the road to keeping this thing moving forward.

Century wants desperately, it seems, to delay these proceedings and keep the Coalition from participating in the mediation; that's above my pay grade. I don't have anything to do with that. What I have to do with is the propriety of deposing opposing counsel in a case; that's what this is about. There seems to be some question of whether or not Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale are actually opposing counsel to the insurance companies.

Well, listening to this today and the way that my clients have been kind of run up and down, it sure seems like these are my opponents, Your Honor. It seems pretty adversarial to me. I don't think there could be really any question about it.

The case law is actually quite instructive, Your Honor, to depose opposing counsel, which is what these two witnesses are, Century must meet some requirements. They have to come forward with a showing, why? Because this is what the courts call it, these are the drastic measure. Now, I think that's very important to recognize that. This isn't just a deposition. We're allowed a Notice of Deposition under Rule 30 and you'll get some facts from a witness.

These are opposing counsel. And much has been made of the Baron & Budd decision today, Your Honor, and even Mr. Rice spoke this morning -- well, maybe this afternoon.

The Baron & Budd decision has nothing to do with whether or not opposing counsel should be deposed. Mr. Rice's deposition wasn't the subject of that opinion. Really, scope and discovery in the 2019 setting really wasn't discussed too much. The question was whether or not engagement letters should be disclosed. And that court said, yeah, sure, you need to disclose engagement letters. Well, that's not really at issue here, I don't think anymore, Your Honor, because I think Your Honor's already cleaned that up at the last hearing back in September.

So what really are we talking about here? Well, there's three factors that Your Honor is, as the case law suggests, Your Honor, should take into account. The first one is the importance of the information to a central issue

before the Court. How important is the information that Century seeks here to an issue that's actually before Your Honor? That's the first consideration.

The second one is, are there -- is that information available from less-intrusive sources? And the third one is, what harm might befall the victims' representational rights? Well, if we walk through those, the answer to this question becomes awfully clear, I think, Your Honor. I hope you'll see it that way. What really is the central issue before the Court here?

Well, that's -- I'm trying to get my hands around that. If I were to listen to Century and read what they wrote and all the things that they said today, I'd get a lot of different things in mind, but really the only thing before Your Honor seems to me is the 2019 statement. Are these -- is the Coalition, you know, are they -- have they hit the bogie for the 2019 statement? Again, I'm not here to advocate the Coalition's position. I don't represent the Coalition.

But what I can say is that's what is before Your Honor. There's this mediation participation issue. Is this related to that? I don't think so, because my clients aren't involved in the Coalition anymore. We've also heard other topics, you know, Brown Rudnick. How was Brown Rudnick being paid, what is the Coalition, who are the Coalition's decision makers? Well, I've already explained, Your Honor, my clients

are not. Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale have removed themselves from anything having to do with that.

But now, in listening to Mr. Schiavoni a moment ago, now we're talking these lawyers' capabilities. Do they have enough bandwidth to do their job, can they -- should they be able to allowed to sign proofs of claim? What's the nature of their firm? And they have this fascination and have exhausted pages in their motions with, gee, where do these guys work? Is it a marina? There's a fascination with, gee, how are we going to serve them? Your Honor, as soon as I entered my appearance, I mean, they knew how to serve them. They serve me. I represent these individuals and I've made that clear to Mr. Schiavoni a number of times.

They don't need to serve subpoenas, I've never made that a, you know, a requirement here. I said serve me, I'll accept service, don't waste your time on that, Your Honor. So there's other questions of wonder why there's this fascination and how many people are in this hearing are actually working right now in a traditional law firm setting? Very few, I would imagine. Should we all depose each other on that, because we're not working in a traditional law office setting? Of course not. Those aren't reasons to compel a deposition of an attorney, an advocate in a case.

So what's really at issue, Your Honor?

It's the 2019 statement is all that's before Your

Honor that has anything remotely to do with Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale. The question though is how important is the information that they have to that central issue?

And I could tell you, Your Honor, there's nothing that they have that is not subject to confidentiality agreements, be it a common interest agreement or work -- attorney-work product or the attorney-client privilege. There's nothing that Mr. Schiavoni has mentioned today that is in the possession of Mr. Kosnoff or Mr. Vanarsdale. They just haven't identified anything that's important.

But I listen carefully to Mr. Ruggeri's remarks today, and he kept coming back -- Your Honor kept talking about what I'm talking about now, and I'm probably repeating what you said much better, but he kept coming back to this -- what's my absolute fallback. And his fallback was I got to have the bylaws, I got to have the bylaws. That's where the rubber meets the road here. So if the bylaws are where the rubber meets the road here, they certainly don't need a deposition of opposing counsel. That is I think very, very telling, Your Honor. So that's the first factor.

All the sideshow here that Century has discussed really is not important to any of the central issues before Your Honor. Second factor, are there availability of less — is misinformation available by less-intrusive sources? I mean, I just kind of hit that. If the bylaws are so

sacrosanct and so important, maybe that's the solution.

Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale aren't involved in the Coalition anymore, so they aren't a source of information of what's current. Who are the current decision makers at the Coalition? Mr. Kosnoff doesn't know, Mr. Vanarsdale doesn't know. Who filled their role? They don't know. They are not the best source they are not even a competent source now. They were made available for depositions while they were a potential source of information like that, that they didn't take them up on. He didn't — they weren't really interested in taking that deposition. Well, now, these two individuals are no longer competent sources of current information. So their deposition, you know, doesn't meet their second consideration.

And third, Your Honor, what's the harm to these two individuals 'clients' representational rights? And everyone here knows the attorney-client privilege is the most sacrosanct of all privileges. It'd be invaded with, I think, just about every question I could think of that would be relevant to any kind of relevant inquiry here. If they were subjected to deposition, their adversary seeks information, their adversary's trying to limit their clients' recovery here.

So what kind of questions are they going to ask that are not privileged? There really is nothing, Your

Honor, that would not jeopardize their client's representational rights. And I'll just close with just a real practical thought, Your Honor. We've all been involved in a lot of depositions over the years, I suppose, and sometimes they get off the rails and sometimes they're court ordered and sometimes you go to a court-ordered deposition and just wind up going back to court.

Your Honor, if Mr. Schiavoni hasn't yet nailed down all the topics for his deposition, I've asked him for now six weeks or so, tell me what you want to ask my clients, just give me subject areas, and I haven't gotten an answer. Today we got more and more answers. If we don't know what the scope of this deposition's going to be, Your Honor, I hate to tell you, but I think we're going to be back before you with an ugly transcript, and it's just going to be an unworkable wasteful mess. Maybe that's what my opponents are after.

I'm asking, Your Honor, don't let that happen.

Let's not let this sideshow distract from what really needs to get done in this case. Deposition of opposing counsel is a drastic measure. The other side has not really made much of an effort to meet or even address any of those three criteria, those three considerations. So Your Honor, I would ask that Your Honor deny the motion to compel and grant our motion to quash this notice and for a protective order

preventing these two depositions. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wilks.

Mr. Schiavoni?

MR. SCHIAVONI: Your Honor, we attached to our motion our papers excerpts from Mr. Kosnoff's Web site where he holds himself out to the public as no longer practicing law and is instead serving as a, quote, media consultant and consultant in mass tort bankruptcies. So you know, it's a bit much for an attorney to uphold the protections of the opposing counsel rule, and at the same time claim that he doesn't have any continued role in the cases. So I don't think those standards apply. There are direct and material issues here about 2019 C2B whether those have been complied with here.

The fact that he hasn't signed the stipulation that was signed last night by the other members of the Coalition itself causes issues, and you know, even if one applied the standard for practicing looking for someone who's, quote, opposing counsel, the e-mail that he's authored which has been made public, there was no effort made to claw it back. There's a waiver on it now and nothing else, it provides more than a basis to go forward with his deposition.

If for any reason the Court decides not to allow this discovery, and this discovery was critical in Baron &

Budd, the District Court cites to Mr. Rice's deposition testimony in the -- in the -- in its actual decision, because without it, it was -- you know giving a list of questions that one would be asked, one doesn't know what hasn't been disclosed. It's sort of the whole point here.

You know, it's why we moved affirmatively for an order under 2019 CB2 that all disclosable economic interests be disclosed. Without that, there's no real way to know what's been held back. But in the email itself, they talk about raising money from, quote, mother funders. What the interlocking ties and whether or not those parties all have interests as part of a lock-up agreement to tie the votes, without a deposition, I don't think we're going to get to the bottom of it. The next best thing would be an order requiring all disclosable economic interests to be put out.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. I'm hearing somebody's computer probably. Mr. Abbott, is that the conclusion of our agenda, or we have a status conference?

MR. ABBOTT: There is a quick status conference,
Your Honor. I'm going to just assume, unless the parties
chime in that what we just heard was both 12 and 13; 13 being
Mr. Kosnoff's motion for protective order to which I think,
again, two sides of the same coin. But if the Court wishes
to hear further on that or Mr. Wilks has something to add,

that would have been the next agenda item.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WILKS: Thanks, Your Honor. I feel content that I've said my say, you know, I think

Mr. Schiavoni and I could probably go back and forth for another few hours, but Your Honor's had a long day. So let me be the first to spare you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I will consider those two together. Okay. So let's have our status conference.

MR. ABBOTT: Your Honor, it's not clear as I sit here, that the parties necessarily feel it's necessary, but I'll just defer quickly to Mr. Andolina who is a little closer to it than I.

MR. ANDOLINA: Good afternoon, Your Honor, thanks for your time today. Michael Andolina, White and Case on behalf of the Debtors. Judge, I think we gave you the status of the adversary proceeding in the very first moments of the hearing today which feels about like three months ago, I'm sure, for everyone, especially for Your Honor. But we do have until October 22nd. We're hopeful to make significant progress and come back to the Court with an agreed order extending the preliminary injunction. We already have meetings set up with the TCC, the UCC and the FCR on that issue, and we'll certainly report back to the Court, hopefully well in advance of that deadline.

1 THE COURT: Okay. And notice will get out to the 2 other parties in that litigation with respect to any stipulation? 3 4 MR. ANDOLINA: Correct, Your Honor. That was 5 built into the schedule that Your Honor approved, I think, two status hearings ago. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Great. Anyone else on the 8 status? Okay. Thank you. I am going to review the papers. 9 I think the matters that are outstanding are the 2019 motion, the mediation party, the last two items with respect to 10 depositions of Mr. Kosnoff and Mr. Vanarsdale. And I think 11 they're really all of a piece or at least they're all 12 13 interrelated. So I'm going to review those papers and I will 14 rule probably not tomorrow, more likely Friday, and you'll be 15 contacted for a time. 16 MR. ABBOTT: Okay, Your Honor. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: That's the rule. 18 MR. ABBOTT: That's better said for today. 19 THE COURT: Okay, thank you all. We're adjourned. 20 (Proceedings concluded at 4:58 p.m.) 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION We, Carmel Martinez and Wendy Sawyer, do certify that we were authorized to and did listen to and transcribe the foregoing recorded proceedings and that the transcript is a true record to the best of our abilities. Dated this 16th day of October, 2020. /s/ Carmel Martinez October 16, 2020 Carmel Martinez TX CSR No. 8128 FL FPR No. 1065 /s/ Wendy Sawyer October 16, 2020 Wendy Sawyer, CDLT